ROOM FOR POSSIBILITIES: JAMES JOYCE
AND THE RHETORICAL WORK OF FICTION

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ABSTRACT

Room For Possibilities: James Joyce and the Rhetorical Work of Fiction
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The resurgence of interest in James Joyce's politics over the past decades reveals Joyce as a politically astute, if not active, writer. But Joyce's politics were never easily codifiable or traceable to a set of ideologically fixed positions. Instead, this dissertation argues, Joyce uses the novel as a space where political debate can be dramatized, and the novel becomes a form of deliberative rhetoric regarding future possibilities. For Joyce, the practices of rhetoric and aesthetics are complexly intertwined and interdependent, though they remain, in many ways, oppositional and contrary. Joyce and other modernist writers often viewed rhetoric as a discursive form that limited rather than expanded possibilities. But at other moments, Joyce presses rhetoric into the service of aesthetic (and vice-versa) since deliberative rhetoric and poetics (as defined by Aristotle) both attend to the possibilities of future action.

This dissertation traces Joyce's evolution from a young socialist writer engaged in rhetorical experiments with the essay to his later dramatization of Irish political oratory in *Ulysses.* Joyce began his career as a self-described "socialist artist" in 1904, but would consciously eschew socialism within the next few years. This dissertation locates Joyce's early political rhetoric in his essay "A Portrait of the Artist" and the abandoned novel *Stephen Hero* as unconscious remainders reemerging in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.* In the later text, aesthetics attempt to replace rhetoric as a means of creating radical materialist consciousness, but the later text also re-incorporates and reimagines its earlier incarnations. The earlier texts remain as "symptoms" around which the later is written. Drawing on the definitions of "symptom" in psychoanalytic and Marxist theoretical practice, this dissertation argues that *A Portrait of the*

Artist functions as a text because it includes, even though it attempts to rewrite, the political and rhetorical work of its antecedents.

In crafting the "Aeolus" chapter of *Ulysses,* Joyce returns to the art of rhetoric to dramatize the arguments surrounding Irish labor, politics, and language in 1904 Dublin. Unlike his work in *A Portrait of the Artist,* Joyce presents oratory as a staging ground for reasoned debate and discussion regarding the future course of Irish history. Whereas rhetoric was an unconscious remainder of socialist politics in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,* rhetoric is consciously applied in the work of the characters in the episode who are preoccupied with the consequences of the Irish language movement and middle-class industrialization.

This dissertation ultimately argues against positions that view rhetoric as a weak surrogate for aesthetics or as a discursive limitation that must be overcome for aesthetics to produce valuable contemplative effects. Aesthetics in Joyce's fiction has productive rhetorical purposes: to lead readers to contemplate false oppositions, consider the means by which history is produced, to attend to the process of political decision-making, and to deliberate about the consequences of actions.

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Philadelphia
Wichita
Istanbul

To Barbara.
For making everything
that
much
better.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Of the many lessons lavished upon me in the past, [...] two have left me with a deep impression: that one should never tire of considering the same phenomena again and again (or of submitting to their effects), and that one should not mind meeting with contradiction on every side provided one has worked sincerely"

—Sigmund Freud
Letter to *Le Disque Vert*

"You have asked me what I would do and what I would not do. I will tell you what I will do and what I will not do."

—Stephen Dedalus
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man

1.1 The Joyce of Text

Despite the well-placed and well-spent efforts of the New Critical practice to distance writers' lives from writers' works, the events of James Joyce's life have become an increasingly important part of the experience of reading Joyce.[1] Surveying the vast works on Joyce, readers encounter anecdotes, personal histories, quotes attributed to Joyce, observations about his habits, jottings from his friends or enemies. Extra-textual materials such as Joyce's own notes, drafts, manuscripts and personal correspondence are commonly used to assess his writing process and as a means to trace the development of his practices. Yet, as New Criticism has warned, reliance on extra-textual material can lead to problematic conclusions, especially when they are used to posit "truer" readings based on authorial intentions. Most often, second-hand information is treated with well-deserved skepticism. Nevertheless, many readers still acknowledge (or reject)

the legitimacy of first-hand conversations to confirm their already extant attitudes about Joyce. In part, the reliance on other materials may be due to the gnomic quality of so much of Joyce's writing. But the effects of this reliance have more wide reaching consequences. Ascribing Joyce's own personal affinities, habits, or political attitudes to his work is already to abandon one of the strongest rhetorical positions grounded in Joyce's writing: the disinterestedness of artists to the works themselves or the indifference of artists to the life-world from which they cull their material.

Is it so alarming to view Joyce, the historical person so regularly lauded as the greatest novelist in the English language (though perhaps equally lambasted as an irritating writer of obfuscating prose), as himself a fascinating text who is assembled through the praxis of reading or through literary and historical criticism? He encouraged this work when he said of *Ulysses*, "I've put so many enigmas and puzzles that it will keep the professors busy for centuries over what I meant, and that's the only way of insuring one's immortality."[2] Even still, many of Joyce's early readers did not recognize his work as "genius."[3] In the process of revising and complicating his works, Joyce invited the investigation into his own practices, and as a side effect, history has invited itself to study Joyce's practices as an immortalizable complicator—the epitome of an inscrutable artificer. And the more inscrutable, the more irresistible Joyce becomes as a subject of inquiry. Nonetheless, though Joyce remains a fascinating historical person, an enigmatic and hyper-intellectual dissident of the *status quo*, Joyce the man appears paler in comparison to the fireworks of his fiction.

Very few writers have produced such polar responses from readers as Joyce. Some readers, like Virginia Woolf and George Bernard Shaw, thought of *Ulysses* as the work of a

vulgar schoolboy or produce of a still more rotten culture. Others like Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot thought of Joyce as a compelling realist who could honestly claim to be a writer of modernity. Yet it was not too very long ago that Patrick Kavanaugh asked "Who Killed James Joyce?" in his acerbic satirical poem.[4] He asked who in the world was responsible for turning the vibrant character of Joyce's comic genius into a bland porridge for cerebral contemplation. And as Kavanaugh laments, it is the graduate students and academicians who have eviscerated the joy from Joyce's work in order to make high-order critical claims about literature, earn degrees, and secure employment. But Kavanaugh's anti-intellectualism isn't fair to the varieties of criticism (especially those which parallel Kavanaugh's sense of humor) that have approached Joyce's work, nor is it consistent with the spirit of Joyce whose words and works have encouraged readers to fruitfully pursue the Ariadne-like threads through the labyrinths of his work. Kavanaugh's poem decries the joy that so many feel intellectually and viscerally about Joyce's work, even if they cannot experience the same precise sensations that Kavanaugh himself may have felt when reading Joyce.

Joyce always considered his literary work *as* work and as something that he should be (well) paid to do. In his youth he envisioned himself as an artist at work and whose work should command a fee. Unfortunately, the social need for his kind of work within the medium of fiction was not as immediate as, say roads or bridges, so Joyce needed to teach English and later rely on other (and others') means for financial assistance throughout his career. An anecdote from a later point in his life regarding the sale of the *Ulysses* manuscript in 1924 illustrates this assertion. When Joyce's American lawyer John Quinn sold the *Ulysses* manuscript at auction for $1975, Joyce was impassive. But when he heard that two poems of George Meredith were

purchased for $1400, he became incensed. He refused to accept his percentage of the manuscript sale, and tried unsuccessfully to repurchase the manuscript from A. S. W. Rosenbach, its purchaser.[5] Luckily for Joyce and his family, by this time he had been receiving financial assistance from his benefactors for years.

Joyce's fiction built his reputation; but from this reputation, history has rebuilt Joyce. From Joyce's death in 1941 to the present, interpretations of Joyce's fictions have evolved along with more far reaching ideological changes within the practice of literary criticism. Because critical paradigms change, so do the objects of study. In this way, because the ideological angles from which readers observe texts change, the texts themselves are also changed. The text itself does not simply reflect the social or political attitudes of its age, and the evolution of criticism witnesses the transformation of Joyce's work. For example, *Ulysses* has not been read in the same ways and in the same contexts in 1942, 1969, and 1999. Also, the Joyce who was lambasted as a degenerate and a pervert by readers in the earlier decades of this century is considered less of a pervert today and more of a keen, brave—even "honest"—observer of human behaviors, sexual or otherwise. I do not want to be mistaken as advocating that contemporary readings are "better" or more highly adapted than the interpretations of previous generations. Instead, I want to suggest first that contemporary readings extend the already elastic trajectories of previous readings; and secondly, that as disciplinary criteria for evaluation and interpretation change, so do readers reconsider which elements of texts warrant study. In other words, new critical approaches open avenues to new territory, and new viewing angles can radically reposition the substance of Joyce's texts. When, in common everyday language, one says, "I am reading Joyce," one is presumed to mean the same thing as "I am reading *Ulysses*" or

"I am reading *Dubliners.*" But the statement "I am reading Joyce" should be understood quite differently. It embodies an equivocation that acknowledges one does not read just *Ulysses* or *Finnegans Wake.* One also reads "Joyce." Joyce is not divorced from his works.

In some measure, the sedimentation of critical modalities has led to sets of identifiable attitudes toward Joyce's oeuvre. Christine van Boheemen-Saaf persuasively locates and articulates a fissure in critical approaches to Joyce. Like most generalities, this divide is imperfect; yet it expresses a set of particular critical approaches that are worth restating. The split, she argues, originates from the ideological consequences of the critical works of Richard Ellmann and Hugh Kenner. As she argues, "the 'Ellmannites' [are] historical, and myth-oriented in their understanding, [and] read Joyce as a humanist genius whose work advocates perennial values; the 'Kennerites' tend to see Joyce as an ironist, a genius with words and literary conventions whose playfulness delights and outwits us. Whereas the 'Ellmannites' tend to see Joyce as Irish, the 'Kennerites' read Joyce as a cosmopolitan who presents the Dublin of 1904 as a modern technological city" (22). This is not a great schism (nor in practice does anyone self-identify as a *de facto* Ellmannite or Kennerite); however, the implications of these critical attitudes have considerable effects.

Both of these positions are tenable.[6] And they are not mutually exclusive. Can we read Joyce as both Irish and cosmopolitan, historical and ironic, myth-oriented and playful, humanist and cunning? And not as a static synthesis of these elements, but as one in which these tensions remain locked in place without accommodating the other? Joyce's texts have a tendency to explode artificial oppositions like these and to rebuild their constituent parts in inventive and atypical amalgamations. It is nearly a critical commonplace to see Joyce as an ironically cunning

and playful Irish cosmopolitan myth-oriented historical humanist. Still, the two positions van Boheeman-Saaf locates also mark the wider differences in methodological approaches. One approach is historically specific, but too often avoids assessing the consequences of linguistic play in Joyce's work; the other is less historically focused, but keenly invested in the multiple resonances of Joyce's unique application of language and narrative. A fusion of the two approaches could yield critically beneficial results if they could assess the critical impasses between irony and history, linguistic play and efficacious rhetorical effects (whether they be liberal humanist, committed socialist or otherwise). I intend to argue against the positions that reject the rhetorical work and rhetorical effects of Joyce's texts, and I intend to do this by exposing the tensions between rhetoric and aesthetics at work in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses*. I will also argue against critical positions that ignore the disambiguating strategies that exist among and beside its ambiguity, and against those that consider an investigation of Joyce's novel as a form of rhetoric an act of violence committed against the wider Joycean project. The most common position holds that Joyce's texts are fundamentally ironic, and therefore incapable of creating or taking a rhetorical position.

1.2 Irony Unbound and Bound

The tendency to see Joyce's works as *fundamentally* ambivalent and ironic inclines to systematize them in favor of one discrete *unironic* critical methodology. It also posits an end to the reading of Joyce. This procedure is dramatized in *Ulysses* when Stephen Dedalus rejects the psycho-biographical theory of Shakespeare that he had spent an hour unfolding. But should Stephen's critical example serve as a litmus test for all Joyce criticism? If Stephen ironizes his own critical practice, then all those that follow his methodology must do the same. Yet

Stephen's analysis of Shakespeare's relationship with his wife raises the phantom of Stephen's troubled relationship with his own deceased mother.[7] So if Stephen uses irony to distance himself from confronting the traumatic event his criticism has brought to the forefront of his consciousness, then his decision to treat his critique ironically should not be prized. Getting lost in the play of ironic instability only further suppresses the original antagonisms that must be in place to give rise to the potential for irony. In light of this conflict between ironic dissimulation and the conditions that make irony possible, the following hypothesis may be put forward: any attempt to locate a master strategy for reading Joyce is incapable of addressing its multiple antagonistic perspectives and discourses, yet at the same time, claiming that all antagonisms and discourses are always-already narrated ironically will guarantee that specific critical conclusions will be met. Hence, the position that locates irony, reversal, unweaving as the *telos* of the Joycean project is already at work to foreclose a) alternate readings of the contradictions that are dramatized through textual events and narrative strategies; and b) the historical antagonisms that a text nevertheless expresses and which are beyond the purview of conscious authorial intention. If anything can be said to be "unJoycean," it is the foreclosure of potential conclusions. Can there be a "rhetorical" Joyce? A "political" Joyce? "Catholic" Joyce? "Marxist" Joyce? "Freudian" Joyce? "Feminist" Joyce, "Irish" Joyce? If we concede that there are such abstractions as "Marxism" or "Feminism" (in place of a limitless procession of particular "Marxisms" or "feminisms") and remove from the outset the expedient conclusion that the Joycean project always-already destabilizes these positions, then it is possible to see the multiple discursive registers in Joyce's work as a field on which linguistic antagonisms and historical contradictions are staged and dramatized without anticipating the conclusion of their

inconclusiveness. Rather than limit our conclusions about these antagonisms, the Joycean text dramatizes these antagonisms, establishes them as narrative premises, anticipates their possibilities, and sets in motion the interpretive activity. This is Joyce's work and the work of reading Joyce.

One of William Blake's "Proverbs of Heaven and Hell" may help to articulate the position I'd like to advance in regard to the tension between irony and the pain of history: "Excess of sorrow laughs. Excess of joy weeps." The surplus of an emotion or intellectual position reverses its effects. In other words, the excessive emphasis on Joyce as an ironist leads us to view his entire production as an archetypically comic narrative of the transcendent capabilities of language *over* history, class, and language itself (which evades the contradictions of language *as* sedimented history and vice-versa). And an overindulgence in this imaginary resolution is limiting. Excessive critical devotion to the triumph of irony over the banality of language in Joyce's work cannot adequately account for the fundamental and irresolvable traumatic historical crises that produce textual comic effects. Are there ways to understand ironic language as something other than the ultimate transcendental expression of victory over the limitations of language? Ironic laughter may be the last viable response to the interminable suffering in Ireland brought about by the domination of English economic imperialism, the estimation that Irish nationalist substitutes are utterly unsuitable, and a wavering commitment to an internationalist alternative. By circumventing the text's explicit and latent antagonisms regarding poverty, class and national conflicts, ideological uncertainties, and political fatigue, the "excess of joy" reveals ironic language as something dreadfully uncomic. But perhaps the reverse procedure may find a more welcoming habitat for irony. We can most clearly hear the

laughter of Joyce's language as it emerges against the soundless backdrop of excessive historical sorrows in Ireland and abroad. In this light, Joyce's texts may be heard as the laughter of history—and as the greatest expression of its tragedy.[8]

Stephen Dedalus's refusal to serve any kind of master certainly provides a compelling parallel to Joyce's own conscious refusal to be a transparently politically committed writer. Nevertheless, Joyce's novels express a commitment toward rebellion against established molds. Paralleling van Boheeman-Saaf's position, Andrew Gibson points toward a split between the "Poundian" and "Wellsian" receptions of Joyce's work. Is Joyce an Irish Catholic writer of resistance literature or a post-national cosmopolitan intellectual whose literary practices are above and beyond the mundane realities of class, national, and religious strife? As Gibson explains, "Pound writes of Joyce as chiefly concerned to attain 'an international standard' in art and writing. Pound's Joyce is anti- and post-nationalist and intent on rising above his Irish origins into modern Europe […]. But Wells saw Joyce quite differently. [For] Wells, Joyce is still deeply 'enmeshed in the national politics from which he emerged.' Both Joyce and his art are not only self-evidently Irish and Catholic, but also 'insurrectionary.' Wells effectively identified the multi-faceted outrageousness of *Ulysses* with a political and cultural offensive" (1-2). In both cases, while the issue of national identity differs, the sense of Joyce's antinomianism remains: either his works oppose the limitations imposed on them as "Irish literature," or they oppose the authoritarian limitations of the "English" language. In this situation, regardless of whether or not it is right to consider Joyce as a) an "Irish" writer or b) a writer of "English" literature, the underlying principle of literature-as-committed-resistance to authority remains intact, though the consequences will be different. If Joyce's texts can effectively undermine the

practices whereby language and history become static, sedimented, or uncritical, they must—in some way—engage that very language and history in order to make them speak anew. To bracket, from the outset, ironic reversal and its destabilizing effects may appear as a critically reactionary maneuver; but I hope that this will reveal rhetorical aspects of Joyce's texts that announce themselves as more politically engaged and potentially politically transformative than previously envisioned.

The "Joyce" to whom I am referring is a real historical person who has been textualized and recontextualized throughout the twentieth-century, and whose literary productions are material consequences of the historical and political climate from which they emerge. At the same time, the name "Joyce" also signals a mediating principle that disappears and operates within the gap between history and the texts themselves. This second "Joyce" is the principal figure who is embodied by his texts, but who, through his imaginary immersion in them cannot regulate those effects or their conclusions. The uniqueness and peculiarity of Joyce's work (differentiated from the works of other writers of his generation) result from the distinct political and religious environment in which their writer developed as a historical person and from the praxes through which his writings come into being. I will focus on Joyce's texts as material products built from and in dialogue with the historical conditions from which they emerge as well as products that result from the psychological processes of symbolic drafting and recomposition. But in addressing psychological processes my aim is not to psychoanalyze Joyce—for my reading would be both unschooled and irrelevant. My investigations of Joyce's works will examine their preoccupation with poverty, labor, class struggle, the rhetorical work of enunciating these things, and the artistic labor of putting rhetorical language to work within a

fictional text. Still, this investigation will be incomplete unless it looks at how profoundly or inconsequentially the material events of history produce a psychological residue that can be inferred from the drafting process and from which textual production arises. I differentiate this process from the psychologizing practice since I do not intend to "cure" or stabilize texts, let alone prescribe a methodology by which Joyce should be read exclusively. By calling attention to the texts' symptomatic relationship to the history from which they emerge, I intend to demonstrate that the works themselves can be fruitfully examined as complex narrative events within a determinate historical framework whose distinctiveness can be excavated through their dialogue with their previous incarnations in the writing process.

Throughout his career, Joyce revises his work as an extended quarrel with unequivocal language and its consequences; and though Joyce's revision process has been observed through the drafting of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake,* there remain no longer critical treatments of the genesis of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.* In the chapters that follow, my critical practice will call upon both Marxist and psychoanalytic theories to elucidate the means through which Joyce works and reworks the dialectic tension between social revolution and personal history in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,* especially as the objective of social revolution involves a formal aspect of rhetoric not commonly associated with the work of literary language. The earlier texts from which the later novel emerge —"A Portrait of the Artist" and *Stephen Hero*—contain constitutive political elements that are *written out of* the published novel, but which still constitute the later novel as a response to these earlier and more politically charged works. Further, the rhetoric of the earlier pieces cannot be wholly written out of the later drafts. They remain as traces and motor causes of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* which

ultimately reconfigures and reconstitutes these fractious, formally polemical elements within itself. In "Aeolus," the most self-consciously rhetorical episode of *Ulysses,* rhetoric is no longer a discordant element that erupts from the text, but one that is at play alongside, within, and throughout the narrativization of events. In "Aeolus," rhetoric permeates the language of the text so that rhetoric and political language are not just dramatized but are themselves the modes of dramatization. Whereas the rhetoric of Joyce's "Portraits" is encircled through the process of revision and reemerges in moments of narratological crises, in "Aeolus," rhetoric is already at work through the play of its discursive application. In other words, "Aeolus" is an experiment in literary rhetoric. It offers a kind of compromise between rhetorical and literary applications of language such that the tension created between the two remains opened and the one does not try to subordinate the other.

As Joyce's texts war with unequivocal language and experiment with formal innovation, they produce side effects that, as I have already argued, cannot be seen exclusively through the prisms of irony. They must also be seen destabilizing ironic destabilization. This squaring of irony does not return the texts to an unambiguous language or to unmediated history. Rather, the multiple layers of historico-linguistic revision offer glimpses into the mediating structures that construct history and language. And as these mediating forces come into view through revision, the entwining of oppositions, and the dynamic push and pull between language-for-itself and language-for-others, another complex rhetoric emerges. In what follows, I argue that intratextual conflicts and their effects constitute a new formal product resulting from the dialectical tension between the work of literary aesthetics and rhetorical language.

1.3 From Impossible Conjunctions to Possible Disjunctions

This will strike some as already engaged in a critically antediluvian preoccupation: as a postmodern critique argues, the conception of a "literary language" as distinct from other applications of language is a falsely constructed dichotomy. But even though postmodern criticism rejects "literary language" as the special language of intellectual visionaries who are "unacknowledged legislators" (following Percy Shelley's defense), literary language is nevertheless *real* in the sense that it produces real ideological and material consequences. In my investigation, I am less concerned with the legitimacy of literary language as an extant discursive practice than I am with the historical processes that have separated literary language from other forms of (ostensibly more banal) discourse. And at the turn of the twentieth-century through the first several decades, Joyce and many of his peers still held the conception that literary language existed, even if its existence was only valued as a source of comedy, satire, and in need of reconfiguration and transmogrification.

The Marxist critic Raymond Williams, for one, has pointed toward a historical emergence of "literature" and "literary language" that belies its special, supernatural, or super-linguistic aspects yet nevertheless maintains its existence as an ideological practice. At the core of Williams' argument about the rise of literature as a category in *Marxism and Literature*, literature is first and foremost defined as "the process and result of formal composition within the social and formal properties of a language" (46). Yet the reality of this fact has been historically suppressed. Literature is not magical language spoken by genius visionaries. It is a process of labor, and in order to combat the suppression of this fact, one needs to investigate the category of literature both theoretically and historically. As Williams argues, literature as a new category supplanted *rhetoric* and *grammar* as categories of linguistic conformity, especially as

this conformity became more regulated through the material practice of typesetting (*i.e.,* the setting of block letters). Contrarily, the word *poetry* retained its distinction as active composition: "creation" or "making" (47). Poetic language had begun to emerge as something distinct from the labor process of printing words, and "literature" emerges ideologically as something more highly arranged, systematized, and refined than non-literary uses of language. Unlike poetry, literature connotes a more passive activity, *i.e.,* one "has" literature, one "reads" literature, or one "knows" literature, but "literature" is not something one produces. At first, literature simply designated "printed books" and was "primarily a generalized social concept, expressing a certain (minority) level of educational achievement" (47). Once this definition took common root, later books could or could not be classified as literature depending on whether or not they conformed to the standards of a class-based learning system. As expressions of standards of taste, literary works are those which are bound to the exercise of power by the dominant social class—the bourgeoisie, at this stage of history (49). The literary is thus an ideological construction of quality only once it has been purged of overt anti-bourgeoisie polemicism (whether it is religious, aristocratic, or proletarian).

Williams' definition offers valuable history, but does not assess the accidents which arise from the antinomies in language. How could the works of writers such as Austen or Dickens, both of which have either intentionally or unintentionally polemical, anti-bourgeoisie sentiments still be reasonably considered literary? According to Williams's argument, they cannot be; so how, historically did they become categorized as such? It is possible that the marketplace, the commercial exchange of literary works, can neutralize radical cultural critiques by relegating these critiques to the framework of "fiction." A work of fiction—unlike a manifesto or a

broadsheet—is less likely to cause immediate and directive social effects. As a work of imagination, the critique of bourgeois culture may be as fictional or unreal as Charles Darcy or Oliver Twist. The construction, sale, and purchase of any printed book depend upon and enact the very practices that the book may eschew in its content. Significantly, when radical social critiques within the novel are relegated to the sphere of unreal, inactive "fictions," novels acquire actual discursive space able to perform their rhetorical work on their readers. On the one hand, this distinction may sufficiently neuter any praxis outside of the reading activity as long as fiction remains distinct from the life-world. On the other, the conditions that make possible the transmission of literature (culturally and materially) also simultaneously enable the conditions of its collapse as a viable ideological and material category. The novel stitches the cloth for possible worlds into the seams of the actual world.

Where Williams's general definition of "literature" ends, Terry Eagleton's critique of literature as a category in *Literary Theory* begins. Far more polemical than Williams's descriptivist language, Eagleton argues that literary language is simply a consequence of the developing category of "literature," which emerged as the most suitable means for disseminating bourgeois ideology in the 19th century (19, 22). The power that religion exercised as an ideological force in 19th century England became weakened by scientific rationalism and Darwinism, and though religion was certainly not eviscerated, it was weakened enough for literature to come to occupy the places it had vacated. Literature would depend on the cultivation of literary taste, which would automatically preclude any writing that included elements that would fracture or disturb the creation of a classless, national literature permeated with "timeless values" and amorphous "eternal truths" (22). Essentially, the class concerns of a

potential reader are subsumed by literature's galvanizing nationalism (i.e., a newly-emerging English working-class reader may think, "this book may articulate the lifestyle and culture of the bourgeois, but at least they are *my* bourgeois."). Thus, literature—specifically English Literature—provided a kind of net onto which bourgeois ideology could fall after the tightrope of religious certainty had been shaken.

Eagleton provides five hypotheses for the development of English Literature as a discipline distinct from other forms of literary study such as grammar, Classics or Biblical exegesis. First, English literature cultivates nationalist sentiments in the English language and society. Secondly, once the concepts of a "national" language and literature have taken hold, literature presents the accomplishments of the middle-class as something exquisite, precious, and impressive. Thirdly, literature has a pedagogical function to teach a reader his or her role within the state either as a member of the dominant class or a servant to this class. Fourth, literature is an extremely cost efficient means of social control. The fifth and most important of Eagleton's claims, at least in terms of this current project, extends from the second and third hypotheses and perverts literary ideology into an extremely insidious form of social practice. As Eagelton writes:

> Literature would rehearse the masses in the habits of pluralistic thought and feeling, persuading them to acknowledge that more than one viewpoint other than theirs existed—namely, that of their masters. It would communicate to them the moral richness of bourgeois civilization, impress upon them a reverence for middle-class achievements, and, since reading is an essentially solitary, contemplative activity, curb in them any disruptive tendency to collective political action. (*Literary Theory* 22)

Though culturally, the west has come to embrace the recognition of multiple points-of-view as a high watermark of sophisticated intellection and as a sincerely humanizing practice, its roots here

betray a far less sophisticated and less humanizing *raison d'être.* In short, the emerging discipline of literary studies represented a form of thinking invested with multiple views with marginally equivalent claims to truth, distinct from scientific rational analysis or logical discourse, but still an agent in the service of the dominant ideology.[9] But of course, the experience of "pluralistic thought and feeling" which made literary studies possible and attractive is also, at the same time, the cause that exceeds its mandate and causes systemic instability. By unleashing multiple points of view, thoughts and feelings other than the master's voice are inevitably spoken, and these voices disrupt the otherwise pristine ideological voice. The multiplicity of form, language, and dialogue cannot wholly be organized and controlled by ruling-class ideology. As Jacques Lacan famously articulated (I address Lacan more directly in the next chapter), something in a sentence, a text, an ideology, will inevitably stumble from its place.[10] This position of slippage does not permit ideology to speak itself from within or from outside the text; instead, this position is the very (problematic) site around which the ideology, the language, or the text weaves itself.

Of course, Joyce's work does not seem possible to square with Eagleton's theory of the rise of English Literature as a discipline. How could Joyce—a non-English, anti-religious Catholic, politically independent petty-bourgeois socialist sympathizer merely reproduce the dominant ideology of English bourgeois capitalism? It is possible to argue—as some communist detractors of Joyce's work have done—that Joyce's texts lack not only a political platform but any shared relationship between human beings that could make something approaching political experience happen.[11] But Joyce's work so thoroughly amplifies "pluralistic thought and feeling" that plurality ironically appears as a "normal" facet of lived experience, even though the method

of recreating these effects is so wholly estranging. No credible reading of Joyce's writing would ignore the plurality of style, method, discourse, character, or narrative. But it strikes me as imperative to isolate and reinvigorate the voice of plurality as something other than the voice of the autocrat or bourgeois apologist. Joyce's novels are built around multiple antinomies that refuse synthesis. But the impossibility of creating conjunctions leads to disjunctions that open up possibilities, and these possibilities offer trajectories for language and experience. In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses,* the multiple registration of conflicting discourses reveals the doubles that are attached to every word, concept and feeling. Joyce's texts appear overly complex or intensely ironic because oppositions between concepts are tethered throughout as transparent dialectical sublates. In other words, oppositional language and contradiction is instantiated by the language of narrative, plot, and dialogue.

But there remain three interrelated questions to answer to come to terms with the dialectical form of Joyce's writing. How do Joyce's texts disrupt the false pluralities of the ruling ideology which undergird all lived experience under capitalism? How can—or indeed *can*—"A Portrait of the Artist," *Stephen Hero, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,* and *Ulysses,* dislocate ideology to expose the fecundity of chaos that imbues multiple perspectives? And finally, what kind of discursive practices does this work entail, what kind of knowledge does this rely upon, and what means of presentation must necessarily be employed if this experiment is to fly by the nets of the master's own investments in pluralistic thinking? The answer to these questions must address more than prose style to encompass the rifts between dialectic, poetic, and rhetoric as modes of discursive production.

1.4 "Dagger Definitions"

The division between dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics as distinct but interrelated discursive practices can be traced to Aristotle's anatomization of these concepts throughout the *Organon*, *Rhetoric,* and *Poetics.*[12] The dates of composition for these texts are unknown, and although authentication of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* as Aristotle's own writing or a collection of assembled notes is uncertain, the texts we possess have nonetheless been historically accepted as representing Aristotle's thinking on the subjects. To a large degree, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *On the Soul* also address analytic and dialectical modes of thought, though many of the positions articulated in these texts about analysis and dialectic are presented more generally than they are in the *Organon*. Joyce read Aristotle's *Metaphysics, On the Soul,* and *Poetics* attentively during his time in Paris in January 1903, one year before writing his essay "A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man."[13] And of course, Stephen Dedalus brandishes Aristotle's "dagger definitions" in his own dialectical exchange in the National Library as he produces arguments about fatherhood based on the difference between nominal (effectual) and essential (causal) definitions.

In his larger intellectual matrix, Aristotle divides the sciences into the practical, productive, and theoretical (*Metaphysics* 993b, 1025b). Practical sciences, which focus on ideas of conduct, are the domain of ethics and are outside the direct scope of this inquiry. Aristotle defines the productive sciences as the making of beautiful things. The theoretical sciences involve the production of knowledge and encompass subjects such as math, physics, and metaphysics. The analytic methodologies presented in the *Organon,* or the "instruments" of thinking, are not specified as a discrete science because they are the tools used to analyze relationships without specific contents.[14] For Aristotle, analytic reasoning is based on syllogistic demonstration which proceeds from general premises toward particular conclusions. He

generally defines the syllogism as “an argument in which, certain things having been assumed, something other than what has been assumed necessarily follows from the fact that the assumptions are such” (*Prior Analytics* 24a). This method of inquiry lays the basis for both dialectical and rhetorical forms of deduction, and the latter (the enthymeme, which I will address shortly) is one of the means by which Joyce’s fictions creates room for a deliberation of possibilities other than those misappropriated by the dominant class.

Dialectic, like analytic, is a method for arriving at a third, necessary premise (a conclusion) based on two given premises. But where analytic reasoning demonstrates a necessary deduction from two proofs, dialectic reasoning does not proceed from necessary premises but from premises that two interlocutors agree upon to be generally accepted as true (*Topics* 101a). Though Aristotle privileges analytic reasoning as superior and unfalsafiable, he also finds validity in dialectic reasoning in a fashion very similar to the validity of rhetorical practice. Dialectic reasoning, he argues, “is useful for conversations because, having enumerated the opinions of the majority, we shall be dealing with people on the basis of their own opinions, not of those of others, changing the course of any argument which they appear to us to be using wrongly” (*Topics* 101a). Furthermore, for the sciences, dialectic reasoning is useful because “if we are able to raise difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily discern both truth and falsehood on every point” (*Topics* 101a). Both the dialectician and the rhetorician achieve mastery of their practice when they can employ every available means of persuasion and investigation to achieve their ends. Neither dialectic nor rhetoric have distinct subject matter (like botany or meteorology), but both have the task to differentiate those arguments which are persuasive or deductive from those that merely appear to be deductive (*Topics* 159a).

In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle argues that the primary focus of rhetorical practice is composing convincing arguments (*Rhetoric* 1354a). Dialectic forms a kind of hinge between analytic reasoning and rhetorical practice. In Aristotle's anatomy, dialectic achieves a compromise between the necessary (though perhaps unconvincing) conclusions of analysis and the convincing (though perhaps unnecessary) arguments of rhetoric. And this is the major problem he sees with rhetoric, especially as had been practiced by the Sophists, the group of rhetoric and ethics instructors who competed with Aristotle for students in the democratic and litigious political climate of Athens. Aristotle argues that the Sophists understood the mechanisms of rhetoric and dialectic, but that they lacked real knowledge because they did not subject their conclusions to analytical testing *(Metaphysics* 1004b). Aristotle argues that the Sophists created arguments irrespective of knowledge and that this procedure either innocently or maliciously deceived hearers into ignorance or making poor actions. Still, even though rhetoric and dialectic can be misapplied or distorted, Aristotle claims that both rhetoric and dialectic have legitimate and salubrious applications. For Aristotle, the argument that rhetoric is not a good because it can be misused is not compelling. All things except virtue, he argues, can be misused, and using things (like strength and wealth) justly will have benefits, just as using them unjustly will cause harm (*Rhetoric* 1355b).

Regarding the specific benefit of rhetoric, Aristotle argues that even exact scientific knowledge will not be persuasive to audiences who cannot understand the method or the conclusions (*Rhetoric 1355a).* Thus, rhetoric can make instruction possible whenever analytic reasoning proves too demanding of an audience of non-specialists. Rhetoric leads auditors to adopt a given perspective or take a specific action by use of enthymeme and example.

Enthymeme is a rhetorical deduction that argues for the benefit, value, detriment, or danger, innocence or guilt of something by moving from general categories to particular situations. In rhetoric, unlike dialectic (which in this manner, more closely resembles analytic), deduction is not made from what is necessary or what is assumed to be true, but from what is probable (*Rhetoric* 1359b). In *Rhetoric,* Aristotle writes that the "propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be 'necessary,' will most of them be only usually true. […] A probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the 'contingent' or 'variable.'" (1357a). In other words, a probability is an event that has the capacity for actualization, but will not be made actual by necessity or convention. In a looser sense, a probability is a more specific form of possibility; in a more concrete sense, a probability is the ratio between an event and the total number of possible events.

The *Poetics* expressly links poetry to possibilities and probabilities. Significantly, nowhere in *Poetics* does Aristotle expressly define poetry as either a theoretical or practical science, though it is popularly included as a practical art (and not part of the *Organon,* for example). Since in *Poetics*, Aristotle defines poetry as an imitation of nature, he would not have included poetry within the methodological matrix of tools that create knowledge. Yet Aristotle's treatment of poetics reveals a curiously dialectic character in regard to the potential creation of knowledge. Poetics imitate human action, sounds, words, or those of nature. But poetics can manipulate imitations to create occurrences that did nor or do not occur in the life world. How can poetics imitate things that did not or do not happen? This question hangs on a definitional problem since what is being imitated is not a specific event, but things common to or in some

way linked with nature or lived experience. To quote a well-known and well-trod passage, Aristotle writes:

> the function of the poet is not to say what has happened, but they say the kind of thing that would happen, i.e. what is possible in accordance with probability or necessity. The historian and the poet are not distinguished by their use of verse or prose […]. The distinction is this: the one says what has happened, the other that kind of thing that would happen. (*Poetics* 51b)

Is there a poetic form of knowledge implied by this? Certainly, a potential poetic knowledge would not be the same kind of knowledge created though analytic or dialectical reasoning (since demonstrative reasoning addresses is used in the present between two interlocutors). An Aristotelian poetic knowledge presents illustrations of what can be made possible. These illustrations perform the same inductive function as rhetorical examples since they proceed from specific situations to general principles.

While all forms of rhetorical syllogism (enthymeme) and rhetorical induction (example) address probability in past, present or future, only deliberative (or legislative) rhetoric exclusively addresses the probability of future events. Using Aristotle's criteria, deliberative rhetoric and poetics are alike inasmuch as they can present arguments or illustrations of what can be made possible. The ends of deliberative rhetoric are to achieve the assent of a people in taking or not taking a specific and advantageous action. The ends of poetics are not made as clear. What is the purpose of forecasting future probabilities through the dramatization of events? Why can or should poets say the kind of thing that could happen? Using Aristotle's definitions exclusively, poetics, like rhetoric show the benefits and detriments of any hypothetical action. Poetics, which can dramatize rhetorical arguments and provide rhetorical examples, provides a testing ground for subjects, arguments, actions, and their consequences.

The testing ground opened by poetics can be illustrated by two moments from *Ulysses* which articulate the tension between possibility (or probability) and necessity (actuality). Two brief moments of Stephen Dedalus's interior monologue from *Ulysses* will illustrate the mechanisms of enthymeme at work. In "Nestor," the episode set in Stephen Dedalus's classroom, Stephen looks at his young students in Mr. Deasy's classroom and laments the servile status of the Irish as a "jester at the court of his master" (2.44). History, he thinks, is a "tale like any other, too often heard," and for the Irish, "their land a pawnshop" (2.44-45). The events that have forged Irish history are all-too familiar to Stephen, and as he sits before his classroom hearing about the success that ruined Pyrrhus, he begins to imagine the consequences of an alternate history and if such a possibility exists (or if a possibility is only known as a possibility after it has been actualized) .

> Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a bedlam's hand in Argos or Julius Caeser not been knifed to death. They are not to be thought away. Time has branded them and fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they have ousted. But can those have been possible seeing they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass? Weave, weaver of wind. […]. It must be movement then, an actuality of the possible as possible (*Ulysses* 2.48-53, 67)

The return of Pyrrhus to the Italian peninsula or the rule of Julius Caeser as Roman emperor are historical possibilities, not actualities, and the possibilities (which "are not to be thought away") still exist. Curiously, the pronoun "them" in the third sentence of this excerpt is left with ambiguous referents: either these two murders as "actual" events have been concretized by history, or the possible history resulting from these two men *not having been* murdered has been fettered. In the second case, the alternatives survive, even if only in the more fettered frame of imagination. But Stephen asks two questions regarding the nature of possibility. Is there a possibility that is not attached to the actual, or is every possibility only known *as a possibility*

after it has been made real through motion and time? His answer, for the time being, is that any action is possible that has been made actual, but the possibility of an action being otherwise, can be made actual in language through the Aristotelian enthymeme and function of poetics.

This meditation from "Nestor" anticipates Stephen's response to the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction that he considers briefly in the National Library. [15] Later, in "Scylla and Charybdis,"

> Stephen looked down on a wide headless caubeen, hung on his ashplanthandle over his knee. My casque and sword. Touch lightly with two index fingers. Aristotle's experiment. One or two? Necessity is that in virtue of which it is impossible that one can be otherwise. Argal, one hat is one hat. (*Ulysses* 9.295-299)

Stephen defines "necessity" as "that in virtue of which it is impossible that one can be otherwise" (9.297-98). In this excerpt, the word "one" refers obliquely the law of non-contradiction which emerges in Stephen's consciousness while he plays with his fingers to produce a sensory illusion. But it may also give an unintentional and painful voice to Stephen's sense of immobility. Stephen's view of events as the actualization of the possible are joined with sadness over the loss of the possibilities which become displaced by necessity. But what can actualize the possible *as* possible, and what does Stephen desire that is continually deferred and rendered impossible (by the necessary) yet willed into being by the narrative? My answer to this may seem needlessly complicated, but it retains the methods of both rhetorical deduction (enthymeme) and dialectical reasoning (contradiction) that I see at work in these few textual moments. In Stephen's line of reasoning, every event bears the traces of its potential consequences even though its actualization has erased these consequences. Stephen maintains an unattainable desire for the deferral of the necessary and the actualization of self-contradiction whereby all particular situations are split

between their actual actualization and their residual possible actualization. Stephen's desire gives greater depth to Mulligan's dismissive description of Stephen as an "impossible person" (1.222). If Stephen is an impossible person, it is because he cannot be otherwise, though he is locked in the conflict between things that can be changed and those that can't.

In conversation with Frank Budgen, Joyce said that Stephen could not be changed.[16] But though Stephen himself may or may not be capable of change, he is aware of the faculties that can and cannot change the possible into the actual, and this may be a sign of Stephen's difficulties flying by the nets which have dragged him back to Dublin from Paris. But Stephen's train of thought exemplifies the text's own effort to fly past the nets of bourgeois pluralistic thinking though poetic possibilities, linguistic contradictions, conceptual oppositions. As I hope to have shown, these are not to be reversed ironically (which would contain textual possibilities as another form of material domination by class intent to exploit the text for its own ends). Instead, Joyce's novels transform narrative space into a contemplative staging ground where rhetorical argument and example show, through the poetics of possibility, the moments and interstices which elude complete envelopment by the networks of authority.

[1] As William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley argued, critical practice that projects authorial intent on a literary work does not account for its autonomy which lies beyond the author's authority. Yet the New Critical practice has suffered in light of more cultural and historical modes of criticism which assess the social climate in which authors and texts come into being. William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy," *The Verbal Icon* (Louisville, U of Kentucky P, 1954) 3-20.

[2] Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce, 2nd ed.* (New York: Oxford, 1982) 521.

[3] Rosa Eberly argues that Joyce's first publishers for *Ulysses,* Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap, were among the first to sell Joyce's image as a genius who couldn't be popularly understood. She cites the dialogue between Anderson, Heap, and their readership in the *Little Review* as a site where Joyce's genius was held in dispute. Rosa Eberly, *Citizen Critics* (Urbana, U of Illinois P, 2000) 56-59.

[4] Kavanaugh writes, "Who killed James Joyce?/ I, said the commentator,/ I killed James Joyce/ For my graduation./ What weapon was used/ To slay mighty Ulysses?/ The weapon that was used/ Was a Harvard thesis." Patrick Kavanaugh, "Who Killed James Joyce?" *A Bash in the Tunnel*. ed. John Ryan (London: Clifton Books, 1970) 49-52.

[5] This anecdote is taken from Ellmann's biography (559), but has since become a central story at the Rosenbach Museum in Philadelphia.

[6] Arnold Goldman was the first critic to argue that understanding Joyce requires two conflicting critical methodologies. Arnold Goldman, *The Joyce Paradox* (Chicago: Northwestern UP, 1966).

[7] Maud Ellmann compellingly argues that as Stephen conjures up the ghost of Hamlet's father during his lecture in the national library, he also conjures his guilt and terror over the death of his mother. Ellmann writes, If his living father is dead, however his dead mother is very much alive, demonically vital"(87). I read Stephen's rejection of his Shakespeare theory as a denial of the crucial confrontation with his mother, not as a playful and comic reversal. Maud Ellmann, "The Ghosts of *Ulysses*," *Ulysses: A Casebook* (New York: Oxford, 2004) 83-102.

[8] Though I borrow the argument from Blake, the same argument is made by Slavoj Zizek who argues that today, the only way to show respect for the victims of the unspeakable atrocities of the Holocaust is through laughter. This is not because the Holocaust is in any way comic, but rather because the excess of its traumatic reality renders the expression of sorrow impossible. Slavoj Zizek, *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?* (London: Verso, 2002) 61-69.

[9] Eagleton adds that "It is significant, then, that 'English' as an academic subject was first institutionalized not in the Universities, but in the Mechanics' Institutes, working men's colleges and extension lecturing circuits" (22). It is not surprising that Universities first regarded this

subject as unequal to Classics and unworthy of serious attention. What is surprising, perhaps, is the way English studies was transparently a working-person's subject but nevertheless grew into a subject that merited distinction within a short period of time.

[10] Jacques Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Ed. Jacques – Alain Miller. Trans Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1978) 25.

[11] This position was initially made by Karl Radek at the Soviet Writer's Congress in 1934, but was more forcefully pursued by Georg Lukacs in *The Meaning of Contemporary Reason*.

[12] The Organon, or logical works of Aristotle, includes *Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations.* For my use of Aristotle in this chapter, I have chosen to use the Bekker numbers to cite Aristotle's work so a reader can locate passages from any translation. The particular translations I have used can be found in the list of works cited.

[13] According to Ellmann, Joyce read Victor Cousin's translation of Aristotle (120).

[14] David Ross provides an indispensible introduction to Aristotle's systemization of the sciences. Sir David Ross, *Aristotle.* 6th ed. (New York: Routledge, 1995) 21.

[15] Roy Gottfried also argues for the significant distinctions between possibility and necessity. Roy Gottfried, *The Art of Joyce's Syntax in* Ulysses (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1980) 81.

[16] Quoted in Frank Budgen, *James Joyce and the Making of* Ulysses.

CHAPTER 2

ACROSS THE FAULT LINES:
JOYCE AND THE RHETORICAL SYMPTOMS OF HISTORY

"Whenever you find a doctrine of "nonpolitical" esthetics affirmed with fervor, look for its politics."

—Kenneth Burke
A Rhetoric of Motives

1.1 Blame it on History

In the first episode of *Ulysses,* Stephen Dedalus shares a brief and unsolicited conversation with his English roommate Haines on the topic of Irish servitude. In his tone, Haines seems less interested in Stephen as a friend and more as a specimen of Irish wit, or, more simply, as a sample Irish specimen. Through this conversation, Haines wants to broadcast (and likely legitimate) his own English academic preoccupation with ancient Irish subject matter. And within the time it takes to take the short walk from the Martello Tower to the bathing area beside it, Haines troubles Stephen with questions and observations about God, freedom, Ireland, England, and the church. Stephen at last feels compelled to tell Haines that he is a servant of two masters, "an English and an Italian," until at last Haines recoils and tells Stephen, "We feel in England that we have treated you rather unfairly. It seems history is to blame" (1.648-49). Within the context of the scene, Haines is offering Stephen an opaque apology for Irish history, a

subject that Stephen was loath to discuss. But this statement also exposes multiple registers of attribution, retribution, acceptance and denial.

In Ireland, Haines learns the Irish language and studies Irish culture, ("the peat smoke is going to his head," as John Eglinton will later explain [9.100]) as a kind of repentance for crimes he cannot bring himself to acknowledge. To Haines' mind, neither England nor he himself (as an Englishman) is to blame for the centuries of physical violence and ideological conflict between the English and the Irish. But Haines' dreary act of contrition is, syntactically, missing an active subject. In other words, Haines does *not* say, "Stephen, you can blame the English people for the unfair treatment of your Irish people throughout history. I am English. Blame me." Instead, the motivating subjects (people and events) are syntactically and ideologically distanced by the insertion of History, which is only presented as a void between Ireland and England upon which the burden of blame may be placed.

But Stephen cannot forgive Haines (none the least for keeping him awake and terrified at night), and Haines's view of blame and hurt is not a position with which guilt-ridden Stephen can sympathize at this moment. Immediately, the narrative moves away from their outer conversation to Stephen's inner monologue. Stephen drifts into a recitation of the Nicene Creed and a fantasy of the church defending itself against heretics. Significantly, Stephen focuses on moments in church history where the church itself has been unforgiving. "The void awaits surely all them that weave the wind," Stephen thinks (1.661-62). This interior monologue figures as an individualized field on which particular, isolable social antagonisms between the two men become displaced into globalized issues of crimes against orthodoxy: guilt and punishments are meted out in imaginary form. As much as he can or will allow himself, Stephen

is ascribing blame to Haines for intellectually pestering him, to Mulligan for inviting Haines to join their home, and to history for the inescapable realities it has foisted on him.[1]

For Haines in this scene, history is a scapegoat onto which one can assign blame, but for Stephen, history is always a nightmare. For Stephen, it is an active and malicious subject; for Haines, it is a passive abyss that absorbs fault and responsibility. For Stephen, history hurts—and the terrible thing that does the hurting becomes psychologically displaced onto more agreeable and familiar, though seemingly unintelligible forms. I borrow the (by now well-known) expression, "History is what hurts," from Fredric Jameson, who in a lyrical moment in *The Political Unconscious* argues that:

> History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its 'ruses' turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention. But this history can be apprehended only through its effects and never directly as some reified force. This is indeed the ultimate sense in which History as ground and untransendable horizon needs no particular theoretical justification: we may be sure that its alienating necessities will not forget us, however much we might prefer to ignore them. (*The Political Unconscious* 102)

And though this passage is gracefully written, it may still benefit from clarification. In the language of Marxism, history is distinguished as a series of class conflicts whereby those who possess the available means of production are inexorably conflicted with the many who do not possess these means and must sell their labor power in order to acquire the necessities of life. The particular "desire" that is refused on the stage of history at this moment is the emancipatory desire of the working class. The "ruses" of history—especially the ideologies that present history as a solid, unchanging, non-antagonistic sequence of events—obliterate the self-awareness and agency of a working class. Instead of seeing history as the narrative of an emancipated proletariat, history becomes the log of an ideologically fettered and politically

disempowered multitude. Importantly, Jameson argues, history cannot be accessed directly, but is made palpable only through its narrative consequences. Hence, all appreciations of history and all possible readings of an event, will reach their destination at inopportune moments. And though hindsight enables analysis, it is far from perfect vision.

Also in this passage—which in some ways factors as a summary of his exceptionally sophisticated argument—Jameson also acknowledges that history is never something one can stand outside of (as Haines imagines). History makes political and personal boundaries because it sets limitations to emancipation, fixes events as either possible or impossible. It is the nets in which attempts at possible flight are caught. History, Jameson argues following Spinoza and Althusser, is an "absent cause": it motivates events, but it is only known through its effects, like those which Stephen feels. My arguments in this examination are impossible to make without acknowledging their debt to Jameson's already discipline-changing text. For though Jameson is certainly not the first critic to attempt to fuse Marxist and psychoanalytic analysis, *The Political Unconscious* is likely the most fruitful cross-pollination to date. To give a very short (though possibly overly gnomic) recasting of Jameson's argument: a literary text is a response to a question it didn't know it was asked. It is a site where the real, evental class antagonisms and contradictions between modes of production, are symbolically staged in transmuted and transmogrified form. A text is the dream language of History's narrative.

Before casting a praxis for a Marxist literary interpretation, Jameson argues that Marxism is essential as an "ultimate *semantic* precondition for the intelligibility of literary and cultural texts" (75). Since all texts are effectively products of specific (or a conflict between) languages, cultures, and geographies at a specific moment in time, all texts are invariably in dialogue with—

if not in conflict with—the conditions from which they emerge. Jameson specifies this point by presenting different perceptual frameworks through which texts can be read. He offers three "concentric horizons" of a text's temporal-historical positions: within "political history," the evental and sequential passage of time; within "society," which is defined through the contact and confrontation between social classes; and within "history," which is theorized in a more clearly identifiable Marxist sense as the "sequence of modes of production and succession and destiny of the various human social formations" (75). Each of these horizons initiates a correlating interpretive strategy, and each strategy reconstructs the "text" as an object of study in a manner consistent with its focuses. The following table condenses Jameson's horizons for the social grounding of texts (see Figure 1). For the sake of continuity, I will retain Jameson's own words throughout this figure.

Fig 1. Categories for textual analysis from Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1981) 76, 87, 98.

	Conceptualization of the text as object.	**Applicable definition of "history."**	**Conceptualization of the aesthetic act.**	**Active interpretive principle.**
Horizon of Political History (76)	The individual literary work as a symbolic act.	A series of events and their narrativization.	Ideological	Individual narrative is an imaginary resolution to a real contradiction
Horizon of Society (87)	An isolated utterance within a field of utterances (*ideologeme*).	Antagonism between social classes.	Expression of contradictions.	The text is an individual utterance in dialogue with the utterances of its class and other classes.
Horizon of History (98)	A field of force in which the dynamics of sign systems of several distinct modes of production can be registered and apprehended.	Series of conflicts between antagonistic modes of production.	"Ideology of form"	"Content" is the determinate contradiction of the messages emitted by the varied sign systems which coexist in a given artistic process.

Within the first horizon of political historical grounding of textual analysis, the text is an individual, localizable, nameable text, (like *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*), but it is also grasped as a *symbolic act*. As symbolic acts, texts "do" something: they present imaginary resolutions to real contradictions. In this way, a text can be seen as a kind of wish fulfillment, though that wish fulfillment need not be a "resolution" in terms of providing an ameliorating conclusion. The import of this dimension hinges on the qualitative aspects of the word "resolution." Wish-fulfillments should not be confused with happy endings. A text may dramatize these consequences as negative, or may assess the unresolveability of contradictions as reassuring. Nevertheless, regardless of the specific form of resolutions, these are not *real* resolutions, but symbolic enactments that create imaginary effects (76).

In the second horizon of a text's social grounding, Jameson repositions the unique and individual utterance of the text back into the larger network of linguistic and discursive production. From this vantage point, the text is no longer apprehended as an isolated, monologic declaration, but appears as a voice within a chorus of multiple and conflicting discourses. The textual unit becomes understood as an *ideologeme,* which functions as a "symbolic move in an essentially polemic and strategic ideological confrontation between classes" (85). This horizon makes possible the realignment of ostensibly independent texts within the shared mechanics of language in a field of multiple class-conflicted voices. Yet it is insufficient to draw the conclusions that a given text is "bourgeois," "capitalist" or "socialist," since these terms will have no meaning unless they reveal a definable series of conflicts and antagonisms that can be elucidated through recourse to their dialectical sublate. Further, it is a disservice both to the

practical methodology of Marxist analysis and the uniqueness of the text itself if a set of prescribed motives and results can be inserted into analysis before this analysis has even begun. To say that *Dubliners,* for example is a "socialist" text and that *Ulysses* is a "bourgeois" text says nothing about the text themselves and volumes about the misapplication of Marxist methodology by the critical practitioner. [2] Rather than delimit the voice of the text, this horizon is best suited to provide explanations for the conflicts at work within a text and the means through which these conflicts betray the underlying and fundamental class antagonisms to which the text responds symbolically. Thus, rather than describe any text as "bourgeois," it is more suitable to investigate the way the text expresses the contradictions in class structures and their effects as class antagonisms before exploring the text's relationship to a particular set of class values. Georg Lukacs's well-known argument in *The Historical Novel* compellingly demonstrates that self-associated "bourgeois" writers (Walter Scott, specifically) will nevertheless expose class antagonisms in an unintentionally self-negating manner. Likewise, as Lukacs argues, a self-associated socially committed writer like Flaubert will unintentionally reify the historical contradictions in his texts that he would consciously eschew.[3]

Since the second horizon positions the text already within the broader social world of enunciation, reception and dialogue, the third horizon—the historical horizon—aims to locate the discursive practices of social classes within the historical development of the modes of production. At this point, the text and its ideologemes need to be read in terms of the *ideology of form*, which is defined as "the symbolic messages transmitted to use by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production" (76). This attempts to reverse the problematic approach to a text as a content that is poured into an

already extent and neutral form by positing a “form” (novel, essay, or poem) as a historically determined and socially dependent structure that is created from the sedimentation of non-neutral literary “values” and norms. The form of a text—its own mode of production within the wider networks of all modes of production—is itself an ideological practice molded by the systems from which it arises or which it hopes to draw into being (101).

By seeing History as the “absent cause” put into a direct relationship with Joyce’s work, we will be able to see the ways in which Jameson’s conceptual horizons will produce readings that will evoke the following subjects: the determinate conditions of early twentieth-century Irish political and social history the class struggle between Irish subjects and British Imperialists, and the modes of production that conflict with one another during this period. Taking *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* as an example, we can complete the following table using Jameson’s framework (See figure 2). Each level of the text reveals its own conceptual impasses: the systematic and historical contradictions that are achieved textually as formal, plot-based, and narrative impasses. From the level of political history, the text exposes the imaginarily ameliorating effects of escape as a practical social solution to political crises experienced as immediate psychological phenomena. From the level of society, the *ideologemes* of refusal and rejection of service offers a symbolic resolution to the conflicts of adherence to Nationalist politics or alignment with Imperialist authority. As a dialogic voice, the text presents a third way out of the bind between Imperialism and Nationalism-as-antidote to imperialism. The figure of the artist, who links himself lyrically to the figures of the working classes, becomes a symbolic figure of internationalist alternatives to colonial conflicts. As *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* closes, it withholds at both textual and historical levels, determinate conclusions regarding

Stephen Dedalus's flight from Dublin. This moment exposes one of the fundamental contradictions of the novel which can best be expressed in the form of a question. Can individual acts of aesthetic resistance and geographical flight yield anti-nationalist and anti-imperialist results that will advance the internationalist political agenda of an artist allied with working-class politics?

Figure 2: The Horizons of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* read with Jameson's methodology from *The Political Unconscious.*

	Conceptualization of the text.	**Applicable definition of "history."**	**Conceptualization of the aesthetic work.**	**Active interpretive principle.**
Horizon of Political history	"A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man" as a discrete text and symbolic act.	Narrative of events in Irish political and religious history; fictionalized autobiography.	Ideological and imaginary resolution (flight) of real contradiction (imperialist constraints).	*Bildungsroman* of the artist's rejection of convention; comedy of the self-(re)made man.
Horizon of Society	*Portrait* as ideologeme: the artist's rejection of expectations imposed on him as a middle-class Irish and Catholic subject and his subsequent refusal of historical, political, religious demands.	Creation of an internationalist "artist" class aligned with working classes in conflict with Irish Ascendancy intelligentsia, Irish Catholics, and British Imperialists.	Contradictions include the potential role of artists in working-class politics, the myths and realities of autonomy/self-determination.	*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* as an anti-nationalist, anti-imperialist text within a the wider discursive agon.
Horizon of History	*Portrait* as field on which antagonisms between Home-Rule politics (Parnellism), internationalism (socialism), and capitalism (imperialism) are dramatized.	British and (academic) imperialism, nascent Irish Nationalist Movements, and Christian (religious) domination against an Irish working-class internationalist intellectual base.	Novel *as* novel—sedimented form. Individual self-determination (capitalist individualism) set against the uncertain consequences of Home Rule and internationalism.	The novel as an unfinished project by dint of the historically indefinite relationship between imperialism, nationalism and internationalism.

If *A Portrait* refuses to yield an answer to this other than an imaginary one, it is precisely because historically it cannot. For the text to answer this question, it would need to tear itself from symbolic action and replace itself in the realm of real, evental, shared history—in short, an impossible horizon for itself, but not an impossible rhetorical horizon.

In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (which I will treat at length in the following chapter), Stephen Dedalus intends his flight from Dublin to figure as a flight toward self-discovery and in fashioning himself as he believes he needs to become. Aristotle's dictum regarding the potential power of poetics should be recalled at this moment. Poetry shows the world as it may possibly be, not necessarily as it as lived. For while neither Stephen (who exemplifies flight and self-discovery) nor the text itself (which presents this flight as a kind of enthymeme) can rip itself from its imaginary trappings, they both embody a rhetoric of future possibilities. The text, then, can be considered an example of deliberative rhetoric where future actions and the possibility and probability of escape as a worthy action can be weighed and evaluated by its readership.

At this point, it is useful to bring to bear two critical attitudes toward Jameson's argument, one from James Fairhall and the other from Derek Attridge, and the third from Giambattista Vico (from which the other two draw their arguments). First, James Fairhall in *James Joyce and the Question of History* argues that Jameson's reliance on language to embody the actuality of history puts his arguments at best on a slick or at worst an unreliable platform. And since all history is a narrated reconstruction of events, Fairhall argues, "historical discourse, regardless of the investigative methods behind it, is forever in a cloud of linguistic uncertainty, unable to break free into the sunshine of clear fixed truth" (9). Fairhall's objection is well

situated, since he adds that Joyce's evolving quarrels with power eventually lead to his quarrel with narrative itself. But, to be fair, Jameson does not present history as a "master code." His arguments are too flexible to be reduced to such an easily caricatured position. Instead, Jameson argues that Marxism provides a methodological and conceptual vocabulary for the "ultimate *semantic* preconditions" of interpreting literary and cultural texts." (Jameson 75). Fairhall's larger objection—that Joyce's later work (the second half of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*) obliterates narrative in an ultimate act of emancipation—is somewhat whimsical since these texts nonetheless *narrate* (or are still read as variants or extensions of a narrative performance) even if they uproot other narrative conventions by appearing free from the trappings of authorship, narrator, or an immediately discernable language. On the other hand, Fairhall persuasively argues that Joyce's fictions open up "unlikely or unconsidered historical possibilities," which can produce "new ways of enacting and writing the history of the future" (256). This attempt to produce a future history is as much a rhetorical as poetic act.

Similarly, Derek Attridge in *Joyce Effects,* argues that the destabilizing effects of Joyce's language exposes problems in seeing History as a political *unconscious* of a text or history as a untranscendable horizon. For Attridge, Jameson's dual sense of history as a) an absent cause and b) narratives edited to be compatible with a culture's self-image cannot find correlates within Joyce's fictions. Attridge claims that Joyce's fiction "denies altogether the existence of the referent or the Real," by which we can understand that Joyce's text fabricate their own Real distinct from the unnarratable 'Real' of History. (81). Attridge's objections are well founded, especially since Joyce's text can be seen to draw historical events into themselves and then to transform them into their own language so as to reconstruct a history of their own. But more

importantly, the tendency of Joyce's texts to supplant the Real of History with their own (ostensibly referenceless) surrogate for that Real, gives rise to the possible incompatibility between Joyce's texts and Jameson's reading strategies. Attridge wants to see Joyce's play with the Real as something that can resituate and rein form Jameson's own argument. But this marks a theoretical and critical impasse: either word play can undermine the certainty of historical referents or historical events are the necessary preconditions for irony and linguistic play. For Jameson, the text "must rather draw the Real into its own texture, and the ultimate paradoxes and false problems of linguistics […] are to be traced back to this process […]" (Jameson 81). Recourse to pragmatic accommodations between the two (e.g. all history is a narrative: fiction is a narrative $\therefore$ all history is fiction) do not serve to explain why Joyce would choose fiction rather than history proper as an artistic medium. At this revealing moment of incompatible methodologies, I must concede that there are appear to be irresolvable antagonisms between Jameson's and Joyce's versions of history. For Jameson, History (the unknowable *absent cause*) is only made palpable as history (the narrative *text* of events over time) as the latter draws the former and weaves it into itself. For Joyce, the play of language saturates history (the *narrative* text) such that History (the unreadable interstices of narration) is produced as a surplus byproduct of narration. Joyce's texts are not contained by history, but neither is History arrested in the play of Joyce's language.

Both Fairhall and Attridge's objections are common in Joyce studies primarily because they are made through the lens of Giambattista Vico, Joyce's favorite historian. They also serve to underscore the incommensurability between Vico and Marx's methodologies. While Marx envisions a history of probable necessities (events that will likely happen, given a set of events),

Vico envisions history as necessary probabilities (events that will happen, given the function of narrative). Vico's New *Science* (*Principii di una scienza nuova d'intorno alla-natura delle nazioni*), completed in 1725 but revised continually throughout his life, argues that the proper study of human sciences should reside in the study of man's social history, especially as this history can be excavated through philology. Vico's study of history turns on the supposition that history is fundamentally narrative and historical epochs can be isolated by attending to the specific focuses of narrative acts. This leads Vico to posit an Age of Gods, an Age of Heroes, and an Age of Man. In each epoch, the poetic wisdom of man—the capacity to invent stories about events in order to comprehend these events—locates an agency of "truth" in a specific conceptual space: first, in a shared cultural mythology where gods command human action under divine law; second, in an age of heroes where super-human figures rule on aristocratic principles; and thirdly, in an age of men where reason deposes the divine-right of heroic power and replaces the rule of the hero with the rule of the *demos.* But since each of these periods arise from the failure of the previous period to adequately rationalize the experience of the human mind, even the Age of Man is subject to its own chaotic destabilization which will unsettle rational certainty and return this development to its earliest incarnation, which will then be repeated. For Vico, there can be no proper *end* to history, since history is not conceived as the development of productive means (as in Marx) but rather as a product of the narrative agency that propels human self-understanding to its point of self-annihilation and reconstruction.

In Vico's science, history is not a chronological series of events or a series of causes and effects, it is entirely based in sign systems (linguistic or otherwise), generated through the creative act of narration. Vico argues that:

> My New Science also traces the *ideal eternal history* through which the history of every nation passes in time; and it follows each nation in its birth, growth, maturity, decline, and fall. Now, according to the first irrefutable principle stated above, the world of nations is clearly as human creation, and its nature reflected in the human mind. Hence, I would venture to say that anyone who studies my Science will retrace this eternal history for himself, recreating it by the criterion that it *had to, has to, and will have to* be so. For there can be no more certain history than that which is recounted by its creator. *(The New Science* 349)

This "recounting" of history is made possible by poetic wisdom, an imaginative activity whereby the human mind creates the objects of its own understanding, projecting its contents and limitations first on external objects and later on patterns of social organization. This presupposes a will-to-understand that develops organically through a creative function from personification, to mute gestures, to language (431). But, again, the point of reversal (the point at which heroes supplant gods and men supplant heroes in the speculative imagination) operates as much for the Age of Man as it does for all others. In the final chapter of the *New Science,* Vico argues that the medieval period of European history is a return to the "barbarism of antiquity," a new phase in history that recapitulates the practices of its earliest phase (1046).

The influence of Vico on Joyce's later works is beyond question. But two major aspects of Vico's text have not been widely applied to Joyce: Vico's historical excavation of irony and the role of rhetoric in historical construction. Both of these aspects can offer counterpositions to the ones posed above by Fairhall and Attridge. In *The Art of Rhetoric* (*Institutiones Oratoriae*), compiled over a 30 year period from 1711 to 1741, Vico discusses irony as a subject very briefly, yet as passing as his definition may be, it is nevertheless relevant. Irony "is the trope by which we say that which is other than as we feel" (*Rhetoric* 145).[4] Irony is a practice of speech opposed to the reality a feeling. In this way, irony is a rhetorical form that enables the formation of a conscious and intentional lie, with or without ill effects. But in the *New Science,* Vico posits

that irony is more than simply a lie. He writes that "[i]rony could clearly arise only in an age capable of reflection, because it consists of a falsehood which reflection disguises in a mask of truth" (*New Science* 408). Thus, irony as a developmental accomplishment of language—something that arises at the moment in history when the human mind has developed a capacity for mental (and likely visual) reflection. Before it is conceived as a creative process by which human intelligence makes history, irony itself is conceptualized as a product of historical development. Only *after* creative intelligence knows itself *as* creative intelligence can it practice the art of dissembling. In this moment, Vico's comment is more consistent with Jameson's arguments (i.e., different modes of production will produce different forms of articulation) than with the position that irony is always at work as a destabilizing agent.

If, following Vico, irony emerges at a determinate moment in the development of language (at the emergence of reflection), then it cannot have *always-already* been part of the creative narrative process of history. It may be sufficient to posit that irony emerges as a rhetorical strategy in the evolution of narrative during an age of reflection that presents information in a veneer of its opposite *and yet* can still be understood as an articulation of something more than itself. Irony always supplies communicatively something more than the statement from which it is uttered. This "something more" is conceptualized as a premiere example of the irreducible nature of Joyce's protean language. But a slight realignment in the conceptualization of irony may show that irony is not a magical effect that results from and resides properly in the domain of aesthetics; irony is a rhetorical practice of *saying more than one says*. This is a rhetoric of multiplicity that can enfold multiple positions within itself, yet still allow certain disputatious positions to crest while others recede. In psychoanalytic terms,

the rhetoric of Joyce's earlier texts appear as symptoms—as something that says "more than" they say. This rhetoric appears as something that even amid the multiplicity of discursive registers and linguistic play still seems *supra*-multiple.

The politics expressed in Joyce's earlier texts such as "A Portrait of the Artist" and *Stephen Hero* reemerge differently in later texts and appear as textual symptoms—as discursive elements that say "more than" they say because they encircle an otherwise inconsistent and self-negating element. These elements originally appear either as essayistic, rhetorical, or even manifesto-like elements in the original drafts that erupt in the later text or are reconstituted through the rewriting process in such a way that they are metonymically aligned. But since they are incomplete as symptoms—not completely integrated within the text that holds them—they remain disruptive and dangerous. At this point, it is necessary to shift toward a larger explication of the symptom as a psychological, material and textual element as well as the Lacanian theoretical discourse which permits such an examination.

1.2 The Symptom: What Seems to be the Trouble

Before commencing on a larger explanation of the structure and function of the symptom in psychoanalytic theory and how this might contribute to a political reading of Joyce's texts, it is imperative to discuss first the registers of subjectivity explicated by Jacques Lacan. Lacan identifies three orders (registers or systems) through which a person organizes his or her experience and relations with his or her self-conception and its place within the network of social relations. Lacan identifies these orders as the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. After a subject's acquisition of language, each of these registers is interdependent, organized around or

apprehended through developmental events or analysis, and constitute a specific dimension of experience.

Lacan's definition of the imaginary is made clearest in his 1949 essay "The Mirror Stage as Formation of the *I* Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience." This order, exemplified by the infant's self-recognition in the mirror, inaugurates an individual's self-conception. Ironically, this self-recognition comes in the form of a *misrecognition* (*Ecrits* 80). A child sees itself in the mirror, and instead of disregarding the image as a lifeless mirage, begins to be aware of itself through this image. But whereas the image the infant sees is a total image of its body—a coordinated, fully-shaped, and coherent image—the reality of its body and its lack of coordination and self-mastery and biological incoherence gives rise to a misrecognition: the "ideal-I" or something registered as "that is me, yet I am not that" (76). This is the formation of the ego, which also manifests itself as alien to the fragmentation of the body. But more than this, the image of the form in the mirror is woven into the infant's self-conception. As Lacan writes in his first seminar, "The image of the other's form is assumed by the subject. Thanks to this surface, situated within the subject, what is introduced into human psychology is his relation between inside and outside whereby the subject knows himself, get acquainted with himself as a body" (*Seminar I* 170). The subject's relationship to his own body is therefore an effect of a misrecognition that affixes on the body a sense of its completeness and stasis.

The imaginary is both a register of alienation and captivity. The infant is locked into a distorted perception of its body that it cannot achieve. Interpersonally, this stage is characterized by a dyadic relationship between the emerging ego and its specular double, between the body of the infant and the maternal care-giver. This is a kind of deadlock. The maturation of the infant

leads away from the dyadic system of the imaginary as a result of a third term—the emergence of the system of language as an organizing principle of subjectivity. This breaking of the dyadic relationship becomes the mark of the symbolic order. Lacan explains the emergence of the symbolic order as a kind of invasion of a superimposed order upon the nascent subject by the law of a symbolic father. As Lacan explains,

> The Oedipus complex means that the imaginary […] is doomed to conflict and ruin. In order for the human being to be able to establish the most natural of relations […] a third party has to intervene, one that is the model of something successful, the model of some harmony. This does not go far enough—there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervention of the order of speech, that is of the father. (*Seminar III* 96)

The imposition of the law of the father—the *non/nom du pere*—requires the infant to accept the prohibition against incest in the mother/child dyad. Language now dominates the infant's relationship to itself and to others. This marks the emergence of the subject *as a subject* because it is now both subjected to the law of the prohibition and a subject *because* of the prohibition. Since the prohibition is voiced in language—in the "No" of the symbolic father—the subject submits to the law of language as its mode of self-organization. In his first seminar, Lacan explains the entrance into the symbolic by way of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. The slave labours because "he must satisfy the desire and the pleasure [*jouissance*] of the other. It is not sufficient for him to plead for mercy, he has to go to work. And when you go to work there are rules, hours—we enter the domain of the symbolic" (*Seminar 1* 223). Hence, the symbolic—which is organized by language—is already characterized as an intersubjective register characterized by a loss of freedom. But the imaginary order, already implicitly bound by the constraints of the self-alienating dyad, is no more or less liberating than the symbolic. As the infant releases itself from the deadlock of the imaginary, it comes into being as a subject (an

ostensibly liberating act) through a submission to the laws of language and an inability to encompass the totality of its experience. The emergence of language also marks the emergence of a subject's unconscious. The unconscious is "a schism of the symbolic system, a limitation, an alienation induced by the symbolic system" (196). From the ordering of experience in language, something falls, misses, spills over from the symbolic system itself. It is an excess of language, law, or experience that for whatever reason, resists symbolization. In order for language to reach a certain level of systemic organization, there must be something greater than this system which allows for its organization. This register is the real.

Lacan defines the real as something that "resists symbolization absolutely" (66). One cannot put into language the very conditions of language since these conditions need to be *symbolized* in order to made palpable. Thus the real eludes the system of symbolization; cannot be articulated. It can only be detected in the failures of the symbolic. How then can one know that the real exists, or that the unconscious exists? The real is opposed to the realm of the imaginary because the imaginary body is made possible by the impossibility of concomitance between the real body and its specular double. In this sense, the body can be seen as the real insofar as it is completely alien to the imaginary conception of the body and subject to the impossibility of its complete symbolization within language. The real is both outside of language and unattainable, though psychoanalysis becomes a practice oriented toward the "kernel of the real" because it is nevertheless present and insistent even though always eludes symbolization (*Seminar 11* 53).

Sketching these orders is essential to the larger project of explicating the idea of the symptom in Lacan. However, at this moment, it is most profitable to turn not to Lacan but to

Slavoj Zizek who in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* compellingly assesses the role of the symptom in Lacanian theory and who returns the idea of the symptom—via Lacan—to the social processes and networks from which the concept originates and in which it thrives. Lacan, as Zizek writes, attributes the discovery of the symptom to Marx rather than Freud. Lacan's discussion of Marx's discovery of symptom comes from the XXII Seminar *R.S.I.?* (1974-75) which is unavailable in English and only partially available in French. But the arguments from this seminar are seminal for Zizek's own arguments about the ontological status of the symptom and its role as both a manifestation of a fundamental antagonism and a necessary precondition of systemic cohesion.

In medicine and in common practice, the symptom is conceptualized as a surface level manifestation of a deeper and more systemic problem. For example, chills, headache, soreness, sinus infection are all symptoms of the flu. In Lacanian psychoanalytic practice, a symptom is certainly still a surface level manifestation of a systemic problem, but more than this, the symptom—and the problem to which it is connected—is an essential constituent of the subject as a subject. In sum, a human subject is a subject because of its symptom; without a symptom, a subject ceases to exist as a subject. The symptom is an effect of symbolization, the introduction of the law as an external and intermediary force in the subject's intersubjective relations, and the creation of a non-symbolizable surplus that materializes as irrational and traumatic. The symptom is fundamentally paradoxical: it sustains a subject even as it threatens to destroy it. It makes "me" even as it makes me "ill." The object of therapy, then, is not to cure the subject of his or her symptom since this "cure" will obliterate the subject as a subject. Instead, the aim of

analysis is *identification* with the symptom; or as Zizek explains, "the analysis reaches its end when the patient recognizes, in the Real of his symptom, the only support of his being" (75).

But to return to the earlier problem: how does the symptom, which is conceived as a private and individual phenomena, come into being, according to Marx, through the alienation already at work in the marketplace? Lacan sees the symptom emerge conceptually in the historical passage from feudalism to capitalism (23). Zizek explains that there in material form, the ostensibly inner, psychological and individual symptom has already been "outed" in the process of exchange and that, in fact, the private "symptom" is merely a psychological manifestation of what is already at work in practice. Whereas in feudalism men had fetishized their relationship with other men (as in the "king" or "duke"), capitalism dissolves the spell over "kings" and "queens" through the Enlightenment conception of natural freedom. But the fetish that elevated a king to the role of absolute master does not simply dissolve. Instead, it slides to a new location in the objects and modes of production (25). When artisan production is replaced by production for the marketplace, the prior fetishization of men is displaced onto modes and objects of production. As Zizek explains,

> This is why one has to look for the discovery of the symptom in the way Marx conceived of the passage from feudalism to capitalism. With the establishment of bourgeois society, the relations of domination and servitude are *repressed:* formally, we are apparently concerned with free subjects whose interpersonal relations are discharged of all fetishism; the repressed truth: that of the persistence of domination and servitude—emerges in a symptom which subverts the ideological appearance of equality, freedom, and so on. (*The Sublime Object of Ideology* 26)

The symptom—in this example, the persisting relation between master and slave—is displaced from the field of men onto the exchange of objects. The system of capitalism continues to work, as it were, through the activity of the symptom. The irreducible *lack* of freedom (the workers

sale of their labour and continual enslavement to a system that expropriates their value) makes possible the other forms of freedom that bourgeois society introduces into the public sphere (22).

One final and essential aspect of the efficacy of the symptom has not yet been mentioned: what Zizek calls the "non-knowledge" of the subject who participates in the system made possible through the symptom. The symptom holds the subject together because its irrational, antagonistic, self-negating element is repressed. The emancipation of the serf from the aristocrat causes his slavery to be written elsewhere—in slavery to the commodity and to the expropriation of surplus value by the capitalist (25, 34). Bourgeois society is already structured around an irrational element, and this historically determined element is the proletariat. The working-classes are the symptom of bourgeois society—a paradoxical, irrational entity that makes the system work, but whose de-abstraction from capitalism would obliterate capitalism as an existing structure. The historical recognition that the working-class are the irrational element of capitalism that both affirms and threatens its existence is already understood by Marx in *The Communist Manifesto.* But since 1848, capitalism has been able to "enjoy its symptom," to borrow Lacan's gnomic mandate, by transforming its limitations—commodity fetishism, proletarian revolutions, emerging and competing modes of production into itself.

How is capitalism able to enjoy its symptom—to constitute itself despite the overwhelming number of antagonisms that beset its continued existence? As Zizek argues, capitalism has been able to internalize its contradictions so that capitalism continually transforms its limits into itself, making its revolution permanent. At the moments at which capitalism breaks down, or when its contradictions seem to unravel the threads which hold it together, it is able to use its incoherent loose threads to restitch itself coherently. By seeing capitalism through

the prism of its symptom, Zizek claims that we can see how and why capitalism has managed to cohere even throughout historical, political and economic threats which have been able to shake its structure but not topple it. Using the terminology of Lacan's orders, capitalism has been able to symbolize its real antagonisms, to enfold and recode its traumatic irrationality within its systemic coherence. And even when it is unable to properly symbolize the potentially destabilizing real, it is able to fall back upon imaginary constructions of order and coherence.

The potential for capitalism to enjoy its symptom through the self-regulating mechanisms of the symptom have led Joseph Valente to question the compatibility between Lacanian and Marxist conceptualizations of the subject. In "Lacan's Marxism, Marxism's Lacan," Valente argues that Zizek's twinning of Marxism and Lacanian theory cannot reconcile the contradictory apprehension of the symptom in both theories. Where for Marx the symptoms of capitalism will ultimately destabilize and disrupt the mechanics of the marketplace, for Lacan, the mechanics of the marketplace are guaranteed by their inefficacy. For Valente, Zizek's error rests in equating Lacan's concept of surplus enjoyment (*plus-de-jouir*) with the materialist contradiction (surplus value) (Valente, 155-56). While the systemic contradiction pulls the system of capitalism further apart according to Marx, the same contradiction maintains the system or subject and makes it more rather than less coherent. In sum, according to Lacanian theory, capitalism can never achieve a kind of balance—can never "cure" its symptom. Its contradictions are formative, the process of self-resolution is precisely a reintegration of its contradictions as an ontological necessity. As Valente argues, Zizek "conflates the need for capitalist transformation with its prospective achievement, converting surplus value from a point of dangerous unpredictability to a guarantor of dialectical sublation or ideal resolution" (156). Thus, as Valente argues, the

systematic breakdown of capitalism does not lead to a historically revolutionary moment where modes of production and class struggle appear as an uncontainable Real which obliterates the system as a system. Zizek's sense of Marxism evades a confrontation with the evolutionist aspect of Marxism. And while this may be fine for Zizek, this is a significant problem for Marxism because Marx still proceeds to argue that the contradictions in capitalism will not resolve themselves. Zizek may give us a Lacan pinned to Marx, but Valente effectively argues that "Zizek's Marx" is not "Marx's Marx." To follow Lacan's logic, capitalism is here to stay if it can continually reintegrate its anomalous contradictions and thereby preserve its coherence (even as a fundamentally incoherent process). But elsewhere, Zizek addresses this problem in two distinct arguments: the first addresses the inevitability of class struggle while the second addresses the fantasy-construction of a closed and coherent system.

In the forward to *For They Know Not What They Do,* Zizek laments that his arguments in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* focus on "the notion of the Real as the impossible Thing-in-itself" and that this "opens the way to the celebration of failure: to the idea that every act ultimately misfires, and that the properly ethical stance is heroically to accept this failure" (xii). In so doing, Zizek acknowledges that the political consequences of his initial conceptualization of Marxism cannot be achieved. This tension leads away from a Marxist-Lacanian theory toward one that undermines Marxism-as-praxis through Lacanian criticism. One way to resuscitate this model—and thereby employ its most fruitful aspects—is to reconceptualize the notion of class struggle as a more complex destabilization of capitalist systemic coherence. As Zizek argues, class struggle is a structuring principle of capitalism, but it is not "a kind of ultimate guarantee authorizing us to grasp society as a rational totality" (100). Here, class

struggle seems to lose its *symptomatic* quality: it is no longer conceived as something that holds the system together and also dismembers that system. Class struggle is not a "positive entity" but rather a "point of reference" that functions through its absence because every social phenomenon is another attempt to "conceal and 'patch up' the rift of class struggle, to efface its traces […]" (100).

Class struggle is, in itself, no longer strictly a symptom because it is elevated to the status of the Real. And the consequences of this reconfiguration of class struggle as *real* imply that all domesticating, resymbolizing efforts to reinstall the *real* of class antagonisms are ultimately impossible. Class struggle, then, is not a *symptom* of capitalism as much as it is "*an effect which exists only in order to efface the causes of its existence*" (Zizek 100). In other words, class struggle cannot be reintegrated into the logic of capitalism: it is not the "limit" of capitalism (insofar as this limit is capable of reintegration). To take this the concept one step further, class struggle is the limit of capitalism's ability to transform its limitations. Therefore, class struggle cannot be conceived as a problem that the self-correcting mechanisms of capitalism can continually anticipate and reintegrate. It is, instead, the limit of all possible reintegration.

By reconceiving the role of class struggle as something that absolutely resists symbolization (i.e. the Lacanian real), Zizek investigates the imaginary qualities of continual renewal made possible, ostensibly, through the transformation of productive impediments into a new source of power. The sequence of this logic reveals itself as a closed system that can continually reproduce itself coherently. But through Lacan, Zizek explains that the conceptualization of capitalism as a closed circle is an imaginary construction built to conceal the problematic and traumatic reality of its origins. Capitalism generates a myth of its origins

only after it has achieved predominance as an organizing force of production, exchange, and social interaction. This is the myth of "primitive accumulation" whereby pre-capitalist, pre-industrial man acquired capital and income through diligence and thrift (211). But this original is essentially mythical because it is already conceptualized in the logic of capitalism itself—these figures are not "pre" capitalist in any sense of the term. Instead, they are already formulated retroactively through the language and ideology of full-blown capitalism.

The ideological myth of accumulation permits capitalism to justify its present-day activities of exploitation and extraction of surplus-value because it presents this false history as a "true" or "real" historical precondition of the present. When capitalism emerges as a "closed circle," a coherent and stable entity that transforms its limits into its own source of power, it does so only on the footing of an illusory projection of its present imaginary self-representation onto its origins. This has the effect of concealing its rise as a predominant form of social organization as a necessary and necessarily ephemeral evolutionary period of economic development (211). The task of dialectical analysis, according to Zizek, will unmask the "'fetish' of an Origin by means of which the circle (the synchronous system) endeavors to conceal its vicious character" (213). The result of this analysis should reveal the contingent nature of the system, the methods by which it organizes its own operations through an exclusion of its traumatically irrational aspects, and how its self-reproduction is, in essence, a means of forestalling its inevitable confrontation with the impossibility of its coherence. This process—which in Lacanian theory is conceived as the analytic session—is, for Zizek, the result of dialectical analysis whereby the system (in this case, capitalism) preserves itself through an imaginary conceptualization of its totality and coherence. This imaginary conceptualization is only necessary when the symbolic is

no longer effectively able to reintegrate the surplus of the real. So, at this point, it is again necessary to ask, how can the emergence of the real (as a traumatic and irrational, self-negating element) have any revolutionary influence on any system if the system is already built to enclose the real through symbolic reintegration or through the fantasy of system completeness? The only answer must be for the real to remain open somehow, to remain incoherent either to the symbolic or incomplete to the imaginary.

The answer to this problem may be found through a return to Marx rather than a further elucidation of Lacan. My discussions of Lacan and Zizek have already assumed, perhaps unfairly, a tacit familiarity with Marxism on the part of the reader. But in order to more fully explain the way in which Marxist analysis may supplement the Lacanian concept of subjectivity and agency it is imperative to make the Marxist analysis of consciousness as a product of material life more explicit. Whereas in Freud's schema human agency is conceived as a dialectical tension between unconscious impulses and conscious activity and in Lacan's schema, human agency is a product the submission of the subject to the mechanisms of language, for Marx, human agency is a product realized through the modes of production and the conflicts between social classes within a given mode of production. For Marx, one does not build or write because he knows himself and his needs. Rather, one's needs determine production, and production then determines the consciousness of this production. Human consciousness—knowing what we do—is the result of production, rather than the reverse. The text that will bear heavily on this discussion is *The German Ideology* in which Marx rejects the Young Hegelian propensity for spiritual or theological answers to problems that are fundamentally material.

Though *The German Ideology* is occasionally lamented as a "humanist" blip in an otherwise scientific and analytical system, Marx does not proceed analytically from the standpoint that all people must be politically and economically liberated because this is an ethical imperative or simply the "right thing to do." On the contrary, the historical development of the modes of production has replaced the most basic forms of servitude (serfdom and slavery) with more highly organized forms of labour and production. This historical development can be analyzed through the passages from tribal, ancient, feudal, to capitalist modes of production, each of which creates a greater degree of intercourse and exchange between men, and corresponds to new forms of agency insofar as the division of labour, the purposes of work, and the time needed to produce also change. *The German Ideology* is an early attempt by Marx to formulate a materialist history and its consequences on subjectivity, agency, and consciousness. But all of Marx's conclusions are ultimately produced as objections and reactions to the non-material historical analyses of Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and Max Stirner.

Unlike these three philosophers, Marx asserts that consciousness is a product of material production rather than religion, theology, or egoism. Religion, theology, egoism can all be read more productively as results of productive processes—as the side-effects of the passage from feudalism to capitalism during one particular phase of historical development. In the preface, Marx argues that "the products of their brains have got out of their hands" (23). This quote contains an unsurprisingly double resonance: while on the one hand, the products of men's brains (i.e. consciousness) have gotten out of the control of philosophical understanding (i.e. "out of their hands"), at the same time, the products of men's brains are precisely *products* that arise from their hands (i.e., their material production). In order for philosophy to reinvigorate its

investigations of consciousness and subjectivity, it must provide an empirical examination of the material production and social exchange that gives rise to language, consciousness, agency, and subjectivity. This perspective does not reduce all consciousness to determinate productive capacities on the part of any particular individual, but asserts that all experience of consciousness *as* consciousness is instigated by and anchored to the productive modes of any particular person at a determinate location in the world during a specific period of history. Consciousness, if it is shown to be a product of production, changes as much as any other material aspect of human existence throughout history. Literature, psychology, and other social non-material practices are as much subject to the changes inaugurated by the ebb and flow of the modes of production as are methods of transportation, manufacturing strategies, or systems of exchange.

In this text, Marx does not give a specific definition of ideology, but instead uses ideology in a generally pejorative sense to indicate the theoretical block that restricts German philosophers from engaging material production. Ideology, then, in this discussion of Marx's 1845 text, does not carry the same resonance that it does for the philosophers of the later twentieth-century who build on and develop Marx's early conception. For the purposes of this argument, and in relating Marxism to Lacanian analysis, ideology itself is not the main subject of investigation. Suffice to say that for Marx, ideology is the world of letters distinct from the world in which letters are produced, printed, distributed, or sold. The Young Hegelians "consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men" and are only engaging one another in speculative discourse rather than an empirical investigation (*The German Ideology* 30). As a result, these ostensibly radical philosophers are "the staunchest conservatives" since their

investigations in no way return critically to the conditions that make their own investigations possible.

In order to distance his own critical apparatus from that of the Young Hegelians, Marx begins to elucidate a materialist conception of history built around the following assertion:

> [Human beings] begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence, men are indirectly producing their material life. (*The German Ideology* 30)

As soon as humans are able to meet their needs through production rather than on sheer chance of hunting and gathering, they have begun to produce themselves as subjects. This already assumes a kind of social organization in place such as a division of labour, a mode of exchange, a strategy for cultivation and distribution. In other words, productive capabilities are made possible by a division of labour, yet a division of labour is only necessary when production for subsistence is developed and expanded. The division of labour also creates new organizations of social intercourse and forms of property because the product of labour—subsistence itself—is made possible through social rather than individual activity.[5] As productive capacity increases, so do social networks: i.e., modes of production have, throughout history created the tribe, the state, the estate, the city and the town, agrarian and industrial regions. Each of these possesses specific modes of production and social networks that make continued subsistence possible. Class relations between slaves and citizens, the division between agrarian and other forms of production arrives on the world stage at the same time as the "town" and "city" precisely because some forms of property are moveable and others are not. The concepts of private property, land-ownership, ownership of the means of production, and private possession come into being as a result of the further social development and exchange. The evolution of social intercourse,

communication, alienation, wealth and penury, are, again, anchored to material production and capable of drifting within certain limits of their determinate grounding. The crises of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which saw the decay of monarchic systems and the rise of a mercantile class elucidate precisely the ways in which political life and power are contingent upon the productive modes of a determinate location. These political and philosophical crises are the very criteria from which Marxism itself emerges as a historical analytic method that contributes to an analysis of consciousness and social being. Only after positing the ground of a productive capacity arising from necessity can Marx argue for a materialist conception of social being and consciousness.

For Marx, then, production of subsistence is an ontological premise on which a concept of man as a subject is predicated. Only after the division of labour is established by men who, driven by necessity, form a social network with other men, can men's consciousness of themselves as productive agents engaged in a network of productive activity emerge. Labour is, already itself a division in that it is an externalization of the productive capacity, which is then only partially recognized as a process of self-production. For example, when one produces a chair, one only produces such a commodity because the concept of "rest" is already implicit in the object's construction. Before chairs, one could just as easily sit on the ground, but the act of sitting on the ground neither entails nor contains any labour or self-production. After the chair is built, the practical act of sitting in the chair gives rise to the consciousness that one's labour has produced an object on which a subject may rest his or her legs. The act of "resting" in this case, also creates a subject who rests—one whose work has entailed a period of labour, of course, but also a subject whose labour also enables the subject to shape him or herself as one who has

worked and is now at rest. The body itself changes shape—either from vertical standing or from sitting on the ground—and takes on a new form from which a new consciousness emerges. For Marx, this is a basic presumption in *The German Ideology,* but the argument comes to fruition when the division of labour develops into one in which a subject becomes alienated or estranged from the products of his or her labour and therefore estranged from his or her self-production and consciousness (i.e., self-conception).

According to Marx, the problem that the philosophers of his era have made has been their exclusion of the material conditions that give rise to consciousness, which then makes it impossible for them to conceive of how the products of consciousness become alien to men precisely because consciousness is anchored to the products of their labour, which also become further alienated through the history of productive development. For this reason, it is necessary to quote from *The German Ideology* at some length.

> Definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. […] The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they *actually* are, i.e., as they act, produce, materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will. The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men—the language of social life. […] Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being, and the being of men is their actual life process. […] The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-processes […] It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness. (*The German Ideology* 36-37)

This passage is considerably striking because of it argues that all ideas and conceptions are dependent on the mode of production and the division of labour. But this nearly utopian sense of man's self-creation is met with self-negating forces already at work within productive modes. Because the division of labour makes necessarily sets limits to the possible labour of the individual, the individual is forced to make or choose a productive function that negates the full development of his or her capacity as a self-generated subject. This initial form of self-conception already contains a knot of self-negation commonly referred to as "alienation" or "estrangement" in which labour is "not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they are thus no longer able to control." (48). Thus, the Marxist system of self-production is built around an antagonistic demand, the results of which are paradoxically productive insofar as the system itself already contains its self-subverting, alien and alienating origin.

In classical Marxism, the *telos* of the analysis of capitalism remains the unknotting of capitalist contradictions through the revolutionary action of the working class. As Marx writes in *The Communist Manifesto,* the working classes are the foundation of capitalism because their labour (and its expropriation by the capitalist) forms the basis of production and exchange. The bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production), who were the revolutionary class in the passage from feudalism to capitalism, become a reactionary class in preserving their property and wealth by subjugating and expropriating the labour of the proletariat. Marx writes that "The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself. But not only has the bourgeoisie forges the weapons that bring death to itself,

it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians" (226). The working class, then, become to the bourgeoisie, the labour force that will historically become conscious of itself as a working class, conscious of the expropriation of its labour by its constant penury, and will undo the system that has made them produce without allowing them to re-integrate the products of their labour into their lives. For Marx, the alienation created by the capitalist expropriation of surplus-value is "unendurable" and the contradictions between production-expropriation-property will efface the capitalist mode of production and necessitate the emergence of another form of production.

Marx locates the rifts in production and the unendurable alienation of workers as the motor causes of historical transformation, and in the context of Joyce—as for Lacan and Zizek—it is precisely alienation from and within language that ruptures subjectivity and inaugurates its radical potential transformations. The language of Joyce's fiction, read through the lens Zizek's notion of class struggle as the "limit" of capitalism's systemic coherence, also holds open its own ruptures and exposes its own contradictions. Joyce's texts are composed of disruptive elements that threaten to continually destabilize the text, and binding elements which recompose fractious material in a way that pushes beyond and belies the fantasies of formal completeness. Joyce's fiction does not foreclose its possibilities, even though by not doing so it is threatened with its own systemic incoherence. Joyce's texts are constantly in a state of revolution, and Joyce labors to find new ways to unravel fantasies of coherence and twist language to transforms itself. The texts themselves are performance spaces where historical ruptures, class differences, and productive clashes are displayed and dramatized as contradictions that cannot be reintegrated into any given symbolic or social order.

All the theoretical arguments discussed in this chapter grow from Marx's conception of a revolutionary material consciousness embedded within and growing from production. Joyce identified himself as a socialist for several years and not a Marxist, but his work nonetheless absorbs and amplifies the possibilities and limitations of this system of thought. Joyce's own petit-bourgeois background and aspirations toward a new Irish intellectual class distinct from ascendancy, Catholic, and nationalist movements forced him outside the prevailing political movements in Ireland during the first decade of the twentieth century. Joyce was not working class, though in his early years, he was often closer to becoming a member of the working class than he would have like to have been. His reluctance to align himself politically with the established revolutionary groups of his time is not the result of an unwillingness to act politically. Joyce did not see the fruits of immediate direct action, but instead saw value in the slow, dark cultivation of revolutionary consciousness that grows from daily quotidian actions. Thus, he endeavored to sow the seeds of a consciousness that is capable of social transformation by dramatizing the contradictions that compose and interrupt imaginary totalities. When readers confront the most estranging elements of Joyce's fictions, readers also confront the alienating elements that compose language and history. Joyce moves these from the blind spots of our vision and places them under his narrative microscope. By actualizing readers' confrontations with difficult language, by presenting life as it could be lived, and by creating fictions that become subject for deliberation, Joyce's fictions rhetorically enable revolutionary materialist consciousness.

[1] Andrew Gibson argues that Mulligan's complicity with Haines makes him a court jester in Stephen's eyes and that Mulligan's attitudes prevent Ireland from throwing off the yoke of English domination. Andrew Gibson, *Joyce's Revenge* (New York: Oxford, 2002) 30-32.

[2] Karl Radek's 1934 denouncement of *Ulysses* as a bourgeois text now appears more of a lamentable ideological remnant from the Stalinist demand for a proletarian art. As Radek argued, "What is the basic feature of Joyce? His basic feature is the conviction that there is nothing big in life—no big events, no big people, no big ideas […]." Hardly anyone would agree with Radek's assertion that Joyce presents small events, small people, or small ideas. Karl Radek, "Contemporary World Literature and the Tasks of Proletarian Art," *The Marxist Internet Archive.* ed. Andy Blunden. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1934/sovietwritercongress.htm/>.

[3] As Lukacs argues, Scott's acute attention to realism was stronger than his own class impulses, and as an observer of events, Scott presented in his fictions the contradictions that would inevitably lead to the fall of Aristocracy. Flaubert, on the other hand, was not an acute observer, and in his historical novel *Salaambo* merely presents history as a "window dressing" divorced from the conflicts and contradictions of its milieu. Georg Lukacs, *The Historical Novel* (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1983).

[4] Giambattista Vico, *The Art of Rhetoric* (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996) 145.

[5] In *The German Ideology,* Marx writes, "The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of property, i.e., the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument and product of labour" (32).

CHAPTER 3

REISSUING THE CONFEDERATE WILL

"Man and woman, out of you comes the nation that is to come, the lightning of your masses in travail; the competitive order is employed against itself, the aristocracies are supplanted; and amid the general paralysis of an insane society, the confederate will issues in action."

James Joyce. January 7, 1904

"We can't change the country. Let us change the subject."

Stephen Dedalus. June 16, 1904

This chapter will investigate the evolving conception of the artistic subject as a fulcrum of social emancipation through its initial construction and reconstitution in Joyce's three "Portraits": the 1904 essay "A Portrait of the Artist," the incomplete and posthumously published *Stephen Hero,* and the 1916 *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*.[1] The final passage of Joyce's 1904 essay "A Portrait of the Artist," the first epigraph of this chapter, is one of the clearest statements of a historically constructed and evolving subject of political action in Joyce's work. At the same time, Stephen Dedalus's ambiguous comment to Bloom in the Eumaeus episode of *Ulysses*, the second epigraph of this chapter, suggests an attitude that national or international political change is impossible. Yet, the "subject" that can be changed in Stephen's comment is multiple and ambiguous: it is at once the topic at hand, the political life of Edwardian-era Ireland, the subject of history, and the psychological subject who may be considered, in Lacanian terms, as divided between the reality of his or her body and his or her inscription within the domain of language. Though the country may be considered beyond the

limits of the potentially changeable, the subject is not. There are three ways in which I would like to read Stephen's comment: first, *let us ignore the subject (the topic of discussion) and concentrate our energies elsewhere;* second, *let us work to repress the object of our consternation (both the topic of discussion and the individual who discusses);* and third, *let us change the subject (the individual who is subjected to the conditions of a degrading and limiting ideology).* These subjects, in this gnomic and ironic comment, have the potential to be changed, though there is no guarantee that they will be. In general terms, I argue that the genesis of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* arises from a tension between the text's rhetorical articulation and recomposition of a gradual and evolving politically transformative subjectivity (as it is articulated in Marxist theory), and the impossible cause (more fully articulated in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory) that enables the possibility of reissuing a subject capable of transformative action.[2]

Though Joyce would not finish *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* until 1914 and would wait until 1916 for its publication, he marks its inception in Dublin 1904 at the conclusion of the novel. The final published text is a result of twelve years of mitigated successes, geographic relocations, abandonments and rediscoveries, enlistments of support from the artistic community, and innumerable revisions. The tortuous compositional history of this text is well known: Joyce drafted the short piece "A Portrait of the Artist" on January 7, 1904 and immediately upon its rejection for publication began revising this piece into the longer work *Stephen Hero*; he drafted *Stephen Hero* from February 1904 until 1905 when he abandoned the novel to write what would become *Dubliners.* At the end of 1906 he began to rewrite *Stephen Hero* before abandoning it again in 1909. The first completed chapter of *Portrait* was published

in *The Egoist* on his birthday, February 2, 1914 and the remaining chapters would be published serially (though truncatedly through error and publisher's fear of suppression) until September 1915. Grant Richards, the intended publisher, rejected the novel in May 1915, and it was finally published at the end of 1916. The final two lines of the novel, "Dublin 1904" and "Trieste 1914" mark historically and spatially the pains and triumphs which met one another in equal measure (Ellmann 353-54).

But though Joyce concludes the novel with spatial and temporal markers of its inception and completion, these markers do not specify that the 1914 *Portrait* has resulted from the recomposition of the 1904 "A Portrait of the Artist" and the abandoned *Stephen Hero.* Are these texts simply drafts of a finalized text or do they warrant further consideration as relatively autonomous, self-sustaining texts? Susan Stanford Friedman argues compellingly that the three are "distinct parts of a larger composite text," but the text's final temporal markers resist making these previous drafts decidedly detached kernels distinct from the published text.[3] As we know, Joyce fully intended the 1904 "Portrait" for publication. But in less than a month after its rejection, he began recasting it into *Stephen Hero* (Ellmann 148). I suggest that we read these three texts as discretely autonomous texts initially intended for publication, but also read the first two as drafts that were plundered, revisited and revised for a finalized text. The consequences of such a double-take should reveal the interweaving and contamination of the three and the relative autonomy of each which makes such interweaving possible in the first place. By viewing each version of the novel as part of a larger text, as Friedman does, we are able to read this composite as one whose "parts are like the imperfectly erased layers of a palimpsest, one whose textual and political unconscious can be read with a psychoanalytic, intertextual approach" (Friedman 22-

23). The palimpsest, by design of its composition, is a multilayered accumulation of signifiers that become progressively unreadable with each additional layer. To sift through this textual mass, it is likewise valuable to take the view that each successive rewriting of the text is an attempt to unwrite the previous (28). Such rewriting and unwriting becomes a reissuing of the former, a recasting of the previous which changes not only the generic location of the text, but the way the texts conceive a locus of aesthetic and emancipatory action.

The process of revision is most regularly understood as an attempt to perfect the imperfections of earlier work. In the genesis of *Portrait,* then, it is necessary to ask what perfections remain and what messes are sifted from the progressive revisions of "A Portrait of the Artist" and what motivates the transformation. In what ways does the subject of the text, as both the conception of a subject of philosophical and practical agency and the substance of the narrative, change? What are the implications of the transformations of the formal, psychological, and political subjects that are reissued in each successive text and what are the consequences of these transfigurations? An attempt to address these questions must account for the text's tripartite character as well as its transformations from the 1904 "Portrait" to the inception and abandonment of *Stephen Hero* to the finalized and published *Portrait* of 1916. The various reissuings of the text are motivated on the one hand by the constant jostling and friction between the essay and the novel forms, and, on the other hand, by the socio-political tensions constituted within and alongside these forms from which a reimagined political subject is produced.

The sifting process of revision shares an affinity with a metallurgical metaphor of the process of assaying or essaying. To "assay" or "essay" an alloy or amalgam involves chemically testing its composition to determine its constituent parts. In this broadly metaphoric sense, I

consider Joyce's process of revision as the work of a metallurgical essayist who continues in revision the essayistic work of the initial composition. At first glance, the metallurgical metaphor strikes a dissonant chord with Stephen Dedalus's concluding diary entry in *Portrait* where he attempts to "forge in the smithy of my soul" an identity for his race. Where the metallurgical forger seeks to create, meld and amalgamate, the metallurgical essayist seeks to break down, test, decompile. To extend the metallurgical metaphor to the writer, the essaying process of revision reveals the primary attempt *to test* the composition, not necessarily to extract the precious from the imperfect. Within the later texts the forger attempts to cover the essayist, but since the essayist refuses to remain wholly covered, the text exposes a friction between its desires to compose a national or international consciousness and its doubt that such a composition is practicable.

On January 7, 1904, Joyce began and completed, presumably in one sitting, the short composition "A Portrait of the Artist"—a title suggested to him by his brother Stanislaus—in his sister Mabel's notebook. This primal scene of textual inception is made possible from material provided by the family. Joyce composed his work under the title of the brother in the pages of the sister and the issued text bears the trace of its race. The rejected text remained unpublished until 1960, and has since been called a "narrative essay,"[4] "part manifesto, part narrative,"[5] and something approaching "non-fictional autobiography" that cannot be satisfactorily understood as either "essay or story."[6] More recent discussions of this text have referred to it simply as an "essay" though they have not addressed the specific generic contours of the text that would formally distinguish it as an essay.[7] Perhaps like the editors who rejected it, critical tradition has been at a loss for an appropriate category for this text. Yet in all of these attempts to place the

text into a generic category, one aspect of the text remains consistent: it is *essay-like* if not an essay *in toto.* The critical sense that this text is generically more than one may indeed result from the hybridity of the essay form.

In his defense of the essay, "The Essay as Form," Theodor Adorno notes that critics have too eagerly lambasted the essay for its lack of tradition, its hybridity, its apparent randomness and fragmentation, its lack of independence from the scientific and artistic models from which it borrows, its disconnect from accepted philosophical categories and its supposed betrayal of intellectual freedom.[8] But while other critics expressly consider these aspects to be limitations or flaws in the essay form, Adorno applauds them as its merits. The essay is not dependent upon artistic and scientific writing as much as it relies on "luck and chance" and "reflects a childlike freedom that catches fire, without scruple, on what others have already done" (Adorno 93). This childlike freedom is not parasitism or dependence upon other compositional models, but rather a hybridization of artistic autonomy and a scientific "claim to truth free from aesthetic semblage" (94). The essay is an outlaw because it operates beyond the laws of *de facto* artistic and scientific writing; by interpreting experience, it exposes the myth of unmediated knowledge., According to Adorno's sense of critical and political injustice, the essayist has been historically "slapped as if with a yellow star" (99, 93).

The essay reveals the mediating forces through which knowledge is aesthetically produced. Further,

> [T]he essay urges the reciprocal interaction of its concepts, in the process of intellectual experience. In the essay, concepts do not build a continuum of operations, thought does not advance in a single direction, rather the aspects of the argument interweave as in a carpet. […] Actually, the thinker does not think but rather transforms himself into an arena of intellectual experience, without simplifying it. While even traditional thought draws its impulses from such

> experience, such thought by its form eliminates the remembrance of these impulses. The essay, on the other hand, takes them as its model, without simply imitating them as reflected form; it mediates them through its own conceptual organization; it proceeds, so to speak, methodically unmethodically. ("The Essay as Form" 101)

The dialectical tension between method and the unmethodical is preserved in the composition through the praxis of an agent who mediates the subject of knowledge. Envisioned as such, the essay transforms both the thought and the thinking subject by making the latter the site of experience of the former. If we consider Joyce's 1904 essay vis-à-vis Adorno's model of essayistic operations, we are reading a "portrait of a subject as a mediating field of thought." It is a working-through of the relationship between aesthetic practice and the lived reality of a historical subject. This should not come as a surprise because the tone of the essay is at once that of a writer discovering a symbolic form for himself and presenting himself and his body as the site of that discovery. As a subject divided between his body and his attempt to symbolically configure that body, Joyce in his essay illustrates precisely the Lacanian division between the Real and Symbolic registers since the slippage of signifiers makes complete containment of the Real by the Symbolic impossible.

The 1904 "Portrait" is an experimental combination of non-fictional, exhortatory rhetoric, autobiography, and plotted narrative in which the essay becomes authorized as the site of bodily, artistic and political discovery. The text draws its hortative authority (as a type of deliberative rhetoric) from a narrative of aesthetic conversion. The text oscillates between the writer himself as the parental figure (i.e., bodily site) of the political change he desires and the writer as a precondition of the men and women from whom the "confederate will issues in action." In the second case, the necessity to issue the confederate will through a continually developing and

evolving conception of the artistic subject (here an issuing and essaying rather than issued and essayed subjectivity) is paramount to the realization of a subjectivity attempting to construct an aesthetic capable of creating political effects.

In the first sentence of the essay, Joyce writes, "The features of infancy are not commonly reproduced in the adolescent portrait for, so capricious are we, that we cannot or will not conceive the past in any other than its iron, memorial aspect" (257). Already, the essay bespeaks itself through metallurgical metaphor and suggests that a reevaluation of the past as "iron" and immovable is desirable. As Joyce continues, "Our world [...] is, for the most part estranged from those of its members who seek through some art, by some process of the mind as yet untabulated, to liberate from the personalized lumps of matter that which is their individuating rhythm, the first or formal relation of their parts" (258). This sentence begins to formulate a tension between the desire to *essay* (in this sense, to free a "rhythm" from a "lump") and a desire to *forge* (to reintegrate the "estranged" artists with the larger world) that I suggest underlies all three of the portraits. The essay also announces a concern with history as a "fluid succession of presents" that must evade the errors of noncausal historiography if it is to be more than "iron" or memorial.[9] To clarify this point, the past is erroneously seen as iron when it is not seen as a fluidic chain of causes. Instead, Joyce the essayist confronts history as a series of presents, each which is the precondition of the latter; and by breaking down the elements of the past into discretely identifiable parts (*essaying)*, these parts can then be viewed as part of the process through which history is forged.

The essayist of the "Portrait" measures his past successes and failures in rhetorically and aesthetically inspiring the souls of others to experience his own rage against false consciousness

and class exploitation. He imagines himself as something approaching a social realist, an artistic laborer:

> Like an alchemist he bent upon his handiwork, bringing together the mysterious elements, separating the subtle from the gross. For the artist the rhythms of phrase and period, the symbols of word and allusion, were paramount things. And was it any wonder that out of this marvelous life, wherein he had annihilated and rebuilt experience, laboured and despaired, he came forth at last with a simple purpose—to reunite the children of spirit, jealous and long-divided, to reunite them against fraud and principality ("A Portrait of the Artist" 261).

Yet the "children of the spirit" are inhibited by the very things that signal compromise to Joyce throughout his career: "social limitations, inherited apathy of race, an adoring mother, the Christian fable" (262). In the final *Portrait,* this list of detriments becomes "nation, *language,* and religion," and while nation and religion remain and language is added, social limitations and an adoring mother are erased (203). Friedman persuasively argues that though Stephen Dedalus's mother is initially presented as a limitation to his artistic desires in "Portrait," she is noncensorious in *Stephen Hero,* and that she is increasingly censored by the text of *Portrait.* The displacement of rage from "mother" to "language" substitutes language metonymically for the mother along the signifying chain.[10] The desire to reinvent a language, then, may also give voice to a desire for the essayist to assume the imaginary role of his own mother.

Though the essay does not detail precisely what qualifies as a social limitation, it does, curiously, distinguish such a limitation from culturally or genetically inherited traits and we might conclude that "social limitations" are limitations arising from a lower or working-class position. These might include a false sense of class superiority that obstructs class-consciousness; poverty and necessity, which compel one to toil unfulfillingly; the necessity to work, which prohibits continuing education; or a willingness to accept a reified historical

perspective. The artist here imagines himself as a laborer, an alchemist and architect whose work promotes an agenda opposing deception and aristocracy; his work is not devoid of a political program but instead, he sees his aesthetic work as already politicized. Yet in this initial instance, he recognizes that his use of rhythm and symbol have not achieved the rhetorical ends he has desired.

This sense of rejection does not cause the speaker to abandon his project: it refocuses it. The failure of the artist to inspire others leads to his own isolation, what the essayist calls "the first principle of artistic economy," and in his isolation, he views a solitary figure who stands as a metaphor for his own isolation. Initially, he sees islanded "figures" wading on the beach, but in the next paragraph, the "figures" become an islanded "figure" as he addresses the "beneficent *one*" (italics mine) who has presented him with a metaphor for his own artistic and political isolation.

> Beneficent one! (The shrewdness of love was in the title) thou camest timely, as a witch to the agony of the self-devourer, an envoy from the fair courts of life. How could he thank thee for that enrichment of the soul by thee consummated? Mastery of art had been achieved in irony; asceticism of intellect had been a mood of indignant pride: but who had revealed him to himself but thou alone? ("A Portrait of the Artist" 263)

It is not the figure itself directly but the reflection of the thinker back to himself through the figure that inspires a change in the subject. She allows him—as does the essay form itself — to view the writer as a site of self-discovery. The body of the writer, in this sense, becomes a palimpsest in which former failures are written over with contemplative silence, isolation, and irony. In the image of the artist as suffering self-devourer, we can also see the essayist who makes himself the material for artistic discovery and expression. This self-consuming action is doubled: it is the effort to redeem politically those suffering under "fraud and principality," and it

is also a desire for the artistic subject to issue himself in a new form. This vision writes over the earlier failed experiment to transform others: the post visionary speaker sees his body—re-symbolized and rewritten into new words which he will give to the multitude—as a new textual location where he might reattempt to reunite the children of the spirit.

As a result of this event, the essayist notes with banality that his "faith increased" (264). This is decidedly not a dogmatic faith, but a faith in the engenderable emancipatory action of others. The emotional process becomes politicized when the narcissistic faith is extended to a faith in others to likewise transform artistic fatuity into practicable aesthetic and political action. Yet this faith appears to be out of place after he has announced his newly apotheosized self. In fact, its expression foretells a sense of incompleteness and as a result, the final passage is ambiguous as to where or to whom to locus of social agency is placed. It concludes:

> Already the messages of citizens were flashed along the wires of the world, already the generous idea had emerged from a thirty years' war in Germany and was directing the councils of the Latins. To those multitudes not yet in the wombs of humanity but surely engenderable there, he would give the word. Man and woman, out of you comes the nation that is to come, the lightning of your masses in travail; the competitive order is employed against itself, the aristocracies are supplanted; and amid the general paralysis of an insane society, the confederate will issues in action. ("A Portrait of the Artist" 265-66)

The "word" here functions as a gift, but the audience for this gift has not yet historically emerged. It is a speech without an audience, but one that expresses a desire for its arrival. As Dominic Manganiello, David Weir, and James Fairhall have argued, Joyce's source for the emergence of a new class stems from his reading of Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme*.[11] The audience for the word is a future class, which Marx addresses "not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it *emerges* from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the

old society from whose womb it emerges."[12] Nineteenth-century society, in both Marx and Joyce, is imagined as a mother, perhaps "an adoring mother" whose repudiation as an object of desire is necessary for the development and evolution of the subject. For Lacan, the repudiation of the mother is an acceptance of the prohibition of incest and marks an entrance into the Symbolic order.[13] The entrance of the new class—a reemergence of the children of the spirit—is predicated upon a recognition of a lack which, as Yannis Stavrakakis puts it, is an "identification structured around the acceptance of this constitutive lack" (33).

On the one hand, this particular fantasy that an audience will arrive is legitimate for a writer of an as-yet unpublished essay. On the other hand, this closing passage presents a tremendous faith that supplanting the material and ideological aristocracies by a confederate will can be done. Dominic Manganiello has argued that "the word" is "delivered in the anarchist spirit by subordinating political successes to the fashioning of 'a new man' [and woman] in the womb of the old society" (71). But this seems more consistent with socialist—or specifically Fabian—gradualism rather than with anarchism because it entails the growth of a new world from the decay of the older rather than through an abrupt, violent change. Additionally, through recourse to the formal qualities of the essay, I argue that in giving his word—moving from word-as-thought to body-as-site to word-as-gift—the essayist is also envisaging himself as the audience, and is producing a dialogue with himself.

But who essays the concluding manifesto and who is its audience? For the essayist in dialogue with himself, the "you" who will provide the nation that is to come (as both "man and woman") is *singular*, which signals a fantasy of a hybridized gender that can deliver issues. It is the fantasy of the essayist who issues itself, who is reissued, as it were. The essayist is the

"consumer" of his own symbolized identification (his essay); the site of his own artistic discovery; the father, mother, and child; and the speaker of and listener to his own word. By occupying various roles, he is a multiple and divided subject. His own "confederate will" signals the birth of his aesthetic antinomianism, as it also signals his war against older orders which he will fight through an aesthetic practice that aims toward practicable and palpable effects.

There is a second way in which I would like to read "the word" that provides an alternative to the egoistic argument that the son becomes his own father and mother, and one that places agency in action not solely his own. As the speaker has failed in the past to reunite the multitude against deception and aristocracy, he sees politically and economically transformative power in the engenderable future. Though his approach to his initial purpose has changed, the initial purpose remains—not erased by rewriting; not aborted, but reissued. In the closing sentence, Joyce atypically welcomes lightning, and this is the lightning of the masses who possess emancipatory power. But in welcoming this lightning, a new problem arises: what is the relationship between the isolated artist and the other fulcrum of political change (conceived as an amalgamation of long divided subjects)? For a definition of this work, and of work in the widest possible sense, we turn not to Bloom but to Marx.

Joyce's personal claims as a socialist during this period and his well-known aversion to Marx is, historically, not a contradiction. As Jonathan Rose has shown in his survey of British working-class reading habits, very few working-class readers chose or even wanted to read Marx; instead, they found their own alloy of socialism in penny leaflets, socialist newsletters, popular political and literary writers.[14] Rose's argument is substantiated, in part, by Ellmann who notes that Joyce attended meetings of a socialist reading group in Henry Street where

"prophets of a new day milder than Marx were discussed" (142).[15] Joyce claimed to have stopped reading *Capital* after the first sentence. But if he had read *Capital* past the first sentence, he would have undoubtedly validated Marx's oft-cited comment on labor as a process of self-transformation. As Marx writes:

> Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates, and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adopted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. (*Capital 283*)

For Joyce, the vehicle of such a transformation is the production of art, and the conditions of living may be transformed by reimagining life in art. But the artist cannot relate to the working classes either materially or communicatively without sharing some of their actions or aims. The artist, conceived at this point as an essayist, is a laborer who engages his arms, head and hands in the transformation of nature, In changing the world around him, he changes himself. But the relationship is not expressly unidirectional: in changing his own nature, he is more capable of transforming the world around him. In the most general terms, the artist and the lightning of masses are united through their self-conception as subjects capable of emancipatory transformations.

In a letter to Stanislaus written one year after the essay, Joyce writes, "it is a mistake for you to imagine that my political opinions are those of a universal lover: but they are those of a socialistic artist" (Letters II. 89). Joyce's socialism may be more attuned to Wilde's sense of unfettered artistic pursuits than with Marx's emancipation of the proletariat, but Joyce maintains a Marxist sensibility that labor is an artful process through which subjects produce themselves.[16]

Since it does not follow that the multitude will take the gift of the artist's word, a new problem arises. How do the thoughts of the thinker, the issues of the essayist, the plots of the artist connect to the actions of the masses? The "confederate will" when considered as a pluralized will, provides an alternate trajectory for Joyce's work in which artistic and socialist-political action are twinned: the former is not in service of the latter, but the two are interweaved like the arguments of the essay as Adorno conceives them.

In writing that he would give "the word," he also writes that he would give of himself and that he views himself as an evolving subject and a fulcrum of political change. The final sentence implies both that *he* is the evolving subject of political action and that he is only one part in a larger social and historical movement that he cannot join except in his capacity as specific kind of worker, an artist in the first decade of the twentieth-century. The private and public have become alloyed. To the larger social movement he creates and contributes himself as both an essayed body and an issuing voice. As a confederate among the confederation, he recognizes that his own revolutionary leanings and actions are literary, and that as a writer, the transformation of nature is as much a part of his own labor as it is that of another.

I would like to read the 1904 essay as a political and formal unconscious of both *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.*[17] Methodologically, this reading derives from Jameson's combination of psychoanalytic and Marxist reading strategies in *The Political Unconscious*. He writes, "the social contradiction addressed and 'resolved' by the formal prestidigitation of narrative must, however reconstructed, remain an absent cause, which cannot be directly or immediately conceptualized by the text."[18] For Jameson, this work constitutes narrative as a symbolic act whereby the text draws into itself the historical situation from which

it arises and on which it performs its work. The conclusion to the essay, in which the thinker claims himself and places himself in prophetic relationship to the change that will arrive later in history, become an organizing principle which finds itself announced in textual knots and impasses in both *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.* Since the later texts engage in more dramatic narrative experimentation, they distance themselves from the earlier essay's overtly rhetorical practice; in the later texts, the concluding manifesto becomes displaced and repositioned as they attempt to distance themselves from overtly polemic writing. Finally, the essay form itself, which functions as the cause of later texts, likewise becomes subordinated. The later texts desire to write over their essayistic origins, their impossible site of origin and the impenetrable and unknowable bodily site which stands as an unsymbolizable lost cause in relation to further symbolic encoding. But the later texts cannot wholly cover the essay form and its political contentions. The masses in travail and the thinker who embodies their struggle return in the later text in the form of something motivating-but-absent.

But why should the revision of "A Portrait of the Artist into *Stephen Hero* leave the essay behind? The transformation raises significant questions about the status of essay and the novel as genres as well as questions about the appropriate rhetorical vehicle for political "content." In what ways does the position of the essay's conclusion survive or not survive the reissuing of the essay into the fiction? As I have argued, the locus of political change expressed in the socialist politics of "A Portrait of the Artist" is divided between aspects of Joyce-the-essayist who positions himself as both the genetic and aesthetic source of revolutionary action, and the world of subjects beyond the essayist's subject-position which is enjoined to be the motor cause of political change. The unnamed essayist is locked into a pre-Oedipal subject position of a

"boundless ego" who cannot distinguish himself from others. As a result of this imaginary boundlessness, the transformation of the essay preserves the indeterminate locus of political change as all-pervasive and multi-subjective. Using the Lacanian distinction between Imaginary and Symbolic registers, it is relevant to view the shift between the two as a reinscription of the imaginary fantasy of self-mastery into the new linguistic field of intersubjective communication.

After the essay was rejected as "incomprehensible" by John Eglinton and Fred Ryan, Stanislaus noted that his brother said it was rejected because it was "all about himself" (Ellmann 147). In these two responses, the perceived incomprehensibility of the essay is chained to Joyce's sense of his own egoism and his projection of his personal rejection by the Dublin literary community. But this rejection does not explain the specific choice of revising the essay into a *novel* and not, say, a poem or a treatise on politics and aesthetics. It is useful to employ the generic distinctions envisioned by Stephen Daedalus in *Stephen Hero* to explain why the *novel* is the most reasonable vehicle for the projects launched in the essay. Epical art attempts to bridge the impasse between the subject and others. Stephen does not view the epical arts as conservative or nationalistic, but as forms which highlight the relationship between the artist and his audience. It is an aesthetic practice made both for its own sake and for others'. He writes that "epical art" is the "art whereby the artist sets forth his own image in immediate relation to himself and others" in contradistinction to lyrical arts (in which the image is "related to himself") and dramatic arts (in which the image is solely "related to others") (*Stephen Hero* 77). The revision of the essay as a novel exposes the tensions which inhere in the socio-egotistical motivations of the essay and preserves the essay as the dialectical sublation of the novel form. The essay form and all it entails—the attempt to verbalize and transform the writer's body, the

"methodical unmethodicality" of its style, the centrality of an imaginary central consciousness in its composition—become repressed in the later text and are present as the absent cause which guides the production of its revisions.

As Zizek has argued, reading the forbidden content of any text does not involve looking for a secret that is hidden elsewhere, but involves attending to its materiality. "The Unconscious is outside, not hidden in any unfathomable depths" (*The Plague of Fantasies* 3).[19] Zizek traces this critical legacy not to Freud, but to Marx for whom the "secret of the commodity form" is "not the secret *behind* the form but *the secret of this form itself."* (*The Sublime Object of Ideology* 11). But, as he further argues, cynicism—an acknowledgement that this work is already in place—bars our reading of textual "symptoms." If one already possesses the knowledge that one can only proceed by repressing the uncontainable, one has already accepted this action as a fact. Thus, when Zizek considers the patterning of social reality, he writes

> What they do not know is that their social reality itself, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic inversion. What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know how things really are, *but they are still doing it as if they did not know* [my italics]. The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what may be called the *ideological fantasy.* (*The Sublime Object of Ideology* 32-33)

Applying this critique to the essay, it is not the essay as it is, but the ideological fantasy of the essay that patterns the revision. If Joyce the writer *knows* that he is abandoning the essay and the politics embedded within this form, then he proceeds *as if* he does not know the significance of this abandonment. An ironic distance emerges when Joyce ceases to be the essayist and immediate site of political authority and becomes a novelist plotting the events in the life of a character-as-essayist, Stephen Daedalus. And though an ironic distance emerges, the essay is

maintained through Stephen Daedalus, the fictional essayist because, as Zizek writes, "even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, *we are still doing them.*" (33). Hence the essay is not the "secret" of *Stephen Hero* or *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,* as much as it is reinscribed within the manifest content, in this case, the textual form, of the novels themselves. While the novel dramatizes Stephen's production of his college essays, the essay form is, at the same time, inextricably bound to the contours of the novel.

As a *roman á clef, Stephen Hero* transforms and dramatizes the historical events of Joyce's own production and presentation of his essay "Drama and Life" before the Literary and Historical society in January 1900. But I am less concerned in making comparisons between Joyce's essay and Stephen's essay than I am in attending to the dramatization of the process of essaying in the novel. Rather than consider *Stephen Hero* a *roman á clef,* I would like to discuss it as a kind of social problem novel, a *tendenzroman,* which Engels defines as a "point-blank socialist novel […] to glorify the social and political views of the authors."[20] Granted, *Stephen Hero* is no more an explicit *tendenzroman* than it is a *roman á clef*; rather, it is a hybrid of conventions and forms whose formal and linguistic multiplicity prevent the dominance of a single privileged literary form. Also, though Engels does not prefer the *tendenzroman,* I think by including the *tendenzroman* within the concatenation of narrative discourses, we may discuss critically the resulting effects in linking the "point-blank socialism" of "Portrait" to the conservation of "point-blank socialism" in the essay-novel *Stephen Hero.* In fact, the essay-novel may conform more readily to Engels's opinion that "the more the opinions of the author remain hidden, the better for the work of art" (Engels 41).

The chapters of *Stephen Hero* which remain available to critical history date from February and June 1905 rather than from when Joyce first began the novel in February 1904. Beginning with chapter 15 (the first to survive), Stephen Daedalus is presented as a superior essayist. And though he writes in an "antique," "too easily rhetorical" and "obsolete" style, he is also "remarkable for a certain crude originality of expression" (27). His professor (like Eglinton and Ryan) is baffled, intrigued, and finally concerned about Stephen's simultaneous originality and obscurity and he informs Father Butt of his problems with Stephen's remarkable but irreverent style. But Father Butt expresses a liking for Stephen's writings, which have puzzled the professor, and the priest encourages him to write something for one of the Dublin publications. When Stephen defers the priest's suggestion and instead proffers further arguments and deliberations regarding his esthetic hypotheses, readers confront a dramatic hesitation and resistance which duplicate Joyce's own misgivings about presenting essays to those who do not understand what they are and, consequently, what he means. For Zizek, as for Lacan, the "final purpose of a demand is thus not the satisfaction of a need attached to it but a confirmation of the other's attitude toward us."[21] The object of the demand in this instance—publication for Joyce (rejected) and oratorical performance for Stephen (threatened with censorship)—would not be satisfied by publication nor with unfettered license to speak, but the confirmation of the attitude of the Other, the audience, the reading public. For Tony Thwaites, Stephen and Joyce precisely desire this rejection and censorship.[22] This censorship gives increased zeal to the essayist's project. The confirmation of the rejection of the Other in regard to the essay is particularly significant since the essay, following Adorno's model, is the transformation of the thinker into an arena of thought. It is not simply the language that desires confirmation of an attitude, but the

body as well. At the level of publication and enunciation, the "no" of the editor and the priestly Father identifies the subject *as a subject* who is simultaneously constructed around this prohibition.

The laborious process in which the specular subject transforms itself into a linguistic subject is revised within the double sense of "artistic labour" in the sixteenth chapter of *Stephen Hero.* Here, Stephen "persuaded himself that it is necessary for the artist to labour incessantly at his art if he wishes to express completely even the simplest conception and he believed that every moment of inspiration must be paid for in advance" (32-33). Though the grammar of the phrase "laboured incessantly *at*" appears awkward, it may be read as a metaphor for parturition, and the underlying motif of the artist continually *in* labour or *at* labour exposes his imaginary conception of the artist figure as proletarian and female. In this sentence, the closing image of "A Portrait of the Artist" in which the progressive future order emerges from the wombs of an anemic and paralytic society is re-visited: the artist's labors produce and are produced by rhetorical persuasion, the mechanization of self-composition, and the economics of exchange. The figure of the artist is conceived and issued as a mother, a maker, and a purchaser of a text which, in this instance, is a formative treatise on the birth and criteria of artistic categories. It is significant that Stephen meditates on the assemblage and permutations of vowel sounds to make "cries for the primitive emotions" (32). In a sense, the essayist is awash within the domain of language, issuing signifiers for the previously unlettered cries of the infant. As the subject shifts from the Imaginary to the Symbolic register of subjectivity, his cries are no longer articulated *as cries* but as articulable signifiers in the grammar of the Symbolic.

Perhaps the most important cry of *Stephen Hero* is the appearance of the name "Stephen Daedalus." The unnamed subject of the 1904 essay, the essayist who had kept himself at a distance from the immediacy of experience by his use of the third-person pronoun, is replaced by the dramatized essayist "Stephen Daedalus" in the essay-novel, and, later by the artist "Stephen Dedalus" in *A Portrait*. In Louis Althusser's analysis of ideological production, the emergence of the name, the interpellation of the subject, undergirds the very production of subjectivity. To paraphrase his argument, no one is a subject until that subject is named and called by its name. The process of interpellation for Althusser produces the subject's "imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existence."[23] E. P. Thompson's well-known materialist critique of Althusser's theory of interpellation rests squarely on Thompson's refusal to view subjects as wholly passive participants in ideological formulations, and it may be that the dialogue regarding interpellation is now a dead issue for Marxist theory.[24] But while interpellation may be a closed-book for Marxist criticism, it remains open in its relation to the Lacanian conception of the Imaginary and Symbolic orders. Likewise, the relation of Stephen's introduction as a subject and the construction of his essay within the narrative becomes a problem of the relation between Imaginary and Symbolic subject positions. Reading Althusser's system of naming (a symbolic gesture) as an investiture of imaginary relations *via* Lacan's registers of subjectivity must address the role of the Symbolic in the circuit of ideological production. To formulate a more pointed question: how can the act of *naming* place a subject within an *imaginary* relationship to the life-world when the very object of naming is dependent upon the materials made available only after entrance into the domain of language? It is likely that the Imaginary, which cannot be known in and of itself, can only be perceived through the Symbolic and that, consequently, the

Imaginary as it is recalled through the Symbolic is itself a fantastic invention of a linguistic subject.

The transformation of the unnamed (but known) essayist of the 1904 text into the named subject of *Stephen Hero* demonstrates the overlapping of the Imaginary and Symbolic orders. To carry this one step further, the subject is *always-already* named according to Althusser, and is interpellated before birth and subjected to the forces of ideology before its biological existence. On the one hand, one may argue that Stephen Daedalus, the always-already interpellated subject of *Stephen Hero,* is the author of "A Portrait of the Artist" arriving late. But such an assumption would negate the unique sense of authorship attributed to the essayist in the process of writing. And since the essayist of the 1904 text presents himself from a distance in the third-person masculine singular pronoun, we might, on the other hand, argue that the essayist does not speak until he is, in fact, named as the first issuance of the confederate will. As Daedalus will be reissued again as "Dedalus" in *Portrait,* his third transformation announces the slippage of the signifier which reveals itself through the layers of textual weavings. The discrete "Joyce-the-essayist" and the discrete "Stephen-the-dramatized essayist" become conflated, that is, melded together in the metallurgical sense, forged together as links within the chain of signifiers. This, at the same time, makes Stephen the essayist of "A Portrait of the Artist" while maintaining his discrete distance from the text from which he has issued.

Within the text, the forging of Daedalus (his self-composition) and his essay (his composition) are mirrored and made possible by his own movement. In another moment, Stephen finds himself unable to compose his essay while sitting. While this may seem banal at

first, the scene exposes the interrelationship between Stephen's body as the site of experience and the essay as the transformed material of that experience. His time was

> Consumed in aimless solitary walks during which he forged out his sentences. In this manner he had his whole essay in his mind from the first word to the last before he had put any morsel of it on paper. In thinking or constructing the form of his essay, he found himself much hampered by the sitting posture. (*Stephen Hero* 69).

His mind is at work when his body is at work, and the mind is recumbent while the body is reposed. Here, labor appears in the form of *forging* sentences. The confederate will, the productive and progressive forces of labor cannot be divorced or separated from the activity of essayistic production. The social, psychological, and formal registers from which these images of labor as social, procreative and artistic processes emerge belie the anxiety of the 1904 essayist now imagining another essayist (not wholly him and not wholly his own, but an extension of himself through the chain of signification) encountering for the not-yet millionth time, the fear of self-mutation for artistic creation. As the essaying process tests the composition of metal without reducing it, Stephen's process of essaying is a matter of determining esthetic criteria and value: Stephen tests the composition of a beautiful object to determine the features that compose that object and ascertain the degree of "purity" in that object. In the metaphoric metallurgic conflation of the authorial essayist and the figural essayist, the process of essaying attempts to determine "how much" of the authorial and figural essayist is present in the chain of signification. The problem of agency (i.e., who composes the reissued subject) is extended into the field of writing (i.e., how the reissued form is shaped by the subject), and again to the subject of politics (i.e., how the evolving subject acts as an agent of history). The potential for dynamic political textual effects can be seen as emerging from a form which itself emerges from a subject.

Richard Ellmann has maintained that Joyce's aesthetics and his politics are indivisible.[25] The same can be said of Stephen Daedalus. When Stephen is pressed by his friends to express his political views, each time he insists that he is still in process of coming to terms with them. In response to Madden's prompt regarding his politics, Stephen asserts "I am going to think them out. I'm an artist, don't you see […] Give me time" (56). Later, he announces again that "At present I have a reluctance to commit a sacrilege. I am a product of Catholicism; I was sold to Rome before my birth. Now I have broken my slavery but I cannot in a moment destroy every feeling in my nature. That takes time" (139). He does not disavow the political, but surreptitiously announces that his political positions will eventually find their locus in, and not instead of, his art. Time allows for reflection, reflection for exploration, exploration for discovery, discovery for essaying, essaying for aesthetics, and aesthetics for social and political awareness. Rather than move blindly into a political practice, Stephen investigates the forms of thought that might ground a political praxis, and that form, by means of the transformed essay, becomes his esthetic.

As a self-proclaimed artist in search of his politics, Stephen falls back on the essay as the form of his labors. He considers the essay as a site in which he "very seriously intended to define his own opinions for himself" (76-77). As he rejects the "patriot's programme" as yet another form of submission to a higher authority, he moves into a consideration of the aesthetic as a means of discovering a form of internationalist political thought, that can be made without recourse to preexisting authority. The artist, as Stephen conceives it, is a "mediator between the world of experience and the world of dreams," and as a mediator, the artist is responsible for the influence of each of these worlds upon the other (78). His essay, as he describes it to Madden, is

"the first of my explosives" (80). Possibly, this metaphoric explosion aims to erase the distinctions between the historical world of experience and the aesthetic world of the dream, but I think it more likely that such an artistic explosion aids in maintaining the lines of division, but making them more porous. The contamination of the one world by the other results in both the political grounding of the aesthetic and the transformative influence of the aesthetic upon the political.

Stephen's essay "Art and Life" (originally "Drama and Life" but changed in response to the esthetic criteria which extend beyond drama) is both the result of and final cause of his own odyssey through Dublin. The "heaven-ascending essayist" revels in the "actual achievement of his essay" whose motivating purpose has been self-exploration. The transformation of Joyce's own 1904 essay into Stephen's construction of his essay marks a shift from the aesthetico-political manifesto of the artist to a dramatization of a character approaching a similar conclusion. The 1904 essay's manifesto does not appear in this rewriting, but rather reemerges in the tripartite division of human dispositions for esthetic ends into the three categories of lyrical, epic, and dramatic (77). These divisions arise from a reconfigured sense that his work is invariably oriented toward a specific audience for a specific purpose: in short, the categories appear more rhetorical than aesthetic. But where does the essay form and the essay that anticipates the essay-novel fit into this formulation? By Stephen's criteria, the 1904 essay is properly epical, though an essay may be lyrical, epical, or dramatic. In all three cases, the *cause* of the artwork is the artist's image of his own *image.* This indicates the Imaginary register by which the artist sets forth a misreading of his own image as a composite whole. (*Ecrits* 80). The relation between the essayist and his issues becomes reconceived as a misapprehension, a belief

that the body can be somehow wholly integrated into the process of signification. The great pain of the essayist, then, is a confrontation with an unrepresentable lack that, by definition resists signification. It is a blot that bars the essay from wholly representing himself to himself. Nevertheless, this fundamental impossibility gives rise to the possibilities met through the labors of revision.

This blot which resists essaying is alluded to in Stephen's definition of the supreme artist. As Stephen argues,

> The artist who could disentangle the subtle soul of the image from its mesh of defining circumstances most exactly and ~~re-embody~~ it in artistic circumstances chosen as the most exact for it in its new office, he was the supreme artist. (*Stephen Hero* 78)

In the manuscript, the word "re-embody" is slashed; it is prepared for removal but, since the novel-essay never saw publication, it remains immobilized as something always waiting to be removed. It is intended to disappear, but it appears textually as something to be missed. As something to be missed, this "re-embodiment" is the very definition of *jouissance:* "excess," for Lacan, "surplus enjoyment" for Zizek.[26] All three Lacanian registers are present in or alluded to in this description of the supreme artist's work. Disentangling the image from its surroundings and revising it is the very project of *Finnegans Wake* announced in this early juncture. The supreme artist alluded to here is the narcissistic image of the artist himself who does and does not embody the image in its new office. The very act of *embodiment* is then the source of the activity and it gestures toward a chasm around which the subject constitutes itself as a subject.

But the transformed labour that Stephen envisions no longer emerges from a violent explosion, as evinced by Stephen who revises the violent image of his essay as an explosive after he delivers it. At this point, he believes that "the tomahawk, as an effective instrument of

warfare, had become obsolete," even though the aim of the essay remains sympathetic with the aims of "collectivist politicians" (146-47). Stephen

> acknowledged to himself that he could not take to heart the distress of a nation, the soul of which was antipathetic to his own [...]. He wished to express his name freely and fully for the benefit of society which he would enrich and also for his own benefit, seeing that it was part of his life to do so. It was not part of his life to undertake an extensive alteration of society, but he felt the need to express himself such an urgent need, such a real need, that he was determined no conventions of society, however plausibly mingling piety with its tyranny, should be allowed to stand in his way, and though a taste for elegance and detail unfitted him for the part of the demagogue, from his general attitude he might have been supposed not unjustly an ally of the collectivist politicians, who are often upbraided by opponents who believe in Jehovas, and decalogues and judgments with sacrificing the reality to an abstraction. (*Stephen Hero* 146-47)

This passage exposes Stephen's conflicting attitude toward his audience. On the one hand, he divorces himself from the distress of the nation, and on the other, he sees that he has to express himself in such a way as to "benefit" and "enrich" his society. It is appropriate to ask of this passage: does Stephen see himself as an artist in the service of his world or does he not? He announces a conflict about how—not whether—his own work can benefit his nation, and the passage reveals new distances Stephen places between himself and his audience. His new purpose is not to take on intense changes of society, but incremental changes that find their locus in his alteration of his own attitudes and artistic productions. This quarrel arises from the relation between the lyric and the epical forms of art, whether the work sets forth the artist's image to himself alone or to himself and others. Stephen appears to be working through this tension, but again remains committed to presenting himself to and for the benefit of others. His effort does not escape from its lyrical impulses, but cannot be wholly reduced to them.

Stephen emerges from this line of thought with a greater dislike and distrust of those he scorns.

> Contempt of [the body] human nature, weakness, nervous tremblings, fear of day and joy, distrust of man and life, hemiplegia of the will, beset the body burdened and disaffected by its black tyrannous lice. Exultation of the mind before joyful beauty, exultation of the body in free confederate labours, every natural impulse toward health and wisdom and happiness had been corroded by the pest of these vermin. The spectacle of the world in thrall filled him with the fire of courage. […] He […] would live his own life according to what he recognized as the voice of a new humanity, active, unafraid and unashamed. (*Stephen Hero* 194)

At this moment, the "social limitations" of "Portrait" are transformed into the "hemiplegia of the will" of the masses, and the "confederate will" is transformed into the artistic labours of Stephen Daedalus. This scene repeats the occasion in "Portrait" where the essayist regathered himself after failing to unite the people against fraud and principality. But whereas "Portrait" ends with a declaration of faith in the politically transformative potential of others, this statement appears to abandon such a faith and locate it wholly within the artist himself who must labour against the weak-willed and anemic. Yet this passage remains ambiguous regarding the agent of transformative labour since Stephen recognizes a "voice of a new humanity" which may not be solely his own voice. Stephen here continues to work through and revise his earlier attitudes, and though he expresses outrage and disaffection with many people, he does not express disaffection with all people**.**

The confederate labour to which he sets himself to work includes a significant revision of his earlier essay into a newly conceived esthetic which is built on his epiphanies. Stephen defines his epiphanies as "a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or gesture or in a memorable phrase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments" (210-11). This recording of epiphanies becomes Stephen's first delivery from his own confederate labours. No longer is he concerned with his essays as

explosives, but he is, as he thought before, with the potentially transformative power of elegance and detail—the refinement, so to speak, of artistic expression. Hence, he considers himself unsuited for the role of the political demagogue or propagandist. Stephen's (and Joyce's) epiphanies have long been the subject of study.[27] More recently, Jean-Michel Rabate in *The Future of Theory* has noted that the inclusion of the epiphany within the text causes the epiphany to lose its status as epiphany (128). As Rabate argues, the epiphany is a "bridge to a mimetic practice of language," and Joyce presents "mimesis as a process connecting art with life and to refuse any divorce between them" (130-31). In other words, when the epiphany ("a sudden spiritual manifestation") becomes alloyed with a text, it loses some of its autonomy as a discrete linguistic event but removes some of the distinctions between the text and lived experience. These sentiments confirm a sense in which the epiphany is a form in which a more finely tempered practice of writing can represent a living confederate, which can best be understood as an early effort in the artist's larger, if less definable, work of transforming his world.

It is important to hover on the "vulgar" aspect of the epiphany, especially in the light of Stephen's contempt for what he perceives as the weakness of the people. Stephen sees the proper work of the man of letters as the recorder of vulgar speeches and gestures because they are the source of "sudden spiritual manifestations." Etymologically, we may consider the "vulgar" as the praxis of a common people, and the composition of vulgarities as a grammatical praxis whereby the common becomes uncommon, unfamiliar. This kind of practice becomes more highly developed in *Ulysses* through the artful rendering of the "common man" Leopold Bloom. Yet, as Beja notes, an epiphany must be "sudden" and a longer sustained work like

Ulysses cannot be an epiphany itself, though the longer work might contain or revise epiphanic moments (719).

Stephen's first epiphanic production involves a conversation (though I am not sure if it may properly be called a conversation) between a young man and woman:

> The Young Lady—(drawling discretely) … O, Yes … I was … at the … cha … pel …
> The Young Gentleman—(inaudibly) … I … (again inaudibly) … I …
> The Young Lady—(softly) … O … but you're … ve … ry … wick … ed … (*Stephen Hero* 211)

But Stephen, when he explains his conception of the epiphany to Cranly does not present him with this primal example. Instead, he chooses another example, a hypothetical example, of himself observing the Ballast Office clock. Why does Stephen not use this primal example to illustrate his concept of the epiphany? Why should he choose an imaginary event—an observation of a clock—to instead exemplify what for him emanates from the vulgarity of speech or gesture? Rabate, who in a compelling reading of this conversation's ellipses and the innuendo it arouses on the part of the reader, argues that the scene "forces readers to be wicked" while its omissions also point "to a constitutive gap in language" (Rabate 129). For these gaps point to a confrontation with an unsymbolizable content, and Stephen's book of epiphanies—a dramatization of Joyce's own book of epiphanies—are a collection of transcriptions with this encounter. I would also add that another gap appears between Stephen's first recording of an epiphany and his first attempt to narrate the epiphanic experience. By *not* presenting the conversation as an example of the epiphany to Cranly, he also avoids confronting that which resides in the "vulgarity" of the illustration. Joyce points to the gap by having Stephen proffer an alternate example. Here, as above, we can see the *ideological fantasy* emerge as Stephen's

gestures proceed toward an encounter with the Real via the epiphanic ellipses which locate but cannot name this encounter. That is, the clock stands in for what Stephen could not narrate to Cranly. The first epiphany becomes a second blot even though it has been approached and recorded as a primal blot. Stephen's exegesis of the epiphany can be seen as an imaginary recreation, a hypothesis which is proffered in lieu of the initial experience. This might suggest a traumatic element in the recording of the initial epiphany, an inability or unwillingness at this moment to recognize and narrate the constitutive significance of the vulgar, the common people and their language, in the early stages of his work.

But this reading should not devalue the significance of the perception of the clock as an example of an epiphany. We recall Stephen saying that he needs time, that his work takes time. The clock stands here as a sudden spiritual manifestation with a root in a significant feature of Stephen's political thought: the time to develop opinions. When Stephen discusses the observation of the clock as an epiphany, can we not also see him meditating on the time he needs in order to think out his opinions? Further, can we not also see his political opinions in process of being developed through the discussion itself? I would like to read Stephen's description of the aesthetic apprehension of the clock as a metaphoric return of Stephen's repressed political thoughts, in which the political resides in the fissure between "the time" needed to work through a set of socialist political ideas and "the clock" which manifests them.

Stephen's explanation of the apprehension of the beautiful is predicated upon an object that already carries with it significant ideological weight, the weight of the time that he refers to solely as the necessary component of rhetorical and artistic discovery. Stephen notes of the ballast office clock, "I will pass it from time to time, allude to it, refer to it, catch a glimpse of it.

It is only an item in the catalogue of Dublin's street furniture. Then all at once I see it and know at once what it is: epiphany" (211). Further, "Imagine my glimpses at that clock as the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exact focus. The moment the focus is reached the object is epiphanized. It is just in this epiphany that I find the third, the supreme quality of beauty" (211). Stephen has begun his esthetic discourse in *Stephen Hero* by first engaging the issue of audience and by dividing the genres of literary art in primarily rhetorical categories. By the conclusion of *Stephen Hero,* Stephen has reconsidered the primacy of audience as the basis for artistic forms and has revised the basis (slightly, to be sure, because the artist's image always remained as the irreducible kernel of his categories) for the artistic endeavor to the perception and rendering of the object of beauty. From the text, it is clear that Stephen was concerned with "applied Aquinas" at the time of his essay's composition, and his conversation with the college president suggests that his essay included a discussion of Aquinas. Yet Stephen's *de facto* explanation of "applied Aquinas" to readers of *Stephen Hero* has been deferred for over 100 pages of the novel when he first explains the epiphany to Cranly.

One possible reason for this deferral evokes Stephen's own uncertainty regarding how he can apply his reading of Aquinas to the experience of the beautiful. Very possibly, he could not render a viable translation and explanation of "*integras, quidditas, claritas*" (87) until he began to theorize the epiphany as an experience of "integrity, a wholeness, symmetry, and radiance" (212). Defined most simply, Stephen explains "integrity" or "wholeness" as a kind of breaking free of the object of perception from the objects that surround it. "To apprehend it you must lift it away from everything else; and then you perceive that it is one integral thing, that is *a* thing" (212). The mind then "considers the object in whole and in part, in relation to other objects,

examines the balance of its parts, contemplates the form of the object, traverses every cranny of the structure" (212). In concluding his oration, he defines the final quality as the epiphanic moment: it is the moment in which "its soul, its whatness leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany" (213). The entirety of this monologue, arising as it does from a consideration of the Ballast Office clock, concludes with Stephen's ironic comment that "It has not epiphanized yet" (212).

But what gazes back at Stephen from the clock, or, more to the point, what does *not* gaze back at Stephen that *should,* such that it prompts his rendering of the esthetic to Cranly? It is germane to consider here Lacan's formulation of the gaze in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.* Lacan defines the gaze as "the object on which depends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation."[28] As Lacan also states that "the real supports the phantasy, the phantasy protects the real"; that the gaze appears as a stain, and that it is characterized as a surprise.[29] In short, there should be, in the Ballast Office clock, something staring back at Stephen, were it truly an epiphanic experience, and that "something" is the phantasy of the Real of the subject that lies beyond symbolization. I hasten to add that the misrecognition of the epiphany in the Ballast Office clock fits as a misrecognition of the unconscious political theories of Stephen Daedalus that appear at this moment only as something to be missed.

He does not proceed from consciously connecting the clock with his insistence that his politics need time to develop. Nor has he proceeded from a position in which the complete and "vulgar" example takes primary significance in defining the epiphany to Cranly. I do not mean

to suggest that Stephen Daedalus has abandoned the political fervor that marks the conclusion of "Portrait." Indeed, I am suggesting that the political significance of the work of art continues to slide along new strings of enunciation. By the close of what remains of the text of *Stephen Hero,* Stephen has located the confederate will in confederate labours, and these confederate labours have shifted from his sense of the epical work to the epical labor of art, and to the consideration of the tripartite apprehension of the beautiful object and the epiphanic moment. There remains in the epiphany great transformative power by which old objects, old ideas and ideologies, are perceived anew and revised.

Though it is impossible to account fully for Joyce's strategy or purpose in revising *Stephen Hero* into *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,* it is crucial to make hypotheses in order to link the socialistic rhetoric of the initial essay to the emerging esthetic and to the final published novel. While Ellmann does not speculate as to why Joyce revises *Stephen Hero,* he does suggest the most valid and inescapable explanation: Joyce's dissatisfaction with what he had already written. There has been a tendency in the critical tradition to agree with Joyce that *Stephen Hero* is a lousy book, though I think to simply discount *Stephen Hero* and "A Portrait of an Artist" as immature or incompletable evades confronting the import of the drafts as compositional strategies whereby political and aesthetic symptoms are revealed, suppressed, viewed, and revised. As influential a critic as William York Tindall, for example, sees *Stephen Hero* as a foil for *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.* By seeing how badly written *Stephen Hero* truly is, Tindall explains, readers gain an appreciation for the greatness of *Portrait.* "Without value itself, *Stephen Hero* provides a clue to value, letting the glory of creation through. If art is significant form, here is insignificant formlessness."[30] Yet Tindall is

nevertheless accurate in ascribing *Stephen Hero* to the position of scholarly curio, "stuff for the forge," whereby critics might gauge the changes, evaluate the discrepancies between the earlier and later works. What remains of *Stephen Hero* is not formless, though it indeed becomes stuff for the forge. It remains part of a continuing process by which an already-formed work finds itself refashioned.

Tindall's consideration of *Stephen Hero* as inadequately formed has been mirrored by several critics who seek to plumb the fragment for answers to the question of its revision. Both Colin MacCabe and John Paul Riquelme assess the problem of the fragment's irreconcilably competing forms whose incongruity ultimately leads to frustration and failure rather than appropriately innovative frictions. For Colin MacCabe, *Stephen Hero* does not remain incomplete because it lacks a conclusion as much as because its aims cannot be completed.[31] For MacCabe, *Stephen Hero* is not properly a narrative because it cannot disentangle "representation from articulation." He argues that "narrative collapses into discourse, but, after each collapse, the narrative limps lamely on."[32] In a similar view, Riquelme explains that the lack of difference between the character and the narrator weakens purpose and development, and that the narrator of *Stephen Hero* is far too obtrusive to fulfill the promise of shifting narratological perspectives. Either *Stephen Hero* dawdles along hamfistedly not knowing when where or why perspectives are changing, or the narration of *Stephen Hero* involves itself too forcefully in the thoughts and words of its characters. For Riquelme and MacCabe, Joyce's evolving strategies for alternating textual perspectives and more masterfully developing complex relationships between narrative and character voices are more fully achieved in *Dubliners* and *Portrait.* There are merits and benefits to these perspectives, especially since they point toward a desire on the part of Joyce the

novelist to revise his experiment with alternating voices within fiction. But I think that the problems that Tindall, MacCabe, and Riquelme see with *Stephen Hero* may be explained as a working-through of the difficulty that arises for Joyce in combining the discourses of the essay and the forms of the novel. And seeing them as a working-through of competing voices might reveal a clearer case for the originality and complexity of the abandoned fragment.

There is a register at work in *Stephen Hero* in which the narrator and characters cannot be disentangled because they depend on one another for their existence. As Riquelme writes, "the narrator has not firmly established narrating conventions clearly differentiating and merging his perspective and his characters."[33] While this indeed signals the failure of an innovative interpenetration of character and narrator's language, I think it also signals the success of another innovative form. In this formal experiment, the narrator and character inhabit a common consciousness that is revealed not just through a shared language, but through an amalgamation of their thoughts, actions, and common events. The text aims at becoming an essay-novel. As a concatenation of essay and fictional devices, the narrator becomes more essayistic, moving more along the lines of discovery, into a more rhetorical rather than narratological invention.

The ambivalence between narrator and characters is a problem that inheres in combining the work of the essay and the work of fiction. The initial revision of the essay into the novel marks the strain in which a narrative consciousness begins to emerge as that other than the voice of the essayist. *Stephen Hero* perhaps fails as a novel and remains unfinished because it does not know what quite to do with the subject and the narrator it has created, as well as the esthetics it has developed. Nor does it come to terms with the political ideas that gives root and ballast to its esthetics. It is fitting that the fragment of *Stephen Hero* that has survived both begins and ends

in the middle of its action, because it performs the tendency Adorno attributes to the essay form, that of finishing where it feels it has nothing more to say.

Since the opening chapters of *Stephen Hero* have been lost to history (apocryphally Joyce threw them in the fire), it is unfair to compare the beginning of *Portrait* to what now remains of the beginning of *Stephen Hero.* As Richard Ellmann has noted, Joyce began rewriting *Stephen Hero* into *Portrait of the Artist* at a time when he became increasingly preoccupied with the ideas of gestation.[34] Clearly, from the outset of "A Portrait" Joyce had been preoccupied with the images of insemination, gestation, and parturition, but though these early images function primarily as social and political metaphors, in *Stephen Hero,* and especially *Portrait,* the images of gestation and birth become infused in the language and the form of the novel itself. Thus, it is fair to maintain that the language and the formal division of *Portrait* into five main chapters mirrors the development and growth of Stephen Dedalus from an infant into a man on the verge of becoming an artist. It is doubly generative.

As the fourth chapter of *Portrait* ends, Stephen observes the figure of a wading woman, in a scene undoubtedly culled from the 1904 "Portrait," but significantly revised for the novel. Because this scene marks for Stephen his decision to become an artist, it is germane to attend to its revision from the earliest to the last vision. As I have written, the figure in the 1904 "Portrait" is observed by Stephen from a position where he himself is not observed. Since he remains out of sight, the vision for him is private, non-reciprocated, and voyeuristic, and the "enrichment of the soul" for which he thanks the islanded figure results in what he thinks of as revealing himself to himself. In this sense, the figure is as instrumental as a mirror, and Stephen's resultant decision is less to become an artist himself, than to note the frailty of the body and to reclaim a

sense of passionate existence. In *Stephen Hero,* however, this scene is likely lost, but is alluded to in the following passage:

> At times Stephen would half clothe himself and cross the shallow side of the Bull, where he would wander up and down looking at the children and the nurses. He used to stand and stare at them sometimes until the ash of his cigarette fell on to his coat, but, though he saw all that was intended, he saw no other Lily, and he usually returned to the Liffey side, somewhat amused at his dejection, and thinking that if he had made his proposal to Lucy instead of Emma he might have met with better luck (*Stephen Hero* 230-31)

But here is a problem: the extant passages of *Stephen Hero* begin when Stephen Daedalus is a student, which corresponds to the fifth chapter of *Portrait.* If there was a "bird girl" scene in *Stephen Hero,* it may have preceded the remaining chapters. Yet, I see this passage more than merely Stephen's return to Bull Island (where, presumably, he previously met Lily, a character absent elsewhere from the remaining fragment of the text), but as a revision of the scene in the 1904 "Portrait" where he stared long and longingly at the "islanded figure." Assuming that Stephen is, in this scene, looking at figures on Bull Island, he is not seeing what is seen by the speaker of the 1904 "Portrait" or Stephen of *Portrait.* Instead, Stephen's experience is mostly materialistic, and though we have a sense of what he is thinking, his thoughts are much thinner and much less ecstatic than in the other two versions of the text. Stephen's sense of detachment—as evinced by his inattentive smoking—is matched by the prose of the narration which is likewise inattentive in presenting Stephen's attitudes toward the figures on the island. As readers, we witness this scene in *Stephen Hero* as through a lens and a very cursory form of psychonarration, rather than through the more detailed and ecstatic psychonarration and narrated monologue of either "Portrait" or *Portrait.* Stephen's prose is absent, only to be replaced by the prose of a nonplussed, more physically oriented narrator.

When Stephen encounters the "bird girl" on Bull Island in *Portrait,* we find much more commonality between the Stephen Dedalus and the 1904 essayist than between Dedalus and *Stephen Hero*'s Daedalus. The same scene, in *Portrait,* is rendered as follows:

> She was alone and still; gazing out to sea; and when she felt his presence and the worship of his eyes her eyes turned to him in quiet sufferance of his gaze, without shame or wantonness, Long, long she suffered his gaze and then quietly withdrew her eyes from his and bent toward the stream, gently stirring the water with her foot hither and thither. The first faint noise of gently moving water broke the silence, low and faint and whispering, faint as the bells of sleep; hither and thither, hither and thither: and a faint flame trembled on her cheek. […] Her image passed into his soul and no word had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy. Her eyes had called him and his soul had leaped at the call. To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life! A wild angel had appeared to him, the angel of mortal youth and beauty, and envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before him in an instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory. On and on and on and on! (*Portrait* 169-70)

Since this scene marks Stephen's commitment to his role as one who (among other things) will "recreate life out of life," it is curious to note the divergent paths taken by the Stephen of *Stephen Hero* and the Stephen of *Portrait.* For, assuming again that Stephen had been to Bull Island and met his epiphany in the lost pages of *Stephen Hero,* Stephen Daedalus works vociferously on his school essay, whereas Stephen Dedalus of *Portrait* sets himself upon his villanelle. The conflict in Stephen Dedalus's mind between the form of the essay and the form of poetics becomes also the site of conflict between the differing forms which attain differing ends. Stephen, as an essayist, is the artist of *Stephen Hero.* His artistic labour is primarily essayistic, and his essaying functions not only to disentangle and distinguish one element from another (as in the metallurgical sense), but also to meld the worlds of experience (the practical, material life-world) and the world of dreams (the world of art, artifice, and imagination). The most pertinent question to ask of *Portrait,* considering the importance of the essay form to "Portrait" and the

prominence of the essayist in *Stephen Hero* must then be the following: to where and wherefore does the essay and the essayist disappear in *Portrait*?

Since the history of rhetoric and oratory have so heavily informed the development of essays and their composition, Stephen's attitude toward the essay in *Portrait* can be seen, by extension, as an expression of his attitude toward the oratorical. In the fifth chapter of *Portrait,* as Stephen attempts to compose a poem, he recalls what he has learned of verse from "a ragged book by a Portuguese priest" (179). His sense of verse, taken from this book, is quoted in part, which obscures the sentence when it is read in the full context of the larger sentence. Stephen recalls the sentence: "*Contrahit orator, variant in carmine vates"* (179). James Atherton, who originally identified Stephen's source as the *Prosodia* of Emmanuel Alvarez, notes that the larger sentence from which this excerpt is taken reads, "*Si mutam liquidamque simul raeeat brevis una, contrahit orator, variant in carmine vates"* and specifically addresses Latin prosody.[35] Out of its original context, the phrase suggests that "the orator condenses, the poet amplifies in their verse." In context, the full sentence is translated by Don Gifford as, "If a syllable that is both mute and liquid precedes a short syllable, it is short in prose but long or short in verse." (228). Placing Stephen's comment within the context of his immediate meditations on the pronunciation of prose makes the Latin phrase appear less of a slight to oratory and more of an appeal to the proper use of phonemes. But nevertheless, the phrase itself has been wrenched from its surrounding sentence—even within the context in which Stephen considers it—and yields an attitude toward the oratorical which regards it as distinct from and opposed to the work of the poetic. The Latin word *contrahit* bears both constructive and pejorative associations: to bring or draw together, assemble, collect, to diminish, contract, or tighten. Thus, the phrase

contrahit orator, when considered in itself, can be translated as both "the speaker draws together" and "the speaker diminishes." But this is at odds with the history of rhetoric which has favored variety and copiousness of style since Quintilian. The second part of the phrase, *variant in carmine vates,* can likewise be translated as "the poet changes in verse" or "the poet expands in verse." In one way, the phrase in toto suggests "Orators close up possibilities while poets enlarge them." And in another, the phrase suggests, "Orators bring together while poets expand in verse." Such a dichotomy, in the second sense, seems less dismissive of the role of oratory, and the suggestion that all poets expand linguistic possibilities while all orators contract them appears dogmatic and ludicrously incompatible with Stephen's esthetic considerations.

When the larger sentence of the *Prosodia* is placed in the larger consideration of Stephen's deliberations, the phrase suggests that different pronunciations are appropriate to different applications of language. The oddly placed Latin phrase appears as a symptom within the text of a incongruity that rises beyond a question of appropriate pronunciation. Instead, I view this moment as the emergence of an intertextual conflict between *Portrait* and its previous incarnations. But for the existence of the previous "Portraits," this moment would seem oddly placed and hardly symptomatic. Yet since the texts have been preserved, it is possible to see how in this moment, when Stephen Dedalus attempts to compose a poem, he is beleaguered by his own sense of an incongruity between the work of the orator and the work of the poet. Poetry and oratory are *not* the same, and Stephen struggles to move between the two modes.

In this textual moment, and differing from both previous incarnations of the "Portrait," Stephen Dedalus begins to set the work of the orator and the work of the poet in opposition to one another. As the poet expands (syntactically or ideologically), the orator brings together. In

the polemicism of the earliest text, the essayist had attempted to unite a population against a deceitful aristocracy. This kind of unifying work toward a political goal (as general as it may be) fits most credibly with the work of the orator. Through his poetic ambitions, Stephen does not want to unite anything or anyone if this also equates to sacrificing the expression of potentiality through aesthetic work and experience. The poet, as he considers it, can open an audience to become aware of possibilities that extend beyond a uniform or polemical goal. But this work becomes a new kind of polemic—an "aesthetic polemic" whereby political and aesthetic conflicts may be apprehended in a moment of reflective consideration. Stephen's position in seeing the orator as "assembling" different ideas toward a common aim is similar to the metallurgist's practice of forging different metals into a newer composition. The poet does not "assemble" for the sake of any specific polemical purpose, but rather assembles language such that it may be create new connections between previously unrelated practices. The opposition between poet and orator remains, for Stephen and for the novel itself, a problem for critical scrutiny and practical examination. Rhetorical and aesthetic practices may not be unified in the novel, but the work that results from their dialectical tension, suggests that the poet may bring together an audience through a reflection of the possibilities offered by aesthetic considerations.

Stephen's later refusal to sign MacCann's copy of the Tsar's pledge for universal peace can also be seen as an action based on a refusal—not simply to submit to the authority of the Tsar (though it is most certainly that)—but also as a refusal to commit to the political position of his colleague. By rejecting MacCann's request, he refuses to forge his name falsely on a document he believes is a sham. Through this refusal, he also performs an action consistent with the text's own evolving attitude toward the revisablility of a sense of political commitment.

Stephen does not refuse to sign because he opposes universal peace, but because he does not see the Tsar's form itself as a vehicle *for* universal peace. Instead, though he says, "the affair doesn't interest me in the least" readers of the 1904 "Portrait" know very well that the well-being of the world state is foremost in the mind of the young artist (197). For Stephen, Tsar Nicholas, the author of the pledge, is not a likely candidate for his allegiance since the Tsar is indeed less likely that he is himself to unite the masses against fraud and principality. Stephen cannot give his name to the Tsar's project because his name is already being given to another purpose. Almost restaging the way in which the 1904 artist was rebuffed for his own efforts to unite the masses, Stephen in *Portrait* rebuffs the efforts of the Tsar and MacCann as futile because they call for unrevisable and uncorrectable political ends. This is not to argue that Stephen's own political ideas lack a telos, but that Stephen's telos involves a mechanism of revision, correction, and change.

Is it not contradictory to Stephen's political perspective which contains the possibility of change and revision that he should hold the kinetic arts, the arts which evoke action and change, in such disdain? Stephen defines the esthetic emotion as one that arrests movement, as a static emotion. As he argues:

> The tragic emotion, in fact, is a face looking two ways, towards terror and toward pity, both of which are phases of it. You see I use the word *arrest.* I mean that the tragic emotion is static. Or rather the dramatic emotion is. The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire and loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something: loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. These are kinetic emotions. The arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are therefore improper arts. The esthetic emotion (I use the general term) is therefore static. The mind is arrested above desire and loathing. (*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* 205)

If his refusal to sign the pledge arises not solely from his sense of its insincerity but from his distaste for ideological stasis, how then could Stephen laud the esthetic stasis? Conversely, if the refusal to sign the pledge arises because it limits potential future action, how can Stephen degrade the arts that, ostensibly, engender future action? The dialectic between kinetic and static arts, as with kinetic and static political views, seems an irresolvable contradiction for Stephen and one that he is at length to delegitimate through a skillful oration against kinetic arts and a simple disregard for static politics. What aesthete of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries did not eschew the didactic arts and political stasis? Stephen's esthetics rest on his concept of arrested emotion—on a stasis which allows thoughts to emerge and arguments to locate themselves. The stasis that is afforded by the esthetic experience allows for a contemplative practice that extends beyond immediate questions of practicality and allows for an escape from ideological stasis. Rhetorical stasis—in the work of the Greek and Roman rhetoricians—is precisely the strategy for discovering the kind of question in dispute between two people so that appropriate responses may be invented.[36]

Stephen's objection to an overtly pointed political art arises from his distaste for an art that would require movement or political action beyond the contemplation afforded by aesthetic experience. Though in physics, stasis and kinesis are opposed, in rhetoric, the stasis of the orator (that is, the kinds of questions orators discover and on which their arguments are founded) and the kinetic movement (that is, either the oration itself or the action that follows the oration) are merely different aspects of the same persuasive art. Stephen's own esthetics are here grounded within the didactic—he is attempting to persuade Lynch to view static and kinetic arts as irreparably distinct. But Stephen cannot overcome the contradiction that enfolds his aspirations

toward the static within his own didactic oratory. In order to address, not resolve, the contradiction, Stephen must acknowledge that his art and his ideas regarding art emerge from the workshop of the oratorical, the disputatious, as well as essayistic. Whereas in *Stephen Hero,* Stephen attempted to clarify his position to himself, in *Portrait,* Stephen is attempting to clarify his position in a disputatious and dialogic encounter with Lynch. There is very little stasis in Stephen's argument.

Stephen's contradiction is more fully expressed in his conception of the rhythm of beauty that dissolves esthetic stasis (206). The word "rhythm" stands out as an unlikely agent in pursuing a line of argument on the stasis of beauty. Since rhythm hardly exists without movement, it is thus necessary for Stephen to insert the idea of the rhythmic into the cessation of stasis. Yet Stephen's definition of "rhythm" attempts to circumvent its more physical and kinetic manifestation. He defines rhythm as "the first formal aesthetic relation of part to part in any esthetic whole or of an esthetic whole to its part or parts or of any part to the esthetic whole of which it is a part" (206). Through a prosaically Aristotelian rhythm, Stephen marks rhythm as an entirely static event: at this moment, he evades the involvement of the subject in the rhythm of beauty. By effectively writing out the participation of the subject in the rhythm of beauty, Stephen is forced to inscribe the subject elsewhere.

It is from this relocated and reinscribed subject position that Stephen most forcefully rearticulates the projects of the 1904 "Portrait." Considering the previous versions of the novel, his comment that "We are right [..] and the others are wrong" becomes tinged with irony. As Stephen continues, he argues,

> To speak of these things and to try to understand their nature and, having understood it, to try slowly and humbly and constantly to express, to press out

> again, from the gross earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and colour which are the prison gates of our soul, an image of the beauty we have come to understand—that is art. (*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* 207)

Here Stephen's conception of art owes more to Shelley than to Aquinas. Among the multiple labours of the artist, Stephen argues that "to press out again" is the work of art, and at this moment, his conception that *variant in carmine vates* reemerges. It appears that Stephen has come to know, through a misreading of his Latin textbook, that the role of the artist is also the role of the expansive and expanding prophet. Though it would seem that the orator, who brings together (*contrahit*) has been entirely removed from the esthetic, instead, we must note that the orator has been repositioned within the text. He has not been hidden out of sight, or out of mind, but has been reinscribed as the orator himself, Stephen Dedalus.

As Stephen continues to argue, with Lynch's bemused interest, he rearticulates the division of the arts into lyric, epic, and dramatic forms in a manner similar to those which he had articulated in *Stephen Hero.* But newly, he adds

> The personality of the artist passes into the narration itself, flowing round and round the persons and the action like a vital sea. […] The dramatic form is reached when the vitality which has flowed and eddied round each person fills each person with such vital force that he or she assumes a proper and intangible esthetic life. The personality of the artist, at first a cry or a cadence or a mood and then a fluid and lambent narrative, finally refines itself out of existence, impersonalizes itself, so to speak. (*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* 215)

Like the artist or the God of creation, the orator and the essayist is "within or behind or beyond or above" the work (215). If the orator appears to have been written out of the text, it is because he has been written into it so wholly as to be inseparable from it. If he is at all capable of being indifferent, his indifference is predicated upon his being both in and different from the text. Whereas in *Stephen Hero,* Stephen wished "to express his name freely and fully for the benefit

of society" (146), in *Portrait,* Stephen wishes to obliterate it, and by obliterating it, incorporate it into everything. This process of impersonalization is a process of labor by which the artist becomes instantiated within the art, much like any worker in Marx and Engels view instantiates him or herself within the product of labour. It is significant that Stephen in *Portrait* uses the word "handiwork" to describe the object of artistic production, a word that does not appear in either earlier text. The choice of word in this pregnant passage is not arbitrary but motivated, since it marks Stephen's association of artistic labor with all other forms of manual labor. This process by which material work becomes the site of individual, social, and political awareness, augments Stephen's sense that the artist is everywhere in and around his handiwork.
Surely, his handiwork also makes room for the play of the artist "paring his fingernails", which also marks the hands of the artist as distinct, but nevertheless compatible, with the hands of other manual laborers.

Stephen's conversation regarding his sense of "Applied Aquinas" with Lynch in *Portrait* develops quite differently from his conversation of the same topic with Cranly in *Stephen Hero* in respect to his choice of an object to illustrate his theory. Whereas in *Stephen Hero,* Stephen illustrates his argument with the Ballast Office clock, during the similar scene in *Portrait,* Stephen illustrates his argument with the basket of the butcher's boy. Certainly, the Dublin locations of the two texts have changed. Whereas his conversation regarding the Ballast office clock takes place in the vicinity of the Ballast Office in Westmorland Street, his conversation with Lynch takes place between University College and the National Library. As Stephen and Lynch encounter the butcher boy in the vicinity of Merrion Square, Stephen instrumentalizes the basket as an object through which to explain his esthetic.

The change of the Ballast Office clock to the butcher's boy's basket illustrates that Stephen isn't distancing himself from an expression of his political views. Merrion Square remains a respectable residential area, quite different from the respectable business district on Westmoreland street. Though the change of setting may have been necessary since Stephen is now walking from the College to the National Library, the obvious fact remains that Joyce has moved Stephen's esthetic discussion from a commercial to a residential neighborhood. The basket, as an object, evades the sense of deferment with which his explanation of the clock was loaded. In addition, the basket and the boy are loaded with a sense of the grotesque. After all, Stephen points to "a basket which the butcher's boy had slung inverted on his head" (212). One would expect the basket to be untidy, at best, at worst filthy; so why would the butcher's boy place it inverted on his head? Undoubtedly, the boy has just made a delivery to one of the upper middle-class homes along the square. He is a servant to the wealthy. Stephen's choice of the basket, then is newly significant since it is an instrument of a poor, working-class boy making the rounds of an upper-class neighborhood.

A vulgar Marxist approach to this scene might argue that Stephen instrumentalizes the working-class butcher's boy in order to expand on a highfalutin subject that bears no relevance to the plight of the young worker who is carrying a filthy basket inverted on his head. I wish to distance myself from this type of reading, primarily because it overlooks the significance of the earliest essay in which Stephen foresees the emerging power of those like the butcher's boy. Instead, Stephen's illustration of his esthetic at this moment can be read as a continuation of the final paragraph of the earliest essay coupled with his enunciation of his esthetic in *Stephen Hero.* Because Stephen is examining a young man at work and the tools of his work, the observation of

the butcher's boy's basket evokes the earliest text's consideration of the labours of the confederate and fuses this with his esthetic contemplation of the Ballast Office clock in *Stephen Hero*. The zeal of the essay and the time needed to consider, reconsider, articulate and rearticulate this position are textually performed in his contemplation of the basket. Though these two earlier moments are written out of *Portrait,* in this scene, they are preserved inasmuch as the butcher's boy and his basket evoke both Stephen and the reader's contemplation of the world of toil and poverty that he inhabits.

In order to explain Stephen's consideration of the butcher's boy's basket as an object of aesthetic contemplation, it is helpful to invoke Jameson's two readings of Van Gogh's painting "A Pair of Boots." In his first reading, Jameson argues that the painting remains reified and unintelligible unless a spectator, as invited by the painting, can "reconstruct some initial situation out of which the finished work emerges."[37] The painting confronts an initial content of misery, poverty, and toil, but in a "Utopian gesture" transforms this content into a radiant and colorful painting by which a spectator views a tired image as reinvigorated. In his second reading, one that extends Heidegger's well-known reading of the same painting, Jameson views the painting as a wholly materialist mediating force between the "meaningless materiality" of the environmental world and the "meaning endowment" of history and the social world.[38] In both readings, Jameson insists on the transformation of the materiality of the boots into the materiality of paint and canvas. And by transforming these boots from one material form to another, Van Gogh enjoins a spectator to observe the historical conditions from which these boots arise and around which they revolve. They are neither isolated nor decorative objects disconnected from the material world, but objects that contain the world of labor beyond themselves. Both

readings, Jameson acknowledges are hermeneutic inasmuch as they read the painting as a "clue" or "symptom" of the material world which becomes the proper subject of the painting.[39] Though the worker is absent from the image, his or her entire life's work and the work of the world he or she inhabits, are made palpable through the vibrant materiality of the painting.

For Stephen Dedalus in *Portrait,* the butcher's boy's basket produces an effect similar to those that Jameson observes in Van Gogh's painting. The basket is not isolated from the world, nor does Stephen ignore the butcher's boy in his observation. The butcher's boy is "contained" by the basket insofar as it is slung over his head, but the basket also appears as an extension of the young man's body. The basket is intimately intertwined with the life and work of a child laborer engrossed in arduous, probably malodorous and bloody work. As Stephen explains to Lynch, in the first moment of esthetic apprehension, the basket must be isolated from the world around it—removed also from the butcher's boy. But this removal is temporary: it is removed only that it may be distinguished in its particularity, its parts assessed as combining as a harmonious object, and then finally ascertained as a discrete and radiant object of contemplation. The basket contains the world of the boy's toil, a world that is too obscure in its particular everyday operations to be understood as a part of the vast machinery in which it operates. Stephen's assessment of the basket, like Jameson's assessment of Van Gogh's painting, understands that the object has been removed from its everyday context, but also recognizes that this object is a symptom of a historical condition that can be elucidated through attentive deliberation.

If the butcher boy's basket is removed from its immediate and practical use in order to become an object of esthetic deliberation, it is also removed from its practical and proletarian

applications. But this removal is temporary, since Stephen does not fetishize the basket by divorcing it from the work that has motivated it as a practical object. It is removed so that it can be reclaimed. Carried over from the essay of "Portrait" is the sense that esthetic spectatorship is a form of assaying the constituent parts of any contemplative object. At this moment in the text, neither the readers nor Stephen are fully clear on what kinds of work can be done as a result of this essayistic process. The project of the 1904 essay sought to "reunite" a population, but at this moment, neither *Portrait* nor Stephen seem to share this goal. An annunciation of this project does emerge, however, by the conclusion of the text when Stephen attempts to transform himself from an esthetic essayist who pulls elements apart to an esthetic forger who melds them together.

Stephen's effort to explain his esthetic through the materials of Dublin's working-classes is part of an effort to draw newer connections where previous ones have revealed themselves as false. As he notes, "I was not myself as I am now, as I had to become" (240), Stephen also underscores the process of revision which is linked to Joyce's own process of revising "Portrait" into *Portrait.* At the same time, that the Joyce who wrote "Portrait" evolves into the Joyce who writes *Portrait,* the spectral presence of the earliest essayistic Joyce remains within the final published text as something present insofar as it has become rewritten. Despite the reality that the earlier essayistic work was rejected, and that Stephen Dedalus maintained that his essay was an explosive, *Portrait* still claims that the artist possesses a revolutionary zeal through "the only arms I have allowed myself to use—silence, exile, and cunning" (247). Dedalus, the character who rejects the overly didactic arts, replaces his earlier didacticism with a project of self-exploration that he believes will inspire critical reflection on behalf of his readers. The artist cannot blow up his audience: in fact, such violent metaphors are clearly rejected as crude and

ineffective tools compared to the potential exploratory power of narrative art. Stephen's announcement of his non-violent arms effectively invites his friend Cranly to take his own arm into his, which "thrills" him (247). Cranly is the first character to be persuaded by Stephen's rhetorical promise of ideological transformation through aesthetic contemplation.

Further, Stephen's intimacy with Cranly also suggests that Stephen's desire to create a union between aesthetic contemplation and a politically transformative agenda is persuasive. Stephen, holding onto Cranly, says, "I do not fear to be alone or to be spurned for another or to leave what I have to leave. I am not afraid to make a mistake, even a great mistake, even a lifelong mistake and perhaps as long as eternity too" (247). Stephen's acknowledgement that he will make mistakes does not condemn him to make them eternally; instead, by acknowledging error, Stephen also acknowledges his potential for harnessing his errors for the productive purpose of making corrections. But as Cranly suggests to Stephen the potential for sincere, noble and true friendship, Stephen remains uncertain if Cranly mentions his own friendship or that of another. He asks Cranly, "at length," "Of whom are you speaking?" (247). Stephen's alternative recognition and misrecognition of his intimate and aethetico-political connection with Cranly underscores the text's own work in recognizing and displacing the political work and social source of his esthetic. This moment shares an affinity with the alternate revelation and concealment of the dialogical relationship *Portrait* shares with its previous incarnations.

Stephen's dream near the conclusion of *Portrait* likewise conceals and reveals aspects of his concern for the community from which he is seeking to escape. As Stephen writes:

> A long curving gallery. From the floor ascend pillars of dark vapours. It is peopled by the images of fabulous kings set in stone. Their hands are folded upon their knees in token of weariness and their eyes are darkened for the errors of men go up before them forever as dark vapours. Strange figures advance from a cave.

> They are not as tall as men. One does not seem to stand quite apart from another. Their faces are phosphorescent with darker streaks. They peer at me and their eyes seem to ask me something. They do not speak. (*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* 249-250)

As with the Ballast office clock of *Stephen Hero,* and both the bird girl and the butcher boy's basket of *Portrait,* this dream evokes the Lacanian gaze in which Stephen perceives, albeit at a barely perceptible level, his own motivations and aims. The figures here appear subterranean, as figures that are just emerging from the darkness of the cave into the light of day. An appropriate question to ask of this passage is not, "what do they ask?" but rather, "what does Stephen imagine that they ask?" Stephen presents this dream as an epiphanic event in itself and refrains from providing his own analysis, perhaps thinking that the event speaks for itself. Yet its impressionistic nature does not expressly speak for itself, and it is imperative to continue to investigate the unspoken question whose answer will have life-altering results for Stephen. From the earlier texts of *Portrait,* we recall the evolving and recurring albeit more concealed desire to witness or bring forth a transformed multitude. In "Portrait" he would "give his word" to this multitude, and in *Stephen Hero* he would "express himself" for their benefit. In *Portrait,* he acknowledges their misery and their silence, and though he does not expressly say in the text that he will speak for them, this novel and the previous texts themselves may provide an answer to their problem.

As we move toward the conclusion of Stephen's diary, he announces that he desires "to press in my arms the loveliness which has not yet come into the world" (251). Here, Stephen articulates a significant revision of Joyce the essayist's conclusion to his own "Portraits." What was once solely a political desire is here reformulated as what appears as an aesthetic desire. Yet the political origin of this desire remains as part of the text's forbidden content—as a goal that

was once barely registered by Stephen, but now emerging more fully and consciously. The unconscious political cause of Stephen's desire, as announced in "Portrait" emerges displaced as a desire for loveliness, but the loveliness which has not come into the world is surely *engenderable there.* Thus, Stephen's final and oft-quoted conclusion carries the energy of all three versions of Joyce's "Portrait Cycle." As Stephen writes,

> Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race. (*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* 252-253)

The image of the forger augments the image of the essayist, as one who not only pulls apart and distinguishes, but one who reassembles and recreates life out of life. As he will announce in the Eumaeus episode, "Let us change the subject," Stephen concludes *Portrait* by announcing a change in his own labours, and consequently, in his own position as a subject. Though Joyce himself would later admit that he had lost interest in the subject of politics, the multiple revisions of *Portrait* testify that he remained committed to an evolving politics of the subject.

[1] For clarity and simplification, I will later be using the following abbreviations in this chapter: "Portrait" is exclusively used to indicate Joyce's 1904 essay "A Portrait of the Artist"; *Stephen Hero* will be indicated by its full title; *Portrait* indicates the 1916 publication of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man;* and "Portraits" is used as a convenience term to address all three texts.

[2] Lacan defines unconscious cause as a "*μηον* of the prohibition that brings to being an existent in spite of its non-advent, it is a function of the impossible on which a certainty is based" (*Seminar 11* 129).

[3] I agree with Friedman's argument that these three texts represent part of a larger text. However, I am interested in the way that Joyce saw these as part of a long process in creating one text, and yet the aspects of the earlier texts that are included in *Portrait* take the shape of a "return of the repressed." Can the earlier texts be both conscious and unconscious? They can, if the unconscious is to be found at the level of the surface text. Susan Stanford Friedman, "(Self) Censorship and the Making of Joyce's Modernism," *The Return of the Repressed,* ed. Susan Stanford Friedman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1993) 22.

[4] Richard Ellmann, 147. See also Chester G. Anderson, forward, "A Portrait of the Artist," by James Joyce. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (New York: Viking, 1964) 257.

[5] Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain. *The Workshop of Dedalus* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1964).

[6] Richard Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce* (New York: Oxford, 1977) 15. Also Ellmann, *James Joyce* 144.

[7] See Klaus Reichart, "The European Background of Joyce's Writing" *The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce.* ed. Derek Attridge (New York: Cambridge, 1990) 66; James Fairhall, *James Joyce and the Question of History* (New York: Cambridge, 1994) 50; David Weir, *Anarchy and Culture* (Amherst, MA: Massachusetts UP, 1997) 216.

[8] Theodor Adorno, "The Essay as Form." *The Adorno Reader.* ed. Brian O'Conner (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000) 92-93.

[9] Lukacs gives one definition of history as the preconditions of the present. See Lukacs, *The Historical Novel* 186-190.

[10] Friedman argues that the text forces Stephen's mother to assume a censoring role which, in the earlier draft, she would not (44).

[11] Joyce claimed to have read very little Marx, as Ellmann's biography attests. However, it is clear from "Portrait" that Joyce has read Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme.* Dominic Manganiello, *Joyce Politics* (London: Routledge, 1980) 70. See also David Weir 217; and James Fairhall 50.

[12] This argument has been used to demonstrate Marx's anti-anarchism and his own eschewal of the view that a proletarian culture can emerge fully grown on the stage of history. Perhaps Joyce is attuned to Marx's sense of the need for maturation. Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875; New York: International, 1986) 6.

[13] This interruption is necessary, though it moves the subject from one form of alienation to another. As Lacan writes, "The Oedipus complex means that the imaginary, in itself an incestuous and conflictual relation, is doomed to conflict and ruin. In order for the human being to be able to establish the most natural of relations, that between male and female, a third party has to intervene, one that is the image of something successful, the model of some harmony. […] There has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervention of the order of speech, that is, of the father" (*Seminar III* 96). See also Yannis Stavrakakis, *Lacan and the Political* (London: Routledge, 1999) 31.

[14] Jonathan Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2001).

[15] Precisely who those "prophets" were is unknown, although I find it quite likely that they would be Fabian Socialists and other more popular-minded socialists rather than political economists.

[16] In "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," Wilde writes, "The chief advantage that would result from the establishment of Socialism is, undoubtedly, the fact that Socialism would relieve us from that sordid necessity of living for others" and that "Socialism itself will be of value simply because it leads to Individualism." Oscar Wilde, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," Marxist Internet Archive, 20 July 2008 <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/wilde-oscar/soul-man/index.htm>.

[17] Freidman also argues that "in becoming more 'artful,' the final version may indeed subject the draft to the process of linguistic encoding analogous to the production of a dream out of the forbidden desires restricted to the unconscious. […] Representing 'the return of the repressed,' the draft version may contain a powerful and forbidden critique of the social order reflected in the final text" (28). My position differs from Friedman in that I view the later versions of Joyce's text as a continuation of the initial essay's political project that and that the later texts may indeed extend and relocate the initial political position, but do not negate them.

[18] The social contradiction that the narrative addresses must remain an absent cause because if the cause were known, it would dispel the effects of the text. Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1984) 82.

[19] This statement is common in Zizek who insists that the unconscious is not a secret hidden beneath any given manifest content, but interwoven throughout that content itself. The unconscious is always on the surface, though not visible until the proper viewing angle has been achieved. Slavoj Zizek, *The Plague of Fantasies* (New York: Verso, 1997) 3.

[20] To clarify my point, Engels does not think that the *tendezroman* is as politically effective a novelistic form as other forms, but he does acknowledge that it is the most polemic. I would like to realign slightly the view of *Portrait* to account for the ways in which it operates polemically *in addition to* its more common reading as a *bildungsroman.* Fredrich Engels, "To Margaret Harkness," *Marxist Literary Theory*. ed. Terry Eagleton and Drew Milne (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996) 36-41.

[21] In these moments, there does not appear to be a demand made other than for confirmation or condemnation. Zizek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology.* 5.

[22] Tony Thwaites, *Joycean Temporalities: Debts, Promises, and Countersignatures* (Gainseville, FL: Florida, 2001) 11.

[23] Louis Althusser. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," *Lenin and Philosophy* (New York: Monthly Review P, 2001) 118, 109.

[24] Thompson takes pragmatic, materialist exception to Althusser's theory of ideology. For Thompson, the theory of ideology cannot be reconciled with the self-production of consciousness through labor. E.P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory* (London: Merlin, 1978) 234-238.

[25] Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce* 90.

[26] Zizek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 49.

[27] For an overview of the epiphany and the history of its critical reception, see Morris Beja, "Epiphany and the Epiphanies," *A Companion to James Joyce Studies,* ed. Zack Bowen (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984) 707-25.

[28] Jacques Lacan, *Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.* Trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) 83.

[29] Lacan, *Seminar XI* 41, 74.

[30] I disagree with Tindall: *Stephen Hero* is certainly well-formed as a budding social realist novel. Why did Joyce abandon *Stephen Hero*? I argue that *Stephen Hero* did not embody enough of the duality and dialectical writing Joyce was trying to produce. *Stephen Hero* remains an un-ousted possibility in the interstices of *Portrait.* William York Tindall, *A Reader's Guide to James Joyce* (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1959) 102.

[31] Colin MacCabe. *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word.* 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2003) 61.

[32] MacCabe 61.

[33] John Paul Riquelme, *Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fictions: Oscillating Perspectives* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1983) 90.

[34] Ellmann, *James Joyce* 297. More importantly, for the definitive reading of *Portrait* as a series of developments, see Sidney Feshbach, "A Slow Dark Birth," *James Joyce Quarterly* 1.3 (1967): 289-300.

[35] See Don Gifford, *Joyce Annotated.* 2nd ed. (Berkeley: U of California P, 1982) 228; and Anderson, 522-23.

[36] For a more sustained definition of rhetorical stasis, see Hans Hohmann, "Stasis," *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric.* Ed. Thomas O. Sloane (New York: Oxford, 2001) 741-44.

[37] Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.* (Durham, NC: Duke, 1991) 7.

[38] Jameson, *Postmodernism.* 8.

[39] Jameson, *Postmodernism.* 8.

CHAPTER 4

"WE GAVE HIM THAT IDEA":

RHETORIC AT WORK AND PLAY IN "AEOLUS"

4.1 Debating Joyce's Rhetoric

In the concluding scene of "Aeolus," the seventh episode of *Ulysses,* after Stephen Dedalus has finished unfolding the perplexing vision of Dublin's paralysis he calls "*A Pisgah Sight of Palestine* or *The Parable of the Plums*," Professor MacHugh laughs and declares to his cohorts en-route to the pub, "We gave him that idea" (7.1060-61). The "idea" to which MacHugh directly refers is Stephen's recirculation of the image of Moses looking upon the Promised Land from his position as foreigner, which Stephen has borrowed from the oratorical demonstrations given in the newspaper offices by MacHugh and others. But MacHugh's observation resonates beyond its immediate enunciation to underscore and comment upon the episode's own treatment of the give-and-take relationship between the practitioners of rhetoric and the writers of fiction. As I hope to have shown in the previous chapter, rhetoric and poetics both attend to future possibilities, and Joyce's early experiments with rhetoric prefigure his later novels. Yet in the canons of Joyce criticism, Stephen's parable is regularly and conclusively read as a triumph of a legitimate art over the corrupt and devious arts of rhetoric and oratory: the genius of the artist has prevailed over the bafflegab of the rhetoricians.[1] But attending to this

moment with such critical finality tears apart the dialectical relationship between rhetoric and aesthetics and seems incongruous with the work of *Ulysses,* which unfailingly eschews privileging a monologic voice at the expense of others. It is a fanciful misconception to suggest that a parable can be solely a work of art (in and for itself) while disregarding its function as a rhetorical contrivance (an example made for others). As MacHugh notes that the young literary artist has taken the vehicle and materials of his art from the orators, journalists, and rhetoricians of the newsroom, so does the episode, with or without conscious intention, pronounce its own debt to the forms of rhetoric.

In my previous chapter, I sought to demonstrate the significance of Joyce's early political and personal essay "A Portrait of the Artist" as a rhetorical and textual forebear and irrepressible remainder in *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.* While the social and political significance of the initial essay and its manifesto-like conclusion may appear to be abrogated by the final revisions of *Portrait,* I have argued that the published novel extends and transforms the politics and rhetoric of its intellectual and compositional progenitor without effectively contradicting or negating them. But the published *Portrait* does not advertise or announce its polemical origins; the text bristles with its compositional history and produces a series of unexpected and unconventional rhetorical effects. Between the 1916 publication of *Portrait* and the 1922 publication of *Ulysses*, Joyce continued to revise his practice of novelistic experimentation and his sense of its functions. Inasmuch as the word "essay" is etymologically linked to experimentation, *Ulysses* can be read as a continuation of the essayistic tendencies figured and reconfigured in *Portrait.* While it is fruitful to read *Ulysses* as a continuation of the work in *Portrait,* it is also germane to consider the ways in which *Ulysses* is yet another revision

of the aesthetic, political, and rhetorical work of the earlier novel. In what may seem self-evident, from *Portrait* to *Ulysses,* Joyce has moved from a reworking of the essay form to stage a series of stylistic imitations of other linguistic and non-linguistic arts.

As *Portrait* extends and amplifies the essay form, so does *Ulysses* extend and amplify an array of discursive and aesthetic forms without negating or derogating them. Yet the essay form is not, itself, a significant formal ground for *Ulysses.* Thus, I will attend less to the significance of the essay and more to the novel's more discrete examination of and dialogue with the practice of oratory and the canons of rhetoric. "Aeolus" is as preoccupied with the disputes that inhere within the practices of rhetoric (i.e., its assumed monologism and its coercive applications) as it is consciously attentive to the friction that arises when experimental fictional prose narrative evokes a tradition of rhetorical practice and attempts to work rhetorically itself. Further, the socialist and internationalist preoccupations which stimulate the rhetoric of *Portrait* and its progenitors give way to a more historically specific rhetoric of public speeches and informal gossip surrounding Irish Home Rule and the politicization of Irish culture at the turn of the twentieth-century. Stephen Dedalus, the focal point for the narrative in *Portrait* and the first three episodes of *Ulysses,* is less central to the debates and discussion of "Aeolus," and is no longer privileged as the single voice of political or artistic reflection. I do not mean to imply that Stephen becomes a peripheral figure in the episode's rhetorical deliberations, but to take notice of the chorus of deliberating voices of which Stephen is one part, even if he does get the last word.

From the outset, I must mention that while *Ulysses* does not make the political concerns that inhere in Joyce's earlier novel its fundamental preoccupation; I also note that it does it

abandon them. "Aeolus" envisions and practices a rhetoric that expands language and its effects, extends political debate, embraces the ameliorative possibilities of deliberation, and reduces authorial coercion.[2] The rhetoric of *Ulysses* is a rhetoric of abundances; it presents a *copia* of discursive appeals and interpretative opportunities that contribute to political and national dialogue, but does not aim to answer them with authorial finality.[3] It is not a militant discourse in the service of a single didactic or political cause, but a complex of discourses that attend to complex national and international political causes. Andrew Gibson has straightforwardly articulated how Joyce's work is able to function politically without reducing the complexity of the problems it assays: "if anything is written all over Joyce's oeuvre, it is the refusal in principle of the 'quick-fix,' whether artistic, political, intellectual, or ethical. […] Joyce's work draws its readers into a labour that knows no end."[4] The rhetoric of "Aeolus," in particular, functions to eschew quick-fixes, and instead enjoins its readers to participate arduously in the debates regarding the politicization of Irish culture, the value of national industry, the merits of the Irish language, and a more tacit debate regarding the potential rhetorical work of literary art.

Though Stephen Dedalus in *Portrait* may have attempted to oppose rhetoric and aesthetics, Joyce does not. In his schema for *Ulysses,* Joyce lists "rhetoric" and "enthymeme" as the "art" and "technique" of the "Aeolus" episode. By locating rhetoric as a valuable and practicable art, Joyce's organizational arrangement is more closely allied to the view of rhetoric associated with Aristotle rather than Plato. In *Gorgias,* Plato lambastes rhetoric for flattering and damaging the soul by making weak arguments appear strong through the coercive and manipulative power of language. Rhetoric is assessed as a kind of intellectual and spiritual poison to which philosophy and dialectic are the proper antidotes.[5] Diverging from this position,

Aristotle writes that rhetoric is an art of discovering all the available means of persuasive speech, and the function of persuasive speech is to discover the means of finding reasonable probabilities rather than logically verifiable facts (*Rhetoric* 1354a). Rhetoric is not for Aristotle (as it is for Plato) a misguided and misguiding practice: instead, rhetoric functions as the counterpart to dialectic because it can produce arguments based on probability and make strong arguments appear more compelling than dialectic alone.

As Aristotle implies by twinning rhetoric and dialectic, rhetoric involves listening as well as speaking, and its practice as an exchange of arguments makes possible the production of knowledge through probability. Its practice can be monologic, but may also be part of a reasonable and sustained dialogue.[6] The rhetorical method of demonstrative argumentation—the enthymeme—does not uncover necessary or verifiable conclusions, only reasonable and probable conclusions where necessary conclusions cannot be discovered.[7] To exemplify an enthymemic syllogism by evoking a situation from the episode “Proteus”: if Stephen dislikes dogs, it is probable that he would not stop to talk with someone who owns a dog. It is a necessary conclusion that if he does not like dogs, he does not like the dog on the beach, but it is only probable (not necessary) that he would not stop to talk with the dog’s owner. While there may be many reasons why Stephen Dedalus does not talk to anyone on Sandymount Strand, this example of an enthymeme provides one admittedly simple but nevertheless possible explanation that is neither necessarily true nor untenably false. The enthymeme emerges as a salient discursive method for a rhetorically-themed episode of a novel because it is the medium of uncertainty: it resists unequivocal and totalizing claims about the Irish political climate at the turn of the century.[8]

The enthymeme, since it tends to omit one or several syllogistic propositions, requires the involvement of an audience to generate knowledge in the form of compelling probabilities. As Robert Spoo has argued in *James Joyce and the Language of History*, "enthymeme is 'incomplete' only in the sense that, as a form of probable reasoning, it requires the active mental participation of the audience in constructing the proofs by which that audience is persuaded; the successful enthymeme is one that arouses expectations which are satisfied in part by the listeners themselves" (118). Whether or not we are conscious of its call to deliberation, readers are enjoined to complete the rhetorical work of the episode by inhabiting the orations' enthymemic spaces and by evaluating and judging their various merits. Stephen Mailloux has argued that arguments presented through dramatized oratory in fiction position readers as listeners and as judges; novelistic dialogue invests readers with an important evaluative role as deliberators.[9] But if this is a textual practice common within the work of fiction by the early twentieth-century, then how does *Ulysses* put this practice into place or even attempt to transform it? The employment of rhetoric in *Ulysses* is less concerned with making readers despair over the inefficacy of oratory to provoke a desired action or to congratulate its successes along with its characters, but to position readers within historically and culturally specific oratorical pronouncements regarding Irish Home Rule and the possible future of Irish culture and language under self-government. In short, the rhetoric of the episode seeks to enable readers to see, as Aristotle articulates, "what the facts are" about the political and cultural climate of 1904 Dublin, especially in light of how a literate and intelligent working- and middle-class audience would debate them in a friendly but disputatious environment.

But since Spoo and Mailloux's assessments have already aimed to reclaim significant spaces for the rhetorical work of and within fiction, from where would or did a rupture occur between fiction and rhetoric in the first place? As Stephen Dedalus argues, "where there is a reconciliation," "there must have been first a sundering" (9.334-45). The evolving tension between practitioners of rhetoric, the writers of modern prose, and their readers has been effectively summarized by Kenneth Burke. In *Counter-Statement,* Burke writes:

> The reader of modern prose is ever on guard against "rhetoric," yet the word, by lexicographer's definition, refers but to "the use of language in such a way as to produce a desired impression upon the hearer or reader." […] In accordance with the definition we have cited, effective literature could be nothing else but rhetoric: thus the resistance to rhetoric *as* rhetoric must be due to a faulty diagnosis. To an extent, this resistance is a revolt against an over-emphasizing of the traditionally ceremonious (since inferior "rhetoricians," in their attempt to be "eloquent," confined themselves to such material as had been made "eloquent" by earlier and more talented artists). As artists no longer wish to produce the kinds of effect which the devices of the rhetoricians were designed to produce, they overshot the mark—and to turn against a specific method of specific rhetoricians, they persuaded themselves that they were turning against rhetoric *in toto.* Thus, since the rhetorical procedure had become identified as the art of appeal, the artist who chose to appeal in other ways felt that he had given up any attempt to appeal at all. […] [T]he one factor in keeping such denigration of form from doing great damage was the artist's tendency to preserve many more aspects of form than he was aware of. (*Counter-Statement* 110-11)

As this excerpt demonstrates, the antipathy toward rhetoric that arises among writers of modern prose (a category broad enough to encompass writers of fiction) results from the writers' sense that rhetoric reproduces a set of predictable and hackneyed effects. But the writers' and readers' position is a misreading of a more general practice of rhetoric because it is based upon a fractional and incomplete assessment of its practice: ceremonial or *epideictic* oratory. In an attempt to avoid recapitulating the rhetorical effects produced by the ceremonial orator, modern prose writers evade, rightly in Burke's estimation, one practice of rhetoric that has become

immobile and immobilizing. Yet the rejection of ceremonial discourse also, inadvertently and infelicitously, devalues and rejects all other practices of rhetoric as "the art of appeal" (note the singularity of "*the* art.") This does not equate to the death of rhetorical practice, however, since rhetoric survives regardless of a writer's attempt to banish it from the realm of prose writing. In Burke's sense, rhetoric is unavoidable: writing is inevitably a form of appeal, and even a writer who attempts to appeal in other ways is ironically attempting to appeal as a non-appeal. While a writer may "feel" that he or she has "given up any attempt to appeal at all," this feeling may be a self-indulgent fantasy. It is a counterintuitive practice indeed to produce intentionally and consistently unappealing writing in any form. But if the transparency of ceremonial styles of appeal has made these styles fusty and has filled an audience with suspicion and trepidation, then contemporary prose forms ought to make appeals by not appearing to make appeals at all. Appeals of any kind, to any action or deliberation become more tacit, hidden. It is an art to hide art (*ars est celere artem*), as Ovid, an artist for whom Joyce had a great affinity, wrote. In Joyce's terms, the artist may be refined from existence, from the concerns of the political and historical world, but this obliteration is the work of highly developed, systematic, and artful strategy. As the artist recedes, the illusion of the event-in-itself emerges. Further, the rhetorical engagement with political concerns within the work of fiction—what for Joyce should clearly be considered a work of art—are likewise less manifest but invariably present.

The conflict Burke notes between artists and rhetoricians is one that I have previously addressed in Stephen Dedalus's claim that rhetoric is a reductive practice whereas aesthetics is a enlarging practice: *contrahit orator, variant in carmine vates* ("the orator condenses where the artist expands") Stephen's claim is based on a partial and misrepresentational reading of his

prosody textbook and, as I have noted, *Portrait* as a novel labours to come to terms with the conflicting readings of this phrase. Yet Stephen's misreading helps him ground his political quest in terms of an aesthetic under the rubric of what he calls the static arts. The static arts, which encourage contemplation and do not coerce the spectator to act through an appeal to his or her passions, are considered superior to the kinetic arts, which, because they stir the passions to action, are considered vulgar and inferior. In the text of *Ulysses,* a reader confronts something akin to the static art Stephen Dedalus desires: an art that avoids didacticism by employing an abundance of discursive techniques and creates deliberation on the part of readers.

Because, as Burke suggests, rhetoric survives as a practice artists themselves do not know they are practicing (or are at pains to enshroud), rhetoric becomes an increasingly surreptitious activity that elides conscious application or rigorous scrutiny. In an attempt to make a break with the past, some modernist novelists may have also attempted to erase the rhetorical work and effects of the literature of the past. Virginia Woolf, who famously marked 1910 as a rupture with the past, also wrote disdainfully of the transparently coercive effects she saw at work in the novels from the first decade of the twentieth-century.[10] In her appraisal of Edwardian novels she wrote,

> What odd books they are! I wonder if we are right to call them books at all. For they leave one with so strange a feeling of incompleteness and dissatisfaction. In order to complete them it seems necessary to do something—to join a society, or, more desperately, to write a cheque. ("Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" 105)

For Woolf, Edwardian novels may be effectively written propaganda, but they are ineffectively written novels. Further, by stating that they are hardly classifiable as books, Woolf may be implying that they may be more readily classified as pamphlets or manifestos. Her appraisal of popular Edwardian writers as political propagandists exemplifies Burke's assessment of the

mistrustful attitude modern artists take in regard to rhetoric. Woolf detects political or social reformist *rhetoric* at work in the Edwardian novel, and this practice is anathema to the modern writer because, one must infer, valuable works of prose fiction cannot appeal to an audience's aesthetic and political sensibilities at the same time. For those who agree with Woolf, the Edwardians appeal in the most unappealing ways: either they write wonderful propaganda or they write insipid novels, they *cannot* write wonderful novels. In her own enthymemic argument, Woolf does not, any more than Joyce does in *Portrait,* deride the position that prose fiction has or should have progressively transformative social effects (or that the effects of a modern prose fiction are as much produced by rhetoric as the effects of social reformist fiction). Instead, she suggests that the prose fiction of her generation should create contemplative effects other than commitments to political movements or charity, and should discover new strategies of writing with which to fashion them. In "Aeolus," the novel presents multiple cases to the reader; readers take on an evaluative role; the reader deliberates as to whether or not the orations are worthy of action. The ends of the oratorical displays in "Aeolus" are certainly not to join a political party or donate to a cause, but to contemplate rhetorical strategies, weigh sound and meaning, and evaluate political or judicial decisions before launching into potentially disastrous or counterproductive actions.

If, as I have suggested, the art of rhetoric in *Ulysses* is not an appeal for a reader to take a particular action but to consider the consequences of potential actions, then the attitudes toward rhetoric within Joyce criticism seem exceptionally harsh. One strand of criticism regarding the rhetoric of "Aeolus" renders it as an antithesis of Joyce's own political positions. In *The Argument of* Ulysses, Stanley Sultan reads in "Aeolus" a lamentable situation for Irish culture in

which the rhetorician has replaced the poet as legislator and creator of public opinion.[11] Hence, Stephen's concluding "Parable" is, for Sultan, a round rejection of the hapless idealism and proto-nationalism of John F. Taylor's oratory. In a similar fashion, Daniel Schwarz in *Reading Joyce's* Ulysses argues that "the subject of *Ulysses* is the moral paralysis of Ireland, and Joyce's point in 'Aeolus' is that the most paralyzed are the people who are speaking of Ireland in empty and hyperbolic rhetoric" (117). Further, Schwarz writes that "'Aeolus' discredits the hyperbolic Irish rhetoric that depends on glib metaphors comparing the Irish with the Jews and the Egyptians with the English" (118). But what is a "glib metaphor" for Schwarz is likely not a glib metaphor for the characters in the newsroom. Both Sultan and Schwarz argue that "Aeolus" is an effort to reveal the machinations at work in rhetoric, to present it as a transparently dubious and misguided practice, and to reaffirm the gracefulness and fluidity of a true art that Joyce, through Stephen's art and Bloom's liberality, seeks to ensconce in its stead. Their attitudes are not isolated: the derogation of rhetoric as the inflated language of windbags is itself a rhetorical commonplace within the *copia* of *Ulysses* criticism. Additionally, "anti-rhetorical" readings foreclose the possibility that the rhetoric of the episode has a constructive value for the novel and, by extension, the course of Irish literature and history. A novel like *Ulysses* which, like its namesake, ostensibly travels in many directions would not delimit or devalue the direction in which rhetoric carries it. And if, by comparing the "windbags" of "Aeolus" to the bag of wind given Odysseus by the king of Aeolia, one must also recall that this bag of wind was, in part, responsible for one of his many twists and turns. So while a great deal of critical interest has been paid to the pernicious effects of rhetoric, a peculiar subtextual redemption narrative has stolen into view. Critics seek to reclaim art from rhetoric as Professor McHugh sees Stephen

attempting to "wrest the palm of beauty from Argive Helen" and "hand it to poor Penelope" (7.1038-39). This critical position relegates the art of rhetoric to the critical and historical rubbish bin, a peculiar place for an art which Joyce was at compositional pains to replicate and celebrate. But the episode doesn't want to throw rhetoric away—does not want to sanitize or purify artistic language from rhetoric precisely because it does *not* view rhetoric as a contaminant. Or, if it does view artistic language as contaminated by rhetoric, it wants to keep this language contaminated because this creates a more fecund ground for growing discursive possibilities. While the episode may contain voices that derogate the practice of rhetoric, it also voices a derogation of this derogation. This doubled critique allows for a dialogue to emerge about the functionality of political, judicial, and ceremonial oratory, and through this dialogue, the potential for a rhetoric infused with and informed by literary art can emerge.

4.2 The Speeches in the Newsroom

The events of "Aeolus," the seventh episode of *Ulysses*, take place in the offices of the *Freeman's Journal* and the *Evening Telegraph* near O'Connell Street in central Dublin. Characters come and go from the offices on assignments or to the pubs, and although the episode is set in a news office, few news writers appear in the episode (aside from Mr. O'Madden Burke and a brief appearance of the freelancing Joe Hynes). In the editor's office, Myles Crawford (the editor), Mr. O'Madden Burke (news writer) Simon Dedalus (no fixed occupation), Ned Lambert (retailer) Professor MacHugh (classicist), J.J. O'Molloy (lawyer), Lenehan (an itinerant sports writer and professional freeloader), and Stephen (a former teacher as of an hour ago) contemplate the past and present role of Irish journalism in Irish politics, and deliberate on the more general topic of successful and unsuccessful rhetoric.

At this point in the novel, midway through the episode, Stephen Dedalus has arrived at the *Telegraph* office to deliver Mr. Deasy's letter to the editor on foot and mouth disease after Leopold Bloom has left the office to procure an advertisement from Alexander Keyes. Bloom's work canvassing for the advert makes him absent for the most prominent series of events in the episode, a recapitulation of orations recited by a group of men at the office. He is, however, initially present to hear Ned Lambert read a particularly turgid speech given the previous evening by Dan Dawson, a local baker. Following Lambert's reading of Dawson's speech, Professor MacHugh presents an extemporary critique of Roman and English imperial culture from his position as a classicist in Dublin. J.J. O'Molloy then recounts Seymour Bushe's 1899 defense of Samuel Childs, a man on trial for allegedly murdering his brother. Professor MacHugh then recapitulates John F. Taylor's 1901 speech to the Trinity College debate society regarding the benefits of reviving the Irish language. Following these orations, the episode concludes with Stephen's own extemporary oration: "*A Pisgah Sight of Palestine* or *The Parable of the Plums*." As Joyce indicates in his schema, each recounted speech corresponds to a specific branch of oratory: Dawson's (ceremonial), Bushe's (forensic), and Taylor's (deliberative). Though neither MacHugh's speech nor Stephen's parable are accorded a branch of their own in Joyce's schema, they can be read as deliberative speeches, since each is setting out a vision of past or present events that will shape future actions. I will attend to each of the speeches and consider the ways in which the rhetorical forms are employed and discussed by the characters in the text, the historical and cultural questions they evoke, and the ways in which these forms are also on display for deliberation by the readers of *Ulysses.*

Ned Lambert reads excerpts of Dan Dawson's speech to the amusement and discomfort of his audience. Dawson's speech is presented in fragments as Ned is interrupted by a boisterous audience, by the journalistic "headlines" and by the narrative's intermittent rendering of Bloom's own thoughts. The interruptions suggest that the novel, like the characters themselves, does not want to grant Dawson's speech a significant monologic place.[12] Yet the interruptions do not refuse the voice of Dawson's position as much as they erratically prolong its presentation. The excerpt begins:

> *Or again note the meanderings of some purling rill as it babbles on its way, tho' quarrelling with the stony obstacles, to the tumbling waters of Neptune's blue domain, 'mid mossy banks, fanned by gentlest zephyrs, played on by the glorious sunlight or 'neath the shadows cast o'er its pensive bosom by the overarching leafage of the giants of the forest.* (*Ulysses* 7.243-47)

And it comes to an unfinished conclusion:

> *Or again if we but climb the serried mountain peaks […] towering on high, to bathe our souls […] As 'twere in the peerless panorama of Ireland's portfolio, unmatched, despite their wellpraised prototypes in other vaunted prized regions, for very beauty, of bosky grove and undulating plain and luscious pastureland of vernal green, steeped in the transcendent translucent glow of our mild mysterious Irish twilight* […] *That mantles the vista far and wide and wait till the glowing orb of the moon shine forth to irradiate her silver effulgence.* (*Ulysses* 7.296, 7.316-17, 7.320-24, 327-28)

For the characters in the news office, Dawson's speech is paraded as an example of dreadfully grandiloquent and ineffectual oratory: Ned's audience repeatedly asks him to stop reading from it. It is impossible from the except that Ned has read for anyone to discern any particular point to this speech. The text includes the following three headlines which also interrupt Ned's recitation: "SHORT BUT TO THE POINT"; "SAD"; and "HIS NATIVE DORIC." While the first two headlines refer to Bloom's question regarding Dawson's speech and his meditation on O'Molloy's fall from respectability, the third refers, idiosyncratically, to Dawson's Scottish

rather than Irish dialect (Gifford 134). But since Dawson is not Scottish, the arranger of the headlines is likely suggesting that Dawson's comments are not merely out of place, but that they are nonsensical because they are culturally and historically nonspecific.

Presumably, the audience in the newsroom knows where, when, and why Dan Dawson recited this speech, but *Ulysses* withholds this information from its readers. Without a context, readers are adrift in Dawson's speech because we do not know at what point in the speech we have entered or at what point we will leave it. Context might not help because readers are being led to believe that no one understands to whom or for what reason Dawson is delivering his paean. Yet this appears to be a textual bluff since there is indeed a salient political aspect to Dan Dawson's speech that is omitted by the text but understood by some of its listeners, especially Simon Dedalus.

Unlike the later oratorical recapitulations, there is no historical evidence for Dan Dawson ever delivering this particular speech. It was not printed in the *Freeman's Journal* on June 16, 1904 (Gifford 107). Len Platt has uncovered a speech by Charles Dawson (a baker nicknamed "Dan" and undoubtedly the same man) to the Limerick Industrial Association reprinted in the *Freeman's Journal* on April 7, 1904.[13] The historical speech printed in April differs significantly from the fictional speech Joyce has created for the *Freeman* on June 16.[14] The historical Dawson's speech is in fact a work of deliberative oratory, seeking to persuade an audience of manufacturers to create an exhibition of Irish industry. According to the *Freeman* of April 7, Charles Dawson proposed the creation of an exhibition that would "weld all energies into one united and irresistible organization to promote existing industries […], to search for and develop the boundless resources […] which lie buried in the fertile womb of earth, in the rivers

and mountains, in the rapid rivers which wash our coasts […].”[15] The speech continues to enlist a *copia* of the forces of nature which, allegedly, can be harnessed to “grow” Ireland through the forging of an industrial alliance and public exposition.

The novel transforms two major aspects of Charles Dawson’s speech: its rhetorical form and its persuasive intent. It is changed from a deliberative speech exhorting the mercantile class to exhibit its productive capabilities to the world to a ceremonial speech praising the paradisiacal beauties of the Irish landscape. Yet though the readers of the speech omit the industrial aspect of Dan Dawson’s speech (if there is one), amidst the “babbling” of the “purling rill,” the fiction’s language keeps the “hum of industry all over the land” (but displaces it onto a pastoral “industry of nature”) that the Charles Dawson desires. In the historical speech, Dawson wanted to convince his audience that displaying Irish industry to the world would promote further industrial development within Ireland. In *Ulysses,* Joyce has transformed the actual speech such that Dawson is no longer attempting to persuade an audience to put the industry of Ireland on display; Dawson is now putting on display the pastoral features of the Irish landscape without any recourse to deliberation or action to display anything.

In the novel, “Doughy Daw,” as Professor MacHugh calls him, has allegedly missed his mark (even though readers just don’t know, through the novel itself, what his mark may have been); Simon Dedalus succeeds finally in convincing Ned to stop reading: “life is too short” (7.330). If, through recourse to the extra-novelistic historical speech, Dan Dawson’s speech had intended to move a specific audience, the Limerick Industrial Association, to hold an Irish industrial exhibition, then Dawson has failed to achieve this end because his rhetorical strategy undercuts what it had set out to encourage: faster and more productive industrial growth. Instead

of inspiring a boom in industrial manufacture, Dawson extols the bounty of an unspoiled land. The effects are bathetic. Perhaps aware that the speech has put its emphasis in the wrong place, Simon sharpens the talons of his wit against Dawson's whetstone: "Agonizing Christ, wouldn't it give you a heartburn on your arse" (7.241). Simon's animosity toward Dawson may be grounded biographically by the fact that John Joyce (a source for Simon Dedalus) was replaced in his job as rate collector when the office was taken over by Charles Dawson.[16]

Bloom, like MacHugh, Simon, and Ned Lambert, thinks of Dawson's speech as "high falutin stuff," but he considers the office audience, not Dawson, as "Bladderbags" (7.260). Bloom has a different perspective on Dawson's speech from the others. As he knows, it may be "all very fine to jeer at it now in cold print but it goes down like hot cake that stuff" (7.338-39). Even in the midst of what appears as hopelessly overextended and highfalutin rhetoric, Bloom concedes that even Dawson's turgidity will have real intellectual and political consequences—either because of or despite the fact that Dawson manages inadvertently to praise an Irish agrarian paradise when he had wanted to develop an Irish industrial machine. In a moment that anticipates Stephen Dedalus's thought, "*Was Du verlachst wirst Du noch dienan*" ("what you laugh at you will serve nonetheless"), Bloom seems to think that belittling Dawson's rhetoric does not render its effects innocuous (9.491). Though the excerpt of Dan Dawson's speech read by the characters in "Aeolus" also omits the theme of industrialization in Charles Dawson's historical speech, Bloom is likely aware of the rest of the speech since he had purchased and presumably read the paper earlier in the day. At this instance, Bloom's perspective does not negate the feeling that Dawson's speech is injudiciously written and delivered. Instead, Bloom's perspective reveals that the land Dawson regales in his speech is a land that Dawson wants to

industrialize, mercantalize, and commidify in order to display. Thus when Bloom asks, "Whose land?", MacHugh says "Most pertinent question," while Simon Dedalus replies "Dan Dawson's land" (7.272-75). It is a land that they see becoming increasingly privatized and harvestable for exploitation by a professional and managerial class in an emerging capitalist Ireland. And it is no more belongs to these semi-employed and unemployed men than to the ostensible outsider Bloom.

Though in the narrative there appears to be little reason in Dawson's speech for the newsroom audience, the historical context of Charles Dawson's speech indicates that there are indeed important consequences of this rhetoric for the men in the newsroom. As I have already argued, Dawson conjures love and admiration for its pastoral and bucolic countryside where he intended to build up an international awareness of the developing Irish industries. He thereby produces a "back-to-the-land" oration to which an Irish audience like these news writers—who witnessed the ruin brought about by the agrarian economics of the nineteenth-century—would not assent. The audience in the news office, amid the din and whirl of printing presses and other machinery, do not necessarily oppose industrialization: they oppose Dawson's perspective of it. His speech may reveal a desire to build up a love for one's country on the part of his Irish audience, but he instead transforms that devotion into something saleable and the benefits of this, without doubt, they will not reap.

Yet several pertinent questions remain: for what rhetorical purpose is Dan Dawson's speech presented in the episode, and in what ways does the novel itself benefit from putting this speech on display? For the hearers of the speech in the novel (the characters), the speech is intended to amuse, bemuse, or provoke them. Is the intent the same for readers of *Ulysses* who

approach this passage? Critical appraisals of Dawson's speech seem most regularly to reproduce the sentiments expressed by the novel's characters. Instead of repeating Simon Dedalus's comments, for example, readers are encouraged to look more specifically at the politics that inform Dawson's speech even if—or especially because—it appears empty and innocuous. Readers are enjoined to occupy the clefts between the rhetorical and aesthetic aspects of the novel as well as the historical and fictional incongruities that point, albeit obliquely, toward the political work of the novel and its demonstration of oratory. My position is similar to that taken by Wolfgang Iser in *The Implied Reader* who, in regard to the indeterminacy created by the textual conflicts within "Aeolus" writes that "it is through these very conflicts, and the confrontation with the array of different possibilities, that the reader of such a text is given the impression that something does happen to him/her" (212-13). Whereas Iser is mainly concerned with the conflicts that arise from the inclusion of headlines in the episode, I am concerned with the conflicts that arise from the staged re-reading of an oration within the multivocality of the fiction. In this instance, an apparently apolitical speech reveals itself to be highly political, even though its political weight may appear to have sunk under the heft of its prolixity. When we read what appears to be a ceremonial speech, a speech given for no other purpose than to celebrate the skill of the speaker, we should recall Kenneth Burke's maxim in *A Rhetoric of Motives* regarding the autonomy of art: "whenever you find a doctrine of 'nonpolitical' esthetics affirmed with fervor, look for its politics" (28). Dawson's speech is included as a warning of this nature; not an object for derision, but for scrupulous attention. Though it carries the appearance of an apolitical or windy speech, it carries with it not the groaning of an unproductive nationalism, but the rumblings of further economic exploitation by capitalists.

As the news audience concludes their assault on Dawson's speech, Bloom leaves the office to conduct the only actual work done in the episode. Myles Crawford, by advising the newsboys to shut the door because "there's a hurricane blowing," indicates his own rejection of the speech's empty bluster (7.399-400). Crawford, keen on provoking MacHugh, points at the professor and sings from the popular aria "Twas Rank and Fame" from *Rose of Castile*: "*'Twas empire charmed thy heart"* […] "Eh? You bloody old Roman empire?" (7.471-72; Gifford 136). By suggesting that MacHugh has been seduced as a proponent of Empire by his studies in Roman history, Crawford also suggests that he has, by extension, become an apologist for the British Empire. J.J. O'Molloy attempts a brief defense for MacHugh's profession adding that "*Imperium romanum* […] sounds nobler than British or Brixton. The word reminds one somehow of fat in the fire" (7.478-79). The word "Brixton," which causes O'Molloy to bristle, leads Crawford to announce that, "We are the fat. You and I are the fat in the fire. We haven't got the chance of a snowball in hell" (7.481-82). Crawford's statement has multiple implications. It announces his pessimism about Irish resistance to British imperialism, ("snowball's chance in hell"), but also acknowledges that the Irish remain productively and problematically resistant to the homologizing influence of British imperialism ("we are the fat"). Additionally, Crawford's claim is coupled by his acknowledgment that he and O'Molloy have stirred the professor's resentment. His comment is met by MacHugh's attempt to assuage a room that is becoming heated.

MacHugh does not idly allow Crawford's barbs to go unchallenged. "We mustn't be led away by words, by sounds of words" (7.484-85). In its context within the dialogue, MacHugh refers to the sounds "*imperium,*" "Brixton," and of fat in the fire: through an analogy,

he announces that the Irish fat is not, in fact, simply burning away in the British fire. At the same time, MacHugh asserts that Irish cultural resistance to British imperialism does in fact frustrate the British plans to politically and culturally "cook" Ireland. The dialogue in "Aeolus," by adding fat to the fire, is contributing to a historically emerging disturbance in the Irish/British union. In the context of the rhetorical practice of the episode, to believe that the Irish life is merely dissolving would be to submit to a misleading trick of rhetorical tropes ("to be led away by words") without letting the rhetorical procedure of dialogue and debates examine the issue further (to fuel the fire of discussion). Further, the professor presents a defense of his own position and demands that the issue be deliberated further. MacHugh, though he is a classicist, does not sympathize with all aspects of Roman life or practice, and he attempts to articulate his dissent from Roman and British imperial practices to Crawford and the others. He argues that Roman civilization was

> Vast, I allow, but vile. Cloacae: sewers. The jews in the wilderness and on the mountaintop said: *It is meet to be here. Let us build an altar to Jehovah.* The Roman, like the Englishman who follows in his footsteps, brought to every new shore on which he set his foot (on our shore he never set it) only his cloacal obsession. He gazed about him in his toga and he said: *It is meet to be here. Let us construct a watercloset.* (*Ulysses* 7.489-95)

For MacHugh, the greatest achievements of imperial civilizations have been conveniences in transporting waste. Empires do not build demonstrations of their greatness as philosophers, poets, humanists, but testaments to their fixation on their own waste. For MacHugh, the British are fundamentally concerned with consumption and defecation: their concerns with Ireland are symptoms of their own imperial (and infantile) preoccupations. MacHugh does not return to the metaphor of the fat in the fire which Crawford has provided him. Instead, MacHugh replaces the metaphor of burning fat in the fire with the sludge in the sewers of civilization. Rather than

simply surveying the Irish political situation as a waste to be washed through British sewers, MacHugh argues that the sewers are themselves tokens of a degenerate and regressive cultural imagination.

But despite MacHugh's denigration of the machinery of Empire, he is no more amenable to the Irish cultural temperament as an ameliorative substitute for colonial power. He continues:

> We were always loyal to lost causes […]. Success for us is the death of the intellect and the imagination. We were never loyal to the successful. We serve them. I teach the blatant Latin language. I speak the tongue of a race whose mentality is the maxim: time is money. Material domination. *Domine!* Lord! Where is the spirituality? Lord Jesus? Lord Salisbury? A sofa in the westend club. But the Greek! (*Ulysses* 7.553-59)

MacHugh points to a contradiction in his own cultural consciousness, which he extends to his fellow auditors: he is loyal to lost causes but serves the successful. The sense of "we" in this moment seems paramount. Is he speaking of the Catholic lower- or middle-class, the professional class of educators and journalists, the Anglo-Irish, or simply the men with whom he is presently accompanied? It is most likely that MacHugh refers to the class of men with whom he is currently in dialogue, a professional class of teachers, writers, and lawyers who each, in their own way continue to serve British imperial interests though they are loyal to the "lost causes" that frustrate the ends of empire. Yet it is difficult for MacHugh (as much as it may be to his auditors who remain uncharacteristically silent during his speech) to announce precisely the form taken by a simultaneous loyalty to one position and servitude to another. His monologue is increasingly a dialogue with himself—an evolving critique of his own speech. He seems frustrated, incapable of bringing his oration to a conclusion. Like Stephen Dedalus who argues that Ireland is the servant of two masters (the Catholic Church and the British Empire), MacHugh also acknowledges the political and ideological binds that have constructed his

position as an itinerant classicist in 1904 Dublin. Yet he is resistant to these powers but unable to articulate precisely what he or his colleagues must do to escape from these constraints. He is frustrated with the ends of his own practice as a teacher: the purpose of teaching and learning Latin is not an end in itself, but a means by which cultural and economic exploitation is furthered. In the absence of noble, spiritual, or liberal humanist pursuits, he sees his own work impressed in the service of figures like Lord Salisbury, the former English Prime Minister who opposed Home Rule.

But though MacHugh expresses the frustration of his own incomplete hopes, he attempts to re-establish his life work within a lost but resurrectable tradition. As he continues,

> The closetmaker and cloacamaker will never be lords of our spirit. We are liege subjects of the catholic chivalry of Europe that foundered at Trafalgar and of the empire of the spirit, not an *imperium,* that went under with the Athenian fleets at Aegospotami. (*Ulysses* 7.564-68)

This anti-imperial oration is built upon his reference to the end of Greek civilization through the loss of the Athenian fleet. For MacHugh, the antidote to British imperialism is an anti-materialist and presumably liberal humanist project that recovers the democratic and aesthetic project of the Greeks. In a pathetic conclusion to his lecture, MacHugh "strode away from his audience to the window" (7.571). But MacHugh's audience does not assent to his spiritualist antidote, nor do they attend to the pathos which MacHugh's oration has managed to stir for his own mind. Three voices, O'Madden Burke's, Lenehan's and Stephen's each dissent from MacHugh's project, even though they decline to discuss the matter further. O'Madden Burke notes that each Greek attempt to reinvigorate the strength of Athens resulted in defeat. Lenehan who spitefully adds, "Boohoo," seems to be imitating MacHugh's emotional state as much as he provides a mocking lament for the fall of Athens. Lenehan's limerick belittles MacHugh's

melancholy, and Stephen recalls a caustic comment by Mulligan at the expense of MacHugh: "in mourning for Sallust" (7.583-84). It is unlikely that MacHugh mourns for Sallust as much as he mourns for the sense of integrity that he, rightly or wrongly, associates with Athenian political and cultural practices.

MacHugh's oration and the responses it elicits, like Dawson's oration, is registered in the text through a series of interruptions. Headlines, competing dialogues, character arrivals and departures, do not extend the length of MacHugh's speech, but extend the narrative time and space in which his oration is delivered. Again, as with Dawson's speech, the narrative elements that are interposed in MacHugh's speech from beginning to end do not invalidate the speech for a reader, even though characters appear to concentrate less on his speech. By the responses MacHugh elicits, it is clear that he has been heard and, to a lesser extent, understood. The textual interpolations do not negate MacHugh's oratory, and they certainly do not invalidate the import of his speech for those who continue to pay attention to it (even abbreviatedly). Readers encounter in "Aeolus" a frustration similar to MacHugh's: he desires to be heard, and we who read for his speech may view the additional textual elements as superfluous ornaments set upon the page by a narrative arranger who attempts to render the complexity of a bustling newsroom. The rhetorical space the novel affords an oration like MacHugh's is beset by crosswinds and alternate dialogues. So much so, that it is clear that the text places MacHugh's monologue in dialogue with the other voices of the episode. This is the peculiar effect of the rhetorical work of *Ulysses.* It allows a space for monologue insofar as that any character's monologue is set within the larger context of competing but affable textual dialogue.

When MacHugh returns from the window after presumably regaining his composure, he changes the subject from his own consideration of *imperium* to address the anarchistic fashion of the newly arrived Stephen and O'Madden Burke. "Paris, past and present [...]. You look like communards," MacHugh informs them (7.599). Stephen figures as a new dimension to the political and historical problems that MacHugh has been painfully unable to satisfy for himself. When J. J. O'Molloy asks them if they had shot the lord lieutenant of Finland, Stephen responds that they "were only thinking about it" (7.603). Spoo and David Weir have read Stephen's pronouncement as a desire to combat the power of the state with intellectual arms and philosophical explosives.[17] But since MacHugh has just returned within the circuit of conversation within the newsroom, it is also germane to read Stephen's response as a continuation of the text's own dialogue with MacHugh's speech. For the appearance of these two figures at a specific moment of MacHugh's political and pedagogical desperation suggests an alternative to both the Irish equivocation to British imperialism, and to the classical antidote to imperialism MacHugh wants but cannot find through liberal humanist instruction. As Spoo argues, Stephen does not associate himself with anarchist violence as a means of political change because he "is sworn to destroying religious and political institutions in a bloodless, Blakean coup of the mind and spirit" (20). Whereas the professor has come to a desperate inconclusive end regarding his and his fellow Irishmen's fate as servants of the empire who are loyal only to lost causes, Stephen's comment reinvests the professor's position with an alternative form of cultural resistance. The sense of helpless isolation made forcefully evident through MacHugh's temporary collapse is developed, in this scene, through Stephen's annunciation of the combative imagination.

The second dramatized oration takes place after Bloom has left the office to secure Keyes' advertisement and Stephen Dedalus has arrived. J.J. O'Molloy, whom Bloom considers a "mighthavebeen" with a failing practice and a mountain of gambling debts, recalls Seymour Bushe's defense of Samuel Childs, who was prosecuted for the murder of his brother. This murder had been the subject of discussion in the funeral procession in "Hades" as the carriage passed the Childs' house in Glasnevin. None of the men in the funeral procession who considered the murder case at that time are now present in the news office to hear O'Molloy's recitation of Bushe's concluding arguments. According to Ellmann, Joyce was present "in pursuit of rhetoric" at the trial in October 1899 (*JJ* 91). As Tom Power explains to Simon Dedalus in "Hades," Bushe was able to exonerate Childs from the charge of murder because "the crown had no evidence" (*Ulysses* 6.472). Historically, this is accurate, since Childs was prosecuted for his brother's murder only because he had a key to his house and had discovered his brother (*JJ* 756 n49). But what fascinates O'Molloy and his audience is not the evidence for or against Childs' alleged murder of his brother. Instead, they are preoccupied with Bushe's final statement in which he cites the Michelangelo's statue of Moses as a precedent for Childs' right to live. O'Molloy recites:

> *That stony effigy in frozen music, horned and terrible, of the human form divine, that eternal symbol of wisdom and of prophecy which, if aught that the imagination of the hand of the sculptor has wrought in marble of soultransfigured and soultransfiguring deserves to live, deserves to live.* (*Ulysses* 7.768-71)

Joyce redrafted Bushe's speech for *Ulysses,* but in the context of the narrative, O'Molloy—an ostensibly failed barrister—recites from memory a speech he had heard once five years before. Thus, one doubts that O'Molloy should be considered an unsuccessful rhetor himself. Even

Stephen, when asked by J.J. if he likes Bushe's speech, blushes, "his blood wooed by grace of language and gesture" (7.776).

Bushe's closing defense, as it is dramatized by O'Molloy, exemplifies an oft-lambasted style of forensic oratory precisely because it is not based on an appeal to the evidence at hand but an appeal to the emotions of his audience through an analogy to sculpture. Perhaps as skilled an orator as Bushe, knowing that there is no evidence linking Childs to the murder, may have felt that overemphasizing the lack of evidence could appear to a jury as overly aggressive to the state's handling of the case. Instead, through a brief but lyrical oration, Bushe argues that Childs deserves to live because the seemingly living statue of Michelangelo's Moses deserves to live.

Differing from Dawson's speech, Bushe's ornamental rhetoric does not collapse the weight of his argument. He invents an incredibly peculiar means of defending a potentially executable client, and though the appeal may appear illogical, the statement retains a complex coherence. Essentially, Bushe has argued that if a nonliving statue of Moses appears so much to be alive that it deserves to live, than the living man here, Childs, also deserves to live. Bushe's argument rests on enthymemic probabilities, couched, as it is, in conditional language (for example, if *x* should happen, then *y* should happen). Would any audience complete Bushe's enthymeme by claiming that Michelangelo's statue of Moses does not deserve to live? Tacitly, Bushe has flattered his audience's aesthetic sensibility which, undoubtedly, the audience then associates with their own good taste and intelligence. The case at hand—whether or not Childs deserves to live or die—is not suspended, but is redirected to address his audience's sense of their own good judgment. If a jury disagrees with Bushe's enthymeme, they would also by dint of a secondary enthymeme, invalidate their own value of and capability as judges.

At this moment, Bushe has confronted through judicial oratory the aesthetic problem of "interestedness" on the part of the spectator. As we already know, the art of Bushe's oratory is endowed with a specific interest: to "win" his argument by persuading a jury to exonerate Childs from the alleged murder of his brother. But the evocation of Moses' statue should not be seen as a mere flourish or an ornament to an argument. Instead, the argument about preserving the life of a defendant finds itself corroborated and legitimated through the recourse of the aesthetic. Through the living statue of Moses, Bushe evokes, either intentionally or unintentionally, the story of Pygmalion and Galatea.

For Giorgio Agamben, in a reading of Nietzsche's quarrel with the role of the spectator in the production and appreciation of art, the image of the living statue calls into question the significance of "disinterestedness" on the role of the artist. Considering Nietzsche's critique of the Kantian virtue of disinterestedness in the aesthetic experience, Agamben rearticulates Nietzsche's desire to displace an aesthetic grounded in the experience of a spectator with the interestedness of the artist. Agamben writes,

> Pygmalion, the sculptor who becomes so enamored of his creation as to wish that it belonged no longer to art but to life, is the symbol of this turn from the idea of disinterested beauty as a denominator of art to the idea of happiness, that is, of an unlimited growth and strengthening of the vital values, while the focal point of the reflection on art moves from the disinterested spectator to the interested artist. (*The Man Without Content* 2)

Agamben continues to argue that this does not constitute an aesthetic, properly (because an aesthetic must involve spectatorship), but that the story of Pygmalion reveals how the production of art holds a "promise of happiness." Yet this promise of happiness, which functions as a operating principle within artistic production, is also an excess of happiness which results in an experience of the "most uncanny" that threatens to destroy its maker (2, 5, 7). Art certainly has

effects for its creators insofar as they are producing their own lives (and deaths), and it is these effects which, as Agamben argues, causes a figure such as Plato to revere but also shun its power.

Stephen blushes when he hears Bushe's speech because he recognizes in its rhetoric the strains of his own sentiments on the aesthetic as they are expressed in *Portrait*: "to create life out of life" and "to press into my arms the loveliness which has not yet come into the world (*Portrait* 172, 251). Indeed, up to this moment in *Ulysses*, hearing this speech is one of the few pleasant experiences in Stephen's day. Though Stephen may be the only auditor who blushes, he is not the only one to be moved by the speech. When O'Madden Burke remarks, "the divine afflatus" he is referring both to Michelangelo's Moses and Bushe's speech (*Ulysses* 7.774). For the audience in the newsroom, Bushe's speech is not only an argument for the defense of Childs, but also an argument that validates his own practice that wills him as an orator—a practitioner of the art of oratory and, more generally, an artist. For O'Molloy, Bushe's speech is a "polished period" because it suggests multiple registers of artists and artistic products that are at work in its closing statement. At this moment in the narrative, we observe three registers of artists at work: Michelangelo (who crafts Moses); Bushe (who defends Childs via the sculpture of Moses) and O'Molloy (who ceremonially recites Bushe's defense of Childs through the sculpture of Moses). Though each of these speakers may seem increasingly distant from the initial import of the sculptor and his sculpture, the language of Bushe's speech announces that they continually practice an art through their own rhetorical deliberations. Bushe's speech and O'Molloy's recapitulation of it extend a practice of judicial rhetoric to encompass a broader (if more tacit) consideration of the importance of artistic production in determining legal judgments. Bushe is

not engaging in a kind of trickery by evoking the production of art. Instead, Bushe's speech attempts to invoke his audience not only as spectators, but as artists who are likewise willed into the service of critical responsibility through contemplation and deliberation.

After O'Molloy has received the accolades of his audience for his recitation of Bushe's speech, Professor MacHugh again returns to the foreground of the oratorical exposition, although at this moment, he does not continue his earlier monologue defending his occupation. Instead, MacHugh recites a speech delivered by the Irish barrister John F. Taylor to the college historical society on October 24, 1901. That Professor McHugh in 1904 can recall a speech given only once in 1901 and never officially recorded is not unrealistic. In his autobiography, Yeats recalls Taylor's performance, but to attest to the popular power of Taylor's oratory, he recalls overhearing a man "murmuring to another one of his speeches as I might some Elizabethan lyric that is in my very bones."[18] Though Taylor's speech was never fully published by any official or authoritative vehicle (either by the college, the debate society, or by Taylor himself), it was discussed in the October 25, 1901 *Freeman's Journal* and was circulated in different semi-official versions through Dublin between 1901 and 1905. According to Richard Ellmann, Joyce himself likely attended the college debate. Ellmann also explains that a private pamphlet entitled *The Language of the Outlaw* published in either 1904 or 1905 recapitulated a version of Taylor's speech, and that this speech had also been submitted by an unsigned letter to the *Manchester Guardian,* which reprinted it (*JJ* 35). The inclusion of Taylor's speech in *Ulysses,* the longest extra-textual moment in the text (even though Joyce has reworked the original), should not be considered merely as an exercise in debunking or devaluing its contributions to the debates regarding Irish culture or the emerging Irish nation. For Taylor's argument is granted

considerable space by the text and is as lauded by the audience in the newsroom as it was likewise lauded by the Dubliners who had heard it in one form or another for several years. In the episode, Taylor's speech appears as the most accomplished and compelling oration that the newsmen have heard.

As the professor explains, Taylor's speech was an extemporary rebuttal to Gerald Fitzgibbon's call for the Irish nation to accept with more deference the achievements and traditions, including the language and temperament, of the English (7.790-808). Though no extant version of Fitzgibbon's speech survives, it must have undoubtedly appeared as a defense of English and Anglo-Irish culture before an audience who were in no way unanimous in their opinion regarding the role of English culture and language in Irish daily life. In response to Fitzgibbon's call, Taylor presents a historical enthymeme that analogizes England's desire for Ireland's political and cultural compliance with ancient Egypt's similar desire for the pre-Exodus Israelites. Taylor's comparison enumerates the arguments of the Egyptian highpriest as follows:

> *Why will you* [Jews] *not accept our* [Egyptian] *culture, our religion and our language? You are a tribe of nomad herdsmen: we are a mighty people. You have no cities or wealth: our cities are hives of humanity and our galleys, trireme and quadririme, laden with all manner merchandise furrow the waters of the known globe. You have but emerged from primitive conditions: we have a literature, a priesthood, an agelong history and a polity.* […] *Israel is weak and few are her children: Egypt is an host and terrible are her arms. Vagrants and daylabourers are you called: the world trembles at our name.* (*Ulysses* 7.855-59)

Having established the argument regarding the ostensible benefits of the "Egyptianization" of the Jews (and by extension, the Anglicization of the Irish), Taylor concludes his speech:

> *But, ladies and gentlemen, had the youthful Moses listened to and accepted their view of life, had he bowed his head and bowed his will and bowed his spirit before that arrogant admonition he would never have brought the chosen people out of their house of bondage, nor followed the pillar of the cloud by day. He would never have spoken with the Eternal amid lightnings on Sinai's mountaintop*

> *nor ever have come down with the light of inspiration shining in his countenance and bearing in his arms the table of the law, graven in the language of the outlaw.* (*Ulysses* 7.862-69)

In his early study of *Ulysses,* Stuart Gilbert assesses Taylor's speech as rhetorically successful, but only through a considerably awkward and erroneous analogy. For Gilbert, Taylor's speech is undoubtedly eloquent, but logically marred though its recourse to *argumentum ad hominum* (an appeal to the Irish as a race), *argumentum ad fidem* (an appeal to Christian belief) , and *argumentum ad passiones* (an appeal to the auditors's sense of injustice).[19] Gilbert's assessment of Taylor's logical errors reinforces a reading of the rhetoric in the episode as a deviously disorienting practice. But returning to Aristotle's general and affirming claim that rhetorical practice allows disputants to see the facts before them, Taylor's speech is an effort to expose and critique the British cultural and political supremacy during the turn of the twentieth-century. Gilbert is not incorrect in pointing out the methods by which Taylor has presented his argument; however, Gilbert is incorrect to assume that these methods invalidate the political importance of Taylor's speech for the auditors in the newsroom and for readers of *Ulysses.* Taylor is not willfully endeavoring to mislead the Irish people; instead, he articulates a position that has as much validity as his opponent's position so that his audience can then decide whether or not they would choose to study the Irish language. For MacHugh, a professor of Latin and a speaker of English, Taylor's speech has not encouraged him to teach or speak Irish. But neither has MacHugh comfortably assimilated into English or Anglo-Irish ideology. MacHugh is representative of a figure who is enacts political resistance through observation, dialogic exchange, philosophical investigation, and a willingness to engage alternatives..

Even though Joyce may have attended Taylor's speech in 1901, in preparing and rewriting the speech for "Aeolus," he most likely referred to *The Language of the Outlaw.* The difference between Joyce's version of Taylor's speech in *Ulysses* and both the speech printed in *The Language of the Outlaw* and Yeats' own recollection of it have not previously been the subject of a sustained critical inquiry. I intend only to consider the divergences in the concluding sentiment of Taylor's speech. As printed in *The Language of the Outlaw* and preserved by Ellmann, Taylor concludes:

> 'And,' broke out the speaker, 'if Moses had listened to those arguments, what would have been the end? Would he ever have come down from the Mount with the light of God shining on his face and carrying in his hands the Tables of the Law written in the language of the outlaw?' (*The Consciousness of Joyce* 36)

Unlike the *Freeman's* and Yeats' own accounts, this version ends in a rhetorical question—an *erotesis*—rather than a statement. But one cannot claim legitimacy for one and not another version of this speech since there is no extant recording of Taylor's performance. Becoming deeply familiar with Taylor's speech through the pamphlet *The Language of the Outlaw,* Joyce would have read its final moment as a question. In *Ulysses,* and through the character of Professor McHugh, Joyce changes a question about the "language of the outlaw" into a statement. This change turns an enthymemic appeal to the audience (via the employment of the *erotesis*) into a more authoritative declamation. As the question "Would he ever have" in *The Language of the Outlaw* becomes rewritten in *Ulysses* as "*he would never have,"* the text grants greater weight to Taylor's underlying argument that great accomplishments can be built by a subordinate caste emerging from the shackles of an imperial civilization.

Joyce himself was not, as Andrew Gibson reminds readers, politically allied with Taylor's opinions regarding the importance of the Irish language, nor with the Gaelic League's

larger project to de-Anglicize Ireland (15). For Joyce, the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Revival appeared as anemic surrogates that had filled the Irish political vacuum following the defeat of Parnellism at the end of the nineteenth-century. Writing of the Gaelic League in his 1907 essay "Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages," Joyce considered the revival of the Irish language as more of an affectation than a politically advantageous achievement.

> The League organizes festivals, concerts, debates, and social gatherings at which the speaker of *beurla* (that is, English) feels like a fish out of water, lost in the midst of a crowd chatting away in a harsh, guttural tongue. Often on the streets groups of young people may be seen to pass speaking Irish perhaps a little more emphatically than is really necessary. ("Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages" 156)

In this passage, Joyce himself seems unenthusiastic about the role of the Irish language because it does not signify a viable form of political resistance. But in *Ulysses,* Joyce has not allowed his personal political position to overpower the debates in which political and cultural considerations are articulated and compared. Further, even though Joyce may have been unimpressed by the activities of the Gaelic League and with the political sentiments undergirding the closing of Taylor's speech, he was nonetheless impressed by the way in which Taylor as an orator was able to enthrall his immediate audience and captivate public opinion.

Joyce selected this speech specifically for his only audio recording of a passage from *Ulysses* and sent one of the thirty copies of the recording to his father.[20] Because of what appears to be his own fondness for this moment in the novel, a contradiction arises between Joyce's own pessimism regarding the Gaelic League's revival of the Irish language as a political practice and his decision to celebrate the rhetoric that identifies the Irish language as a cultural weapon in the fight against British Imperial domination. Stuart Gilbert, who explained Joyce's reason for recording this passage by saying that it was "the most rhetorical passage in the book

and thus the most easily reproducible," does not account for the contradiction that inheres in Joyce's own position and the novel's position in recapitulating Taylor's historical speech.[21] Joyce's decision to read this passage was certainly made from a sense of its rhetorical power, and the recording itself transforms the sense that "the language of the outlaw" is Irish or Hebrew to the sense that it is really the text of *Ulysses* itself. The "language of the outlaw" is not any particular language: English, Irish, Hebrew, or Egyptian. It is instead the antinomian language of resistance that can be articulated in any language against itself. While for Taylor, the Irish language is the "language of the outlaw," for readers of the novel, *Ulysses* itself emerges as the language of the outlaw. Joyce's recording of his own recomposition of Taylor's speech can be seen as an advertisement for the novel as a cultural assault on the homologizing forces of Empire, especially as these become manifested in language. It also displays a passage from *Ulysses* as an oration, and obliquely acknowledges that its own rhetorical work has been taken from and has transformed the rhetorical work of the political movements that had worked for de-Anglicization at the turn of the twentieth-century.

Within the larger framework of the novel's radical application and critique of a language of resistance, Taylor's speech furnishes a rhetorical figure that *Ulysses* then extends to encompass a practice that can be made in any language against its own laws. Gibson, who argues that Joyce's work originates from a primarily antagonistic perspective, views *Ulysses* as an uncompromising approach to history from the position of a colonial subject involved in a "political and cultural offensive." Gibson, intentionally or not, puns on the dual nature of Joyce's "offensive" novel: it is both a form of resistance and revenge against a colonial nation, and a stylistically and formally ribald "bull" that fouls as it celebrates the language itself (17).

But what makes Gibson's approach to Joyce's offensive work so compelling is his historical perspective that locates *Ulysses* in an English climate that is determined to create and preserve a tradition of "Englishness." *Ulysses* appeared on the world stage at a time when late-Victorian and Edwardian writers were preoccupied with the creation of an English national temperament, politics, and literature. Joyce's experiments with narrative, with concepts of national identity, and against ideological stasis appear all the more threatening and destabilizing because of this rigorous and ubiquitous English pursuit of a legitimate and coherent tradition (8-13).

MacHugh's performance of Taylor's speech continues in the newsroom without interruption. In the narrative, however, MacHugh's recitation is cleft by the interpolation of Stephen Dedalus's interior monologue. Stephen appears to be on guard against rhetoric (to import Kenneth Burke's phrase) as soon as MacHugh finishes his first segment of Taylor's speech. Stephen thinks: "Noble words coming. Look out. Could you try your hand at it yourself?" (7.836-37). But Stephen's comments are too ambiguous for a reader to ascribe a wholesale rejection of rhetorical practice on his part. Whereas Ellmann reads Stephen's interior monologue as a cynical rejection of the orator's art, Spoo reads the same scene as Stephen's own trepidation that he will be the next person asked to perform an oration but does not have a suitable speech in mind.[22] Stephen may indeed be preparing to enter the contest of speeches, but though he is wary of "noble words," it does not follow that he thinks all forms of rhetorical speech are invalid. As with the previous speeches, the textual interruptions do not negate the effects of the oration, nor does Stephen's comment wholly suggest that he is defending himself and his practice as an artist against the oratorical display he is now witnessing. While it is highly unlikely that Stephen would approve of the argument for a revival of the Irish language made

prominent in Taylor's speech, it does not follow that Stephen, in rejecting one particular oration, would mistakenly reject the entire art of oratory all together. Spoo has suggested that the passage from Augustine's *Confessions* that interrupts MacHugh's speech the second time is in fact Stephen's choice for a possible speech (Spoo 123). Stephen internally quotes:

> It was revealed to me that those things are good which yet are corrupted which neither if they were supremely good nor unless they were good could be corrupted. (*Ulysses* 7.842-44)

To paraphrase this passage, Augustine argues that "good" things may be defined as good only because they are potentially corruptible—and presently corrupt—because supremely good things are not corruptible and corrupt things are, and will always be, corrupt. The "good" is a hinge between the supremely good and the corrupt because it can never be supremely good, but need not always be corrupt.[23] Stephen may be commenting on Taylor's speech and may be rejecting the idea that *another* language can operate as an outlaw. Instead, it's a use of *outlaw English* that can wield revolutionary effects. For Spoo, Augustine's meditation on what may properly be defined as "good" may suggest that Stephen is attempting to locate a speech in which the impression of its quality already inheres. But this seems unlikely since Stephen finishes his thought by adding, "Ah, curse you! That's saint Augustine" (*Ulysses* 7.844). Also, here Spoo reads this excerpt as Stephen's psychological projection of MacHugh's possible hostile response to Stephen's attempt at an oration, I read this moment as Stephen's sense that he is an inadequate orator, that rhetoric is still a valuable practice, and that these under-employed men can be redeemed through their role as an intelligent deliberating public. For in an episode of mitigated successes, uncompleted goals, interrupted narratives, Stephen anticipates that this choice of an oration would not be good for this specific audience. Had he chosen to continue to quote from

Augustine, Stephen would have found himself uncharacteristically saying that "our God made all things to be very good" (*Confessions* 150) . This attitude does not correspond to the newsroom's assessment of the oratorical demonstrations nor to their political sensibility. More importantly, the passage from Augustine that Stephen does quote provides him with the thematic materials from which he will later construct his own oration.

For the text itself, Stephen's meditation on Augustine's sense of what is and is not "good" also underscores the position of political or deliberative rhetoric within the work of fiction. On the one hand, either rhetoric may be seen as already good; on the other hand, rhetoric may be seen as corrupt. In the first instance, there is no need for the novel to resuscitate an already viably breathing art form. In the second instance, the text may highlight the disposition in modern fiction writing that already views rhetoric as corrupt and may view its own project as one that may revivify an ailing rhetorical practice for implementation and extension within the field of novelistic discourse. But Stephen does not separate the good from the corrupt—and if he is to participate in the rhetorical exercises and become a rhetor, then he will have to employ it both as something good and as something corrupt. Because the episode presents examples of both polished and pedestrian, productive and seductive oratory, it neither derogates rhetoric as a corrupt practice nor elevates it as a supremely good practice. It does, however, embrace the contradiction between the two practices by allowing space for monologic voices within the framework of a multivocalic text.

As the professor concludes his oration, he adds, "that is oratory" to a noncontradicting audience (7.879). The narrative then presents Stephen Dedalus' internal monologue which is often read as Stephen's dislike of oratory:

> Gone with the wind. Hosts at Mullaghmast and Tara of the kings. Miles of ears of porches. The tribune's words, howled and scattered to the four winds. A people sheltered within his voice. Dead noise. Akasic records of all that ever anywhere wherever was. Love and laud him: me no more. (*Ulysses* 7.880-883)

In this excerpt, Stephen thinks neither of Taylor's speech nor of the image of Moses, in particular, but of the act of speechmaking in general and the "monster meetings" of Daniel O'Connell in the mid-nineteenth-century (Gifford 150). Stephen associates O'Connell to Moses by the fact that O'Connell's mobilization of Irish popular opinion to repeal the Act of Union was unsuccessful, and O'Connell did not live to see his "Promised Land" of an independent Ireland. Stephen appears particularly hostile to O'Connell's oratory: the "miles of ears of porches" suggest that O'Connell has, like Claudius in *Hamlet,* "poisoned" his brothers with "dead noise" and incomplete promises.

But Stephen may be expressing more than a disenchantment with O'Connell's orations. He also expresses his own disappointment in the failure of O'Connell's by suggesting that the noise of the "monster meetings" have been silenced. He also intimates that O'Connell's desire to speak politically for the needs of every Irish citizen has sown within itself the seeds of its own undoing. For O'Connell, who once sheltered a people, has now left those same people without shelter. Stephen admits to himself that he does not want to be "sheltered" by the single voice of a political leader. Stephen rejects he rejects the speeches made by O'Connell as an incomplete (and, to his mind, incompletable) attempt to politically unify the Irish consciousness. Stephen's discontent with O'Connell's speech is consistent with the rejection of servitude he promulgated in *Portrait* but seemingly out of place with his own willingness to give his word and forge a conscious for his race. But since O'Connell was a speechmaker and not a novelist, Stephen may think some of O'Connell's practices can be harnessed for literary work. Stephen also sees the

faithfulness on the part of many Irish citizens to O'Connell's memory as a faithfulness to a lost cause (which had been explained earlier by Professor MacHugh). Here, Stephen refers specifically to the fact that Irish popular opinion lauds oratory but denies artists an important voice in the creation of political or social ideology. For Stephen has never properly been "loved and lauded" by the population at large. Though this passage voices part of Stephen's resentment with the oratorical art, he instantly begins to formulate a way to meld rhetoric with his own practices.

Stephen's observation reveals his own feeling of helplessness and his sense of his own bifurcation as part orator and part novelist. He recapitulates his earlier feeling from "Proteus" when, fantasizing that he might be arrested, he proclaimed, "Other fellow did it, other me" (3.182). Additionally, this moment of self-questioning precedes his later comment in the National Library that, "As we, or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies, […], from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and from, so does the artist weave and unweave his image" (9.376-78). He does not think that he can provide a speech for this audience that would rank alongside those by Bushe, Taylor, or O'Connell. He moves that the men in the office now move to the pub. By this suggestion, Stephen is able to stall producing an original oration which he has been endeavoring to compose since MacHugh began his own (Spoo 124). As Stephen continues to develop an idea for his own speech, MacHugh provides an allusive political commentary to the speech he has just recited: "it has the prophetic vision. *Fuit Ilium!* The sack of windy Troy. Kingdoms of this world. The masters of the Mediterranean are fellaheen today" (7.909-11). By suggesting that empires crumble, it is likely that MacHugh here inspires Stephen's creation of his own oration.

But the text does not allow Stephen's oration to be rendered without interruption: it is divided by the text into seven sections, disrupted by the reappearance of Bloom, Bloom's interior monologue, Stephen's own interior monologue, the voices of the newsboys, the textual headlines, and multiple simultaneous conversations. Compared to the other orations in this episode, Stephen has the fewest auditors. Only Professor MacHugh manages to listen to Stephen's oration from its beginning to its end. It is significant that Stephen does not name his oration until after it has been completed. As it stands, his "vision" (as he calls it), does not properly seem to fit into any rhetorical category. Simply summarized, Stephen recounts a narrative in which two Dublin women climb to the top of Nelson's Pillar on O'Connell street in order to look down upon Dublin. Unable to look up or down from fear and dizziness, the two women stare directly ahead of themselves, eating plums and spitting the plum stones down below on the city street. By all appearances, Stephen has not produced a rhetorical oration at all but a kind of epiphany in which he sets forth a series of images without any specific persuasive agenda. MacHugh posits a title for Stephen's narrative: *Deus nobis haec otia fecit* (God has made this leisure for us). This title, taken from the first of Virgil's *Eclogues,* also calls forth the image of a leisurely musician piping in the shade of his tree. MacHugh is as much pointing to the form of Stephen's narrative as he is to the events of the two women atop the pillar. Stephen, however, claims a rhetorical purpose for his narrative by calling it "*A Pisgah Sight of Palestine*: or, *A Parable of the Plums*." Whereas MacHugh eagerly gave Stephen the title and position of the poet, Stephen, by characterizing his narrative as a parable, declines the role of poet (the Virgilian pastoralist) in this instance for the role of the orator (the speaker of parables).

It is significant that Stephen calls his speech a "vision" because unlike the speeches by Dawson, Bushe, and Taylor (each read by Ned Lambert, J.J. O'Molloy, and McHugh, respectively), Stephen has composed his own extemporary oration. As an orator, Stephen has discovered, invented, and delivered his own performance. Stephen's parable is a clever recasting and inverse of the biblical parable of the sower. The elderly virgins spit plum stones on the busy street below from atop Nelson's Column—a phallic monument to British imperial power—and no germination or growth will result. MacHugh understands the gist of Stephen's vision and emphasizes its bitterness: "You remind me of Antisthenes [...] a disciple of Gorgias, the sophist. It is said of him that none could tell if he were bitterer against others or himself" (7.1035-37). Stephen does not bristle when MacHugh identifies him as a kind of sophist—possibly because Stephen is aware that he has been engaging in a sophistic agon, but more likely because he accepts his position as a wandering, itinerant, intellectual speechmaker. Stephen's willingness to contribute to the speech contest and acceptance of a quasi-Sophist mantle allies him with the rhetoricians of the episode, it does not distance him from them. But as the only contributor of an original oration in the episode (aside from MacHugh's defense of Classicism), he has added an original aesthetic image dimension to the discussion. Stephen is less interested in trumping the rhetorical dialogue with an original work of art than he is in extending the sphere of rhetorical practice into the realm of aesthetic possibilities. Though Stephen's parable can be read as a comment on the infecundity of life in Dublin, it also opens up a myriad of other interpretive possibilities.

By presenting his original vision, Stephen adds greater complexity to the oratorical practices demonstrated up to this point in the episode.[24] This is a rhetoric of multiplicity which

twins the Aristotelian poetics of possibility with the deliberative function of rhetoric. Stephen's parable contains the potential for multiple contradictory readings, and because it is so gnomic, it requires the work of its hearers to argue and debate its significance. It is a rhetoric that demands participation on the part of its audience, rather than their passive allegiance to or dismissal of its position. For instance, Stephen may have chosen Nelson's Pillar as the site for his parable because it was one of the highest points in Dublin at the time, or because the characters are passing O'Connell Street (and the column) at this time. Or he may have chosen this site to signify that this symbol of foreign imperial might in the midst of the Irish capital shows that no growth is possible in Dublin under the shade of this monument. Myles Crawford, who works in this area and who is crossing the very street Stephen has mentioned in his parable wants to know, "Where did they get the plums?" (7.1050). Part of this conjecture may imply that Crawford wasn't listening to Stephen when he told them (they women bought the plums at the base of the pillar), or that Crawford has never seen plum sellers at the base of the pillar. But a more allegorical reading, in keeping with the form of the parable, suggests that these men themselves cannot bear fruit in the shadow of Nelson's Pillar—they themselves are the plums eaten and spit out by their fellow Irish citizens who have aligned themselves with English political objectives. If these intelligent but inactive, down-on-their-luck, semi-employed lunch-time tipplers are the plumstones, then they are the figures that Stephen's rhetoric is trying to assist. By providing these men with a kind of thought problem, he avoids reciting a monologic speech intended to persuade them of one political position or another. He motivates them to consider possibilities of meaning they must make through a conscious deliberative effort. And since the episode closes on their arrival at the pub, we cannot be certain what their conversation might be, but we can

conjecture that they spend at least some of their time wrangling over Stephen's parable, the plum stones, and the potential for growth in Dublin. In their pub chat, motivated by Stephen's vision, these men will undoubtedly deliberate over the future course of growth in Ireland.

Throughout this chapter, I have been arguing against readings that suggest that Stephen's parable is a triumph of art (narrative fiction) over rhetoric, and that the men in the episode are hopeless losers full of hot air. Instead, the figures of this episode are part of the wider community of deliberators who will inevitably make decisions that shape Ireland's future. This can only be done through a willingness to discuss the language of those who are making claims for the future direction of Irish history. For Joyce, rhetoric without aesthetics is indeed hot air; but aesthetics without rhetoric cannot find an audience and will not flourish in this political and historical climate. Joyce forges a connection between rhetoric and aesthetics in "Aeolus" to evade the limitations of both—the monologism of oratory and the political and stagnation and silence of aesthetic contemplation. Whether or not the episode can overcome these limitations depends entirely on a readerly commitment to discourse, dialogue and debate dramatized by the episode.

[1] I refer here to positions taken by Richard Ellmann in *Ulysses on the Liffey,* Stanley Sultan in *The Argument of* Ulysses and Daniel Schwarz in *Reading Joyce's Ulysses* (among others). These are representative views which have, in some ways, become pervasive in readings of rhetoric in the "Aeolus" episode. I will shortly address this position in more detail. One view that diverges from these and maintains the value of Joyce's view of rhetoric is M. J. C. Hodgart, who notes that the rhetoric of the episode "obscures neither the vivid figures of the debaters nor the strong key-images of the chapter." But Hodgart's view is not as common as the others. M. J. C. Hodgart, "Aeolus," *James Joyce's* Ulysses, ed. David Hayman and Clive Hart (Berkeley: U of California P, 1974) 130.

[2] Modernism's inability to leave rhetoric behind has been argued persuasively and at length by Wayne Booth. See Wayne Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983).

[3] The rhetorical concept of *copia,* which flourished before the seventeenth-century, argues that a plenitude of style enriches a speaker's presentation and argumentation. Though the concept of stylistic abundance had been a component of Roman rhetoricians (Quintilian, for example), Erasmus' 1512 *De Copia* provides a handbook for creating sentence variety. Books 7 and 8 of Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory* form the basis for what Erasmus takes as his larger project. Erasmus stresses variation through rhetorical tropes, but also provides examples for amplification, embellishment, and enlargement. For a more thorough sense of *copia,* see Ann Moss, "Copia," *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric,* ed. Thomas O. Sloane (New York: Oxford, 2001) 175-77.

[4] For Gibson, Joyce's work (and the work of reading Joyce) is absolutely a historical and political event, all the more so since Joyce's work expresses the multiple complex networks that inhere in any political situation—not the least in the complexity of turn-of-the-century Irish culture and politics. Andrew Gibson, *Joyce's Revenge* 18.

[5] For Plato, rhetoric is a kind of "knack" or ability rather than a legitimate, technical practice. He also argues that rhetoric creates pleasure and gratification, but that these things are ruinous to the listener who may be spirited away from knowledge by the power of words. Plato, *Gorgias,* Trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford, 1994) 28-29.

[6] Critics have commented on the lack of listening and attention to speaking in "Aeolus," but in my reading, I note that characters are indeed listening to one another, though not necessarily in the most attentive or approving way. Hugh Kenner, for instance, notes that rhetoric "corresponds as it blows though the episodes interstices, to a certain indifference on the part of the talkers, anonymous as the wind […]." Hugh Kenner, *Ulysses* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980) 63. Quoted in Schwarz 117.

[7] Robert Spoo has written at length regarding the enthymeme as a significant trope within "Aeolus," especially in the context of enjoining readers to complete the enthymemic project. See Robert Spoo, *James Joyce and the Language of History* (New York: Oxford, 1994) 118.

[8] Significantly, "Aeolus" asks more questions than it answers, and this may indicate the high level of uncertainty at work within the episode. What is the best speech read in the newsroom? What is the right action that will end Irish subjugation? What are the antidotes to imperialism? And more generally, what is the future for these intelligent, eloquent, and barely employed men? These are some of the open-ended problems left for deliberative contemplation.

[9] Mailloux provides specific examples using Twain's *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* to illustrate his claims. Nevertheless, I think his points can be applied to the debates and conversations in "Aeolus" as well as in other novels. Stephen Mailloux, *Rhetorical Power* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1989) 71-72.

[10] Woolf's quarrel with Edwardian writers like John Galsworthy, Arnold Bennett and H.G. Wells has, in many ways, proved disastrous to these writers. Woolf positioned herself and her generation as the new and vanguard, and literary history has assented: Galsworthy, Bennett and Wells are hardly ever labeled "modern," and with the exception of Wells' scientific romances and Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga,* little of their works remain in print at this time. See Virginia Woolf, "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown," *The Common Reader,* (1925; New York: Harvest, 1984) 105.

[11] Sultan's position seems grounded in the ancient debates between philosophy and democracy, especially as Plato configures them in his dialogues. For Sultan, as for Plato, rhetoricians and politicians are without knowledge. Poets (for Sultan) and philosophers (for Plato) are in possession of true knowledge—and the vast majority of people are willing to be persuaded by "lesser" figures who can please and pander to their senses. I can locate no passage in "Aeolus" where artistic language and production is transparently held in higher esteem than rhetorical production. I do, however, note that the value of these modes are objects for contemplation.

[12] Colin MacCabe has written about the use of headlines in "Aeolus" as something other than narrative interruptions. Through the headlines, "the subject can no longer take up a founding position outside his or her own discourses but is articulated within them." For MacCabe, the lack of central authority in the episode opens a space for the interpretation of discourse. Readers are enjoined to construct relationships. I agree with MacCabe, though I am more interested in the way that headlines add another discursive layer to the text in order to thicken the relationship between the dramatized rhetorical occasion and the text's aesthetic artifice. MacCabe 114, 117.

[13] Len Platt, "Pisgah Sights: The National Press and the Catholic Middle Class in 'Aeolus.'" *James Joyce Quarterly* 35.4 (1998) : 745 n 4.

[14] For the sake of clarity in the following discussion, I will use the name "Dan Dawson" to refer to the fictional character whose speech is being read in the newsroom by Ned Lambert. I will use the name "Charles Dawson" to refer to the historical person who delivered a speech in April 1904.

[15] *Freeman's Journal* 7 April 1904: 7. Reprinted Platt 745 n 4.

[16] Although John Joyce's jobs were various, frequent, and unstable, he was particularly proud of this position. Peter Costello, *James Joyce: The Years of Growth, 1882-1915* (New York: Pantheon, 1992) 117.

[17] This is certainly consistent with Stephen's pronouncement of his "arms" from *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.* See Robert Spoo 133. David Weir 215.

[18] William Butler Yeats, *Autobiographies* (New York: Scribner, 1999) 101.

[19] To some degree, Gilbert's assessment may be considered a significant historical starting place for the theoretical bifurcation between rhetoric and aesthetics as they are presented in the episode. Stuart Gilbert, *James Joyce's Ulysses,* 2nd ed. (1930; New York: Vintage, 1955) 188 n 1.

[20] John Wyse Jackson and Peter Costello, *John Stanislaus Joyce: The Voluminous Life and Genius of James Joyce's Father* (London: Fourth Estate, 1997) 397.

[21] There are several possible reasons why Joyce would have chosen to record a passage from *Ulysses* that he did not agree with politically. First, the speech may have been "reproducible" because it was intended to reproduce a piece of oratory, unlike much of the narrative in *Ulysses.* As a segment intended for public performance, this speech becomes a logical choice for a recording. At the same time, it strikes me as odd that Joyce would choose to reproduce a speech that he himself thought was politically misguided. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that Joyce preferred the grace and beauty of the language over the political import of the speech. On the other, and more in keeping with the arguments I hope to advance, Joyce withholds comment on the value or error of the speech and instead presents it as a subject for an audiences deliberation. See Stuart Gilbert 182 n 1.

[22] Richard Ellmann, *Ulysses on the Liffey* (New York: Oxford UP, 1986) 68-69. Also, see Spoo 123.

[23] Augustine's *Confessions* continue: "If [things] are deprived of all good, they surely do not exist at all." The position taken by Ellmann, that Stephen is lambasting rhetoric as a corrupt practice, still finds itself in the Platonic view that rhetoric may be redeemed when it is practiced by speakers who also possess knowledge and virtue. Aristotle's larger views on rhetoric coincide with the Augustinian idea that rhetoric is neither corrupt nor valuable outside of the

situations in which it is employed. Stephen's interior monologue, which I read as a comment on rhetoric, indeed sees rhetoric as something good but corrupt, since rhetoric can be employed for both ameliorative and deceitful ends. It is the deliberating public who must be on guard against deceit and must consider what speeches inspire the most beneficial and salubrious actions. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Philip Burton (1907; New York: Everyman, 2001) 150.

[24] Stephen's twinning of rhetoric and aesthetics has also been notices by Spoo who writes, "Stephen's 'vision,' as he calls his Parable, is certainly art, and closer to reality than anything he has produced hitherto, yet it draws unashamedly on the exoteric, contestatory impulses of rhetoric. […] Stephen's Parable is emblematic of Joyce's achievement from *Dubliners* on: the creation of fictions that sacrifice neither aesthetic vision nor historical reality—parables that deceive only those who cannot be persuaded in the first place" (134). But where Spoo see's the parable as something foreign and a resistance to his connection with the others (120), I see the parable as Stephen's way of extending their practices.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

"The pity is the public will demand and find a moral in my book."
James Joyce

"So I ask: Who the hell is this Joyce who demands so many waking hours of the few thousands I have still to live for a proper appreciation of his quirks and fancies and flashes of rendering?"
H. G. Wells
Letter to James Joyce

At the beginning of Plato's dialogue *Protagoras,* Socrates accompanies his young friend Hippocrates to the home of Callias to meet the sophist Protagoras who is surrounded by a group of other sophists and their students. As Socrates recounts his meeting with his group of sophists, he likens it to Odysseus' descent into Hades, and he quotes from *The Odyssey,* "'and after him I recognized', as Homer says […]. 'And then I saw Tantalus too […]'" (11). A meeting of the Sophists, the wandering teachers of oratory and 'excellence,' is a descent into hell for Socrates because he thinks of the sophists as men offering life skills for sale (like excellence, oratory, good character) that they themselves don't possess and don't understand. Unlike the sophists, Socrates thinks that wisdom, good sense, character, justice, and courage can't be taught unless they are all knotted together under the rigorous study and practice of inquiry and discussion (26-28, 66). For his part, Protagoras defends sophistry as an ancient art of education, but that

sophists have had to disguise their art out of fear that people would find them offensive toward the gods or to public opinion (12). Protagoras claims that, among others, the poets Homer and Hesiod were sophists because they persuaded young students to "abandon the society of others" (their families and fellow citizens) and associate with others (foreign teachers) for "their own improvement" (12). The poets, since they had painful truths to reveal about people, hid their meaning in a more palatable form which would be acceptable to the majority of people. Socrates doesn't disagree with this point (at least in this dialogue) but he does disagree that associating with sophists, specifically, will improve the wisdom and character of young students. Unlike the poets, the sophists don't disguise what they teach; but since they've brought their subjects into the light of day, they must account for whether or not they possess any useful knowledge about the subjects in which they claim expertise.

Stephen Dedalus in the "Aeolus" episode offers a contrapuntal example to Socrates' experience among the teachers and practitioners of oratory. As I hoped to demonstrate in the previous chapter, Stephen is not presented as an antithesis or enemy to the men of the newsroom or their oratory; instead, Stephen is another voice in debate and discussion who listens to, evaluates, and produces speeches that influence the development of Irish nation and culture. And neither Stephen nor the other characters have answers to the problems they have encountered (how should Irish industry develop, what is an empire, what is a just decision in a murder case, is a revival of the Irish language a valuable practice, is there a future for growth in Dublin?). But they do have time to consider the ramifications of these topics and time to create arguments and deliberate about them. Oratory, debate, and discussion are a major component of this process, and art, when added into the process of deliberation and decision-making, adds a

considerable component to stasis and reflection. Like Socrates, Stephen does not claim to possess knowledge, but unlike Socrates, he does not claim that the others certainly lack it. Whereas the sophists took the objects of their contemplative study out of their hiding places in poetry, Stephen wants to put them back into the realm of literary arts. This does not reduce literary art to a specific moralistic or didactic purpose. Instead, it saturates social and cultural critiques with the broadening and ambiguating influence of a linguistic practice unfettered by concerns for concise or moralizing language.

Throughout my examination, I have endeavored to show that rhetoric and politics are woven into the Joycean fabric, which is accordingly richer for their inclusion. Joyce's texts are indeed hostile to using the novel for propaganda or didactic purposes, but it is essential to abandon the association of these things with rhetoric. In drafting his earlier writing, Joyce was at pains to eliminate aspects of his fiction that appeared too transparent or single-minded, but this is not an effort to remove the rhetorical effects of his writing. Instead, Joyce's revision process throughout his early career found new ways to expand upon his early ideas and to experiment formally by recasting phrases and concepts to make them richer and more complex. It is an error to think that Joyce had rewritten his early ideas because they are too simple, too polemical or especially, "too rhetorical." The perspective that Joyce eschewed rhetoric has emerged after Joyce, perhaps in defense of Joyce's aesthetic projects as they announce themselves through his fiction. But rhetorical and aesthetic effects need not oppose the other. The harmful and tedious effects of rhetoric or aesthetics cannot be erased from their practices, but neither can their salubrious effects be erased. If we are to take one aspect, we must invariably involve the other. Joyce loathed the idea that his work would be read with intent to find a moral or a purpose. But

with or without Joyce's consent, critical history has found many divergent explanations of how Joyce's texts work their effects upon readers. Certainly, Joyce's books do not embody the same type of moral lessons that parables do, but their complex relationship to shared history and their own formal history offer examples of a dynamic and energetic working-through of political, psychological, and narratological difficulties.

For Joyce, the artist has a revolutionary, critical and contrarian attitude toward politics but nevertheless acknowledges that he or she is enmeshed in a world in which expression is always subject to control. Joyce said, "As an artist, I attach no importance to political conformity. […]. As an artist, I am against every state. Of course, I must recognize it, since indeed in all my dealings I come into contact with its institutions. The state is concentric, man is eccentric. Thence arises an eternal struggle" (Ellmann 446). As Joyce sees the conflict between the state and the individual, the state is a centralized, closed, circular entity. Man, on the other hand, lacks a center, remains open and non-circular. In order to speak about the historical realities that result from eccentric artistic impulses and the concentric impulses of the state, the artist employs—willingly or unwittingly—a discursive mode that embodies this tension. Though Joyce lamented that readers would invariably look for a "moral" in *Ulysses*, the novel, as well as Joyce's other novels, resist and evade didactic moralizing precisely because they present multiple conflicting perspectives in tension with each other without offering definite, locatable resolutions. Art and aesthetics are not divorced from politics, but neither can they engage politics directly without losing their ability to assess or create the world as it may become. Rhetoric may figure as a mediating force between aesthetics and politics because rhetoric also makes arguments about future possibilities based on the facts of the present. Joyce's rhetoric,

then, is a non-dogmatic, non-teleological rhetoric of multiple perspectives aimed at the possibilities of political transformation through artistic endeavor.

Early in his career as a writer, Joyce described himself as a socialist artist, but, as I have written, Joyce was never officially affiliated with a specific socialist party or movement. This may contribute a partial explanation as to why Joyce avoids presenting political didacticism directly in his fiction, but we can locate a more substantial explanation in Joyce's adherence to an aesthetic practice that emphasizes contemplation before action and intellectual rather than physical force. Stephen's drunken encounter with Private Carr in the "Circe" episode articulates the position of the intellectual combatant in the face of physical violence. Speaking to Private Carr, Stephen says:

> You die for your country. Suppose. […] Not that I wish it for you. But I say: Let my country die for me. Up to the present it has done so. I didn't want it to die. Damn death. Long live life! (*Ulysses* 15.4472-75)

This is the most directly politically polemical Stephen has been throughout *Ulysses,* and at the moment of violent conflict between himself and a British soldier, Stephen speaks in an "eccentric" (rather than concentric) rhetoric which attempts to bring living men—not nations—into contact with each other. But Carr, whose nation is the aspect of this life which binds his identity, is entirely concentric. Stephen, who is drunk, can't muster his most effective rhetoric for Carr, and unfortunately for Stephen, Private Carr is only more confused and agitated by Stephen. Stephen's speech has failed to work on Private Carr, but it certainly does not fail to leave a significant impression on the novel's readers. It is a powerful speech of frustration with Ireland, a desire for peace, and a confirmation of the drives which will life forward. For the novel, Stephen's speech articulates a tacit desire to replace his dead country with the living

subject who will act and grow in its place. Who or what these subjects will be like and the type of world they will live in cannot be answered by Joyce's fiction. Instead, Joyce's fictions posit a staging ground for the eccentric (de-centered and unconventional) language that pulls apart false connections that have destroyed possible futures and different experiences.

The Dublin of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century into which Joyce was born and from which he would physically flee (though never abandon) was greatly divided in its opinions of its past, its conception of its present, and the course of its future. The lifestyles, religion, language, or habits qualified specifically as "Irish" were always contentious and under revision. Joyce's writing suggests that finding an answer to these considerations would only provide a fantasy that would cover the multiple antagonistic perspectives that were actually under debate. Joyce did not see salubrious effects in the Irish language movement or in a nationalist movement heavily tied to the church. The only sphere where he could find a potential outlet for his own political dissatisfaction, contrarian, and revolutionary tendencies was in the sphere of literary art. Joyce had said of *Ulysses* that if Dublin were ever destroyed, his novel could be used to rebuild it. But the Dublin that would be rebuilt would not be Dublin's Dublin, but a very distinct, idealized Dublin which had been the subject of Joyce's study, fantasy, animosity and desire since his expatriation in 1904. It was in part, an effort to recreate life as it had been live, but also, and more importantly, life as it could have been lived. Throughout his career, Joyce became increasingly interested in creating a language as it could be spoken, history as it could have happened, the novel as it could be written, and the world as it could be experienced. Joyce's commitment to linguistic and historic experimentation was matched by his

commitment to studying the same objects multiple times and by creating a rhetorical and narrative form that could give a voice to unvoiced possibilities.

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